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ABSTRACT: 
 
 
 
 
Michael Everett Roettger:  Three Essays on Inequality and the U.S. Criminal Justice System 
 
(Under the direction of Ted Mouw) 
 
 
 This dissertation uses three essays to examine issues related to inequality and the U.S. 
criminal justice system.   
In the first essay, I examine links between arrest, residential segregation, and immigration 
within U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  This research addresses two separate, but 
contemporary fields of research where a) increased crime is associated with highly segregated urban 
black ghettoes and b) decreased crime is observed among immigrant groups.  Data for race and ethnic 
populations for MSAs are aggregated from 5% integrated public-use micro-samples [IPUMS] of the 
U.S. Census surveys from 1980-2000; data for arrest rates are taken from FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports from 1980-2000.  Results from fixed effect models find statistically significant results 
indicating (i) African American social isolation positively correlates with arrest rates and (ii) 
immigrant groups are differentially correlated with arrest rates based on immigrant race and ethnic 
classification.  
In the second essay, I examine the effects of race and history of incarceration on employment 
among less-skilled men.  Recent findings of audit and employer surveys have found that African 
Americans and ex-offenders are groups who, respectively, are less likely to be hired than whites and 
non-offenders.  Expanding on prior research, I use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
 ii
of Youth to test if labor force participation and unemployment are jointly impacted by race and 
history of incarceration.  To control for unobserved invariant characteristics of individuals and 
interview periods, I utilize fixed effect error terms at the individual level.  Results indicate that, 
relative to whites, African American and Hispanic ex-felons are more likely to experience persisting 
unemployment and time out of the labor force in years after incarceration.    
In the third essay, I examine how genetic, individual, familial, and community-level variables 
possibly mediate a link between father’s incarceration and adult son’s deviance and arrest.  Using 
twin and nationally-representative sub-samples from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent 
Health, I test how molecular genetic, individual, familial, and community variables from adolescence 
may mediate this link.  In analysis, father’s incarceration is found to be robustly associated with 
increased delinquency and arrest among adult sons when these effects are estimated.    
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Raised in a rural county of Eastern Tennessee, some of my earliest memories involve 
pleasant trips to the state’s largest natural area, Frozen Head State Park.  The trips involved a 
winding road through a narrow valley owned by the state.  The drive was notable for two things: 
the rugged contours and undisturbed wilderness of the Cumberland Mountains, and the presence 
of two of the state’s oldest prisons.  The beauty of the natural land stood in stark contrast to the 
razor-wire fences, guard towers, and gray concrete buildings.  
Today, the freedom and beauty of the state park resting next to the grim, confining reality 
of the prison resonates with how I relate crime and inequality in U.S. society.  In the post-Civil 
Rights Era, the total jailed and incarcerated population in the U.S. has quadrupled in the last four 
decades, growing from 250,000 in 1970 to 2.25 million individuals in 2006 (Harrison and Beck 
2006).  As Figure 1 illustrates, the incarceration rate between1980 and 2006 has grown well 
outside the range of earlier decades (Western 2006), increasing by nearly a factor of five from 
midcentury, even with the rapid increases in the U.S. population.  Incarceration impacts large 
proportions of the U.S. population, especially racial minorities.  Today, one-third of black males, 
17% of Hispanic males, and 5% of white males will spend one year or more in prison during 
their lifespan (Bonczar 2003).  Uggen, Manza and Thompson (2006) have recently estimated that 
16 million men, including 5.5 million African American males, possessed a felony conviction in 
2004.  As Uggen and Manza (2006) and Western (2006) have recently argued, the rise of mass 
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punishment and incarceration fundamentally contradicts the ideas 
 
of equality and opportunity.  In broadest terms, the question I address is how the construct of the 
prison relates to the “freedom” and “opportunities” in the areas of society where the prison does 
not exist.  In these essays, by examining patterns of crime and incarceration, I make small 
attempts to relate the inequality resulting from these seemingly unrelated, but closely present 
social constructs.   
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Recent studies have failed to conclusively link general trends in income inequality with 
prison growth (Western 2006).  Nevertheless, the impact of incarceration on offenders, families, 
and societies is substantial.  Empirically, incarceration is linked to decreases in offender earnings 
and employment, (Western and Pettit 2005; Pager 2003; Edleman, Holzer, and Offner 2006), 
negative effects on children and families (Western, Loopo, and MacLanahan 2004; Johnson and 
Waldfogel 2002), a disproportionate impact on minorities (Pettit and Western 2004; Wacquaint 
2001; Bonczar 2003), increased loss of voting rights (Uggen and Manza 2002), a 60% chance of 
recidivism within three years of release, and intergenerational patterns that link father’s 
incarceration with adult son’s delinquency and arrest (Roettger 2006).  In combination, these sets 
of factors generate substantial penalties for individuals, families, and communities where ex-
offenders work and live. 
 In criminological research, a well-established empirical association exists between crime 
and inequality.  In urban metropolitan areas, increases in violent crime have been linked with 
unemployment, poverty, and residential segregation since the late 19th century (Du Bois 1996 
[1898]; Land McCall and Cohen 1990; Massey and Denton 1994; Myrdal 1944/1945; Sampson, 
Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005; Wilson 1987, 1996).  The relationship between crime and 
inequality is magnified with large fines, legal costs, and other expenses associated with criminal 
justice system (Mauer 2003; Reimer 2003); welfare laws that require non-resident fathers to pay 
$40 to $200 weekly in child support while working at minimum wage (Holzer, Offner and 
Sorenson 2005; Edleman, Holzer, and Offner 2006); the difficulty of those with criminal records 
finding employment in the formal labor market (Pager 2003), 60% rates of recidivism for ex-
inmates within three years of prison release; disproportional incarceration of less-educated men 
and minorities (Edleman, Holzer, and Offner 2006; Mincy, Lewis, and Han 2006); and lack of 
4
 
 
educational and work opportunities that provide meaningful alternatives for non-offending in 
adolescence (McLeod 1995; Hannon 2003).  These issues create a durable inequality that 
increases propensities of individuals to engage in repeated criminal behaviors.    
   The racial disparities in incarceration also help to exacerbate existing racial inequality in 
the U.S.  Since 1900, African American males have been incarcerated at four to six times the rate 
of white males in the U.S.; currently, 60% of black male high school dropouts will experience 
incarceration by age 45, while only 10% of white male high school dropouts will experience 
incarceration during this same period (Pettit and Western 2004; Western 2006).  Some racial 
theorists such as Loic Wacquaint (2001) have argued that incarceration forms the basis of a new 
racial system that incarcerates black men while leaving black women to raise families at 
subsistence.  In Black Sexual Politics, Patricia Hill Collins (2005) argues that disproportional 
incarceration of blacks is a result of a new paradigm for controlling the threat of black violence 
against white women after elimination of segregation.  This racial disparity does not simply 
reflect current native population.  For immigrants assimilating into American culture, research 
suggests that skin color greatly impacts likelihood of being incarcerated.  For example, Portes 
and Raumbaut (2001) have found that Hispanic immigrant groups with darker skin tones such as 
West Indies Blacks and some Puerto Ricans have higher incarceration rates related to Hispanics 
with lighter skin coloration.    
  In completing this dissertation, I will extend these bodies of research in three essays.  
Using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I test how incarceration changes 
employment patterns among a set of less-skilled men.  Extending prior research from my 
master’s thesis, I use sibling and nationally representative samples from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health) to examine how familial and 
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community variables influence intergenerational crime and arrest among sons with fathers 
serving time in jail or prison.  Finally, I utilize data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports and U.S. 
Census data to examine how residential segregation and immigration may explain crime and 
arrest patterns observed in major metropolitan areas.  Thus, I contribute to understanding how 
incarceration generates long-term inequality, extend research in the intersection of racial theory 
and criminology, and test how intergenerational crime may be explained by genetic, individual, 
community and familial variables.  
 
Dissertation Format & Overview 
For this dissertation, I have chosen the university’s three-essay format.  The essays in this 
dissertation are on: (1) spatial analysis of the link between crime, residential segregation, and 
immigration within U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs); (2) effects of race and history of 
incarceration on employment among less-skilled men; and (3) effects of race and history of 
incarceration on employment among less-skilled men.  Each essay is intended for journal 
publication.  Although completion of this project involved usage of a number of data sets and 
theoretical frames, my goal in completing the work was to address the larger issues of inequality 
and its causes and the causes/consequences of incarceration.  Through use of secondary data 
sources, I attempt to address these issues by applying quantitative methods to inequality resulting 
from crime and incarceration. 
In the first dissertation essay, I conduct spatial analysis of the link among arrest, residential 
segregation, and immigration within U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  This research 
addresses two separate but contemporary fields of research that indicate associations between a) 
increased crime associated with highly segregated urban black ghettoes (Massey and Denton 1994) 
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and b) decreased crime rates observed among immigrant groups (Sampson, Morenoff and 
Raudenbush 2005).  Data for race and ethnic populations for MSAs in the sample are taken from 5% 
integrated public-use micro-samples [IPUMS] of the U.S. Census for census periods 1980-2000; data 
for arrest rates are taken from FBI Uniform Crime Reports from 1980-2000.  In the sample, results 
from fixed effect models find statistically significant results indicating (i) an increase in black social 
isolation is associated with increased arrest rates and (ii) immigrant groups are differentially 
correlated with arrest rates based on immigrant race and ethnic classification.  A key methodological 
contribution of this paper is the usage of panel data with MSA-level fixed effects to model 
longitudinal changes in arrest rates within MSAs.   
In the second essay, I examine the effects of race and history of incarceration on employment 
among less-skilled men.  Recent findings of audit and employer studies by Pager and colleagues 
(Pager 2003; Pager and Quillian 2005; Pager and Western 2005) and Holzer, Rapheal, and Stolls 
(2004) have observed that African Americans and ex-offenders are groups that, respectively, are less 
likely to be hired than whites and non-offenders.  Expanding on Bruce Western’s (2002) work on 
wage trajectories and Raphael’s (2006) analysis of employment after incarceration, I use data from 
the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to test if labor force participation and 
unemployment are jointly impacted by race and history of incarceration.  To control for unobserved 
invariant characteristics of individuals and periods, I utilize fixed effect error terms for individuals 
and interview sample-years.  By interacting racial classification with employment changes of 
individuals with known criminal histories, I find that race and history of incarceration jointly impact 
time respondents spend out of the labor force.  
In the final essay, I examine if genetic, individual, familial, and community-level variables 
mediate a link between father’s incarceration and adult son’s deviance and arrest.  In prior research, I 
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have found that adult sons of incarcerated biological fathers are 92% more likely than children 
without an incarcerated biological father to be arrested as an adult (Roettger 2006). In this essay, I 
use sibling and nationally-representative sub-samples data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Adolescent Health (Add Health) to test how molecular genetic, individual, familial, and community 
variables from adolescence may explain this link.  In analysis, father’s incarceration is found to be 
robustly associated with increased delinquency and arrest among adult sons.  Extending statistical 
models developed by Guang Guo for longitudinal sibling analysis (Guo and Wang 2002; Guo and 
Tong 2006) and applied to molecular genetic predictors of delinquency (Guo, Roettger, and Shih 
2007; Guo et. al 2008b; Guo, Roettger, and Cai 2008), this dissertation essay is among the first to 
examine intergenerational patterns of delinquency alongside molecular genetic variables.  In using a 
nationally-representative sample of young men, the essay is also unique in providing a representative 
estimate for how father’s history of incarceration correlates with increased delinquency and risk of 
arrest among young men in the U.S.   
 
IRB Adherence 
All previously-collected, publicly-available data are exempt from oversight by UNC IRB 
Guidelines found in 45 CFR part 46.  Data for the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79), the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS) are publicly-available samples, and are exempt from oversight by the Institutional 
Review Board at UNC.  Access to the restricted sub-sample of National Longitudinal Survey of 
Adolescent Health has been previously granted to me conditioned on (1) my status as a doctoral 
student at the University and (2) my adherence to established guidelines for ensuring privacy of 
respondents under the direction of Ted Mouw.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
 
 
 
Immigration, African American Segregation, and Crime Changes in U.S. 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 1980-2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A decade ago, William Julius Wilson (1996) analyzed crime in Chicago neighborhoods 
where urban ghettoes of high unemployment and poverty were associated with a host of negative 
outcomes, including drug use, violent crime, dropping out of high school, and chronic 
unemployment.  Wilson’s analysis demonstrated that African Americans suffered greatly from 
living within such urban ghettoes.  Along with Wilson’s contemporary research, much work has 
been directed towards understanding and documenting the consequences of segregation.  A key 
thread in this research has been the spatial mismatch between jobs and African Americans 
(Dworak-Fisher 2004; Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006; Massey and Denton 1994; Mouw 
2000; Wilson 1987, 1996).  Recent research has noted the high disparities in incarceration 
observed between blacks and whites, with an association of crime to low wages and high 
unemployment.  Though research has linked the spatial mismatch of jobs with residential and 
social segregation of blacks from jobs (Dworak-Fisher 2004; Mouw 2000, 2002), the link 
between residential segregation and crime has historically been explained as a consequence of 
discrimination, disparity, and inequality (Anderson 1990b, 1999; Drake and Cayton 1993 [1945]; 
Du Bois 1996 [1899]; MacLeod 1995b; Newman 2000).  Leading economic theories help 
support this idea, with crime being treated as a rational alternative to legitimate labor market 
activities (Becker 1968).   
A separate contemporary line of research has linked immigration with criminal behavior.  
This strand of research, however, focuses on the strong negative correlation of crime with 
immigrant status (Sampson, Morenoff, and Raudenbush 2005) or on crime as a measure for 
assimilation either into the mainstream economy or urban underclass based on existing racial 
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classifications (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waters 1996).  Reid et al. (2005) have used spatial 
data to show lack-of-correlation between crime and immigration, with effects for Asian 
immigrants showing a negative correlation with crime, to test popular Nativist arguments that 
immigrants commit more crime than non-immigrants.  Using U.S. Census data, Butcher and 
Phiel (2006) have found that immigrants are less likely than non-immigrants to be incarcerated, 
explaining this difference by tough deportation laws for immigrants.  This linkage of crime and 
immigration, however, has not been fully linked with general theories of race and ethnicity in the 
study of crime and deviance (Mears 2001; Reid et al. 2005; Sampson and Laub 2005; Sampson, 
Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).   
The studies linking segregation of blacks with crime and the negative association of 
immigrants with criminal behavior raise an interesting question: to what extent may crime be 
explained by the simultaneous appearance of segregation of black males and the presence of 
immigrant populations?  Historic sociological research has linked the struggle of immigrants and 
blacks for jobs and the spatial and social segregation of blacks and immigrant groups in urban 
centers (Cayton and Drake [1945] 1993; Du Bois 1996 [1899]; Ignatiev 1997; Massey and 
Denton 1994; Roediger 1999, 2005; Waldinger 1996).  With the arrival of South, Central, and 
Eastern European immigrant groups into the U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th century, the 
contemporaneous development of heavily populated and segregated urban slums occurred in 
major U.S. metropolitan centers for both immigrants and African Americans (Lieberson 1980; 
Steinberg 1989).  This trend continues today, with ethnic groups such as Cubans, Mexicans, and 
Vietnamese segregated into ‘ethnic enclaves,’ while the continued segregation of African 
Americans still occurs (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; 
Waldinger 1996; Wilson 1996).  The relationship between crime and populations of immigrants 
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and blacks may be purely spurious, or may be a possible outcome of spatial mismatch of African 
Americans with job availability.  However, if black segregation and emergence of immigrants 
both significantly correlate with changes in crime, this would suggest that patterns of 
immigration and segregation are related.   
To test these hypotheses, I combine metropolitan data for arrest from the FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports with U.S. Census data for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) from the 
decennial census.  FBI Crime arrest rates are readily available for analysis.  The decennial census 
available for IPUMS provides a rich array of race and employment variables.  Fixed effect 
models are used to control for unobserved, time-invariant variables that may influence arrest 
rates within counties.  By using fixed-effects models to control for unobserved, time-invariant 
characteristics, I test if changes in immigration and segregation are significant in predicting 
crime and arrest within MSA’s.   
 
Explaining Crime, Race, and Immigration 
In a recent study, Sampson et al. (2005) empirically demonstrated that first and second-
generation immigrants commit less crime than non-immigrants and that racial differentials in 
crime are also largely explained by generic community-level variables (education, poverty, etc.).  
Using data from this Chicago survey and also macro-data on crime and immigration for the U.S., 
Sampson’s (2006) recent New York Times editorial argued that crime rates in the U.S. have 
declined with influxes of international migrants beginning in the 1980’s.  While this theory of 
crime runs contrary to common Nativist theories arguing that immigrant groups contribute to 
overall increases in crime rates (Hagan and Palloni 1998; Mears 2001), immigrant groups who 
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successfully assimilate into American society, in fact, exhibit lower levels of crime than U.S.-
born natives (Reid et al. 2005; Sampson et al. 2005).  Hispanics with darker skin colorations 
(which include large percentages of Puerto Ricans or West Indies blacks in the segmented 
assimilation literature) and African immigrants are exceptions, converging to crime rates 
exhibited by African Americans after the first generation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waters 
1994, 1996).   
Why might crime be generally negatively associated with immigration, but vary among 
those commonly classified in American society as blacks, whites and of Hispanic origin?1  As I 
will outline below, the general relationship between crime and immigration may be spurious, or 
suggest a more complicated relationship between crime and immigration patterns that vary by 
both race and ethnic status.  Sampson, Morenuff, and Raudenbush (2005) have shown that this 
trend holds for violent crimes among first and second generation Mexican Immigrants in 
Chicago neighborhoods, but third-generation Mexican Americans behave similarly to native 
whites and Hispanics when immigration and SES variables are included in analysis.  While 
groundbreaking, Sampson et al.’s (2005) study does not explain why Mexican immigrants are 
associated with lower levels of violence while Puerto Rican immigrants are associated with 
higher levels of violence.  In fact, first and second-generation Puerto Rican and other Latino 
males are associated with relative higher crime rates (p<0.01) relative to all other immigrant 
groups, including Mexican Hispanics (Sampson et. al 2005, pg 228-229).  Sampson et al. 
                                                 
1  For this paper, racial classification is a single-category measure from self-reported identity that can be measured 
consistently across the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Censuses.  This methodology, while consistent with racial 
classification present in government reports such as the Bureau of Justice Statistics (e.g., Bonczar 2003), has a 
number of limitations.  Issues of multiple racial identity, treatment based on skin color, and/or differences in cultural 
values may substantively differentiate treatment/outcomes observed across racial groups.  Lee and Bean (2004) 
discuss demographic trends for racial groups in the U.S., along with large, emerging subsets of individuals claiming 
multiple racial categories. 
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attribute causes of racial disparities in violent crime rates to general structural conditions such as 
disparities in education and poverty, but do not develop the issue of Hispanic ethnic origin.  In 
doing so, their work does not fully address the differences of race and ethnic origin.    
Similarly, Reid et al. (2005) have found that crime is negatively correlated with Asian-
born populations and is statistically non-significant among other immigrant groups in a cross-
sectional analysis of U.S. cities. Their research contradicts popular cultural arguments among 
non-immigrant majorities that immigrants are linked to violent and non-violent crimes. However, 
this study falls short of fully testing the process of immigration by not interpreting findings based 
on immigrant’s race and ethnic status. Reid et al. also do not address the issue of racial 
segregation in explaining crime.  Similarly, Reid et al. fail to control for unobserved, time-
invariant heterogeneity across cities and incorporate panel data for longitudinal analysis.  Usage 
of panel data for major U.S. cities that controls for the effects of international migration and 
black segregation on arrest can address many of the shortcomings of this study, while also 
providing a general test for associations between crime and immigration. 
In addition to the adoption of panel data, segmented assimilation theory may also provide 
additional insights into why crime rates vary by an immigrant’s ethnic origin and [U.S.] racial 
classification.  Segmented assimilation theorists such as Mary Waters (1996, 1999) and Portes 
and colleagues (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993) have emphasized the 
differences in assimilation processes among immigrant groups.  Mary Water’s (1999) work 
contrasts the movement of West Indians immigrants into native black classifications with her 
(1994) study of assimilation of Western Europeans into a white majority.  Waters work finds that 
dark-skinned immigrants often must deal with perceptions that they are native-born blacks.  
Portes and Zhou (1993) argue that immigration is a process whereby immigrant groups either 
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have continued economic success that converges to mainstream norms or experience 
confinement in inner cities and permanent social membership in the urban underclass.  Building 
on this framework, Portes and Rambaut (2001) argue that residential and economic location of 
members of second-generation immigrants act to generally choose “plain American” or 
“panethnic’ identities such as ’black’ or ‘Hispanic.’  Comparative analysis of various Latino 
immigrant nationalities such as Cuban, Mexican, and West Indian have shown differential 
incarceration rates similar to categories of “white,” “Hispanic,” and “black” (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut et al. 2006).  Thus, segmented assimilation processes may work to 
influence how immigrant groups become associated with crime and are processed differentially 
within the criminal justice system. 
However, as Alba and Nee (2003) note, segmented assimilation theory may lead to 
potentially false bifurcation of immigrant assimilation into either mainstream American society 
or the American underclass.  They argue that bifurcation of assimilation ignores variance 
occurring in families and individuals within immigrant groups.  Bifurcation may also fail to fully 
capture improvements of immigrants, where only lateral movement into unskilled labor markets 
may denote greatly improved wellbeing relative to an immigrant’s country of origin if living 
standards rise.  The treatment of Puerto Ricans or black migrants as similar to immigrant groups 
also ignores unique historical factors and differences of these groups.  In the mid twentieth 
century, Myrdal (1944/1945) recognized that black migrants moving out of a caste system within 
the South would face large class barriers to upward mobility.  Duncan and Blau (1967) found 
that intergenerational mobility of black sharecroppers to the North only marked a transition into 
low-skilled blue-collar jobs.  Analysis by Waldinger (1996) found that children of black manual 
laborers in New York City experienced discrimination in skilled jobs and barriers to penetrating 
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immigrant-dominated niches of low-skilled jobs in private industry.  New York foreign-born 
immigrants, in contrast, were able to maintain dominance within economic sectors by creating 
ethnic social networks and economic niches varying by ethnic origin.  Left socially and 
physically isolated from jobs while concentrated in areas of high poverty and lack of 
employment opportunities, descendents of poor black migrants from the South may turn to crime 
and drugs as a means for escaping such conditions (Anderson 1990b, 1999; Wilson 1987, 
1996a).  Concurrently, segmented assimilation theory would predict other ethnic groups to 
experience general assimilation into the American “mainstream” based upon the ethnic group’s 
racial classification by U.S. society.  Hence, segmented assimilation due to racial labeling by 
U.S. society may lead to different crime and arrest rates across ethnic immigrant groups .   
   
Black Historical Segregation and Crime 
 By differentiating urban black populations from immigrants, historical and structural 
issues become important factors linking race and crime.  While assimilation allows for 
comparative treatment of individuals based on immigrant status, the spatial linkage between 
poverty and crime has long historical precedent, particularly among segregated blacks.  Du Bois 
(1996 [1899]) found that disproportional arrest and incarceration among blacks occurred among 
Southern migrants living in impoverished areas of Philadelphia’s seventh ward.  Investigating 
the plight of blacks centralized in Chicago’s “Bronzville” during the 1930’s, Drake and Cayton 
(1945, pp. 200-210) observed that black Chicagoans resided in areas with the highest 
concentrations of male juvenile delinquents, illegitimate births, disease, and families living on 
public assistance in “ghetto conditions.”  More recent work by Wilson (1987, 1996) and 
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Anderson (1990, 1999) locates African Americans in similar ghetto neighborhoods characterized 
by a lack of jobs, high rates of crime, and continued segregation from other racial groups.   
The historic segregation of blacks into ghettoes, beginning in the early twentieth century, 
continues with highly concentrated populations of blacks in central cities away from 
employment, education, and opportunities for assimilation (Dworak-Fisher 2004; Lieberson 
1980; Massey and Denton 1994; Mouw 2000).  Predatory lending practices and “redlining” by 
banks, movement of whites away from neighborhoods with increased populations of black 
residents, movement of jobs away from black neighborhoods, and lack of access to quality 
education are cited as key factors in generating impoverished ghettoes (Harris 1997; Massey and 
Denton 1994; Mouw 2000). 
  The location of blacks in historic ghettoes must also be emphasized along with the 
lasting effects of segregation and discrimination.  In Myrdal’s (1944/1945) treatise on the state of 
blacks in American society, Myrdal noted the prominence of criminal contacts as a means of 
black-white relationships.  Myrdal wrote:  
To the Northerners, this crime news is the most important source of information they get 
about Negroes.  To white Southerners, the crime news reinforces the stereotypes and 
sometimes serves to unite the white community for collective violence [e.g., lynchings] 
against the individual Negro criminal or the local Negro community in general. (pg. 635)   
For Myrdal, race played a key role in society’s justification of segregation of blacks from whites, 
while also generating stereotypes of African Americans. Contemporary racial theorists such as 
Roediger (1999, 2005), Collins (2005), Bonilla-Silva (2001, 2003) argue that continued 
perceptions of blacks as violent and as threats to non-minorities perpetuate stereotypes, even in a 
society where overt discrimination is highly stigmatized.   
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 Recent empirical research finds persistent disparities that link adverse outcomes of 
African Americans that may be based on these stereotypes.  Behrams, Uggens, and Manza 
(2003) have found that legal changes resulting in permanent political disenfranchisement of ex-
felons and incarcerated populations are historically correlated with black population increases.  
The historical movement of other ethnic groups from neighborhoods that experience an increase 
in their percentages of African American residents continues today with “white flight,” where 
crime, poverty, and drugs are often cited as causes for continued presence of segregated black 
neighborhoods and inner cities (Massey and Denton 1994; Harris 1999).  In relation to the 
criminal justice system, racial disparities persist in sentencing (Steffensmeier and Demuth 2000), 
incarceration over the life-course (Bonczar 2003a; Pettit and Western 2004a),  preferences 
among employers for whites even when blacks lack a criminal record (Holzer, Rapheal, and 
Stolls 2004; Pager 2003), and decreased earnings potential (Holzer et al. 2004; Pager 2003; 
Western 2002; Western and Pettit 2005).  Rates of “idleness” are used by labor economists to 
describe black adult males who are not in school or working (Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006; 
Mincy, Lewis, and Han 2006).  While these individual findings may be debated, such empirical 
research suggests that past and present stereotypes create adverse consequences for a racial 
group that remains physically and socially isolated from the rest of American society.  Urban 
ethnographers (Anderson 1990b, 1999; Duneier 2000; Edin and Lein 1997) and researchers 
(Anderson 1999; Dworak-Fisher 2004; Mouw 2000, 2002; Sampson et al. 1997; Wilson 1987, 
1996a) have documented the spatial and social isolation of blacks from other groups.   
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Segmented Assimilation, Segregation and Crime 
If segregation of blacks and segmented assimilation for international migrants are 
simultaneous historical and structural processes in American societies, how do segregation and 
immigration relate within the structural context of American societies?  The historical context 
provides a mechanism for testing and interpreting this relationship.  As Du Bois (1996 [1899]), 
Roediger (1999, 2005) and Ignatiev (1997) have documented, Irish, German, and Eastern 
European immigrants competed with blacks in the labor force in the 19th and early 20th centuries.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, black migrants and various European immigrants 
settled into Northern cities.  Over the next fifty years, blacks faced discrimination and 
segregation while European groups (e.g., Italian, Polish, Russian—nationalities Lieberson (1980) 
has defined as South-Central-Eastern [SCE] Europeans) eventually assimilated into mainstream 
American society (Lieberson 1980; Myrdal 1944/1945; Waldinger 1996).  While these various 
European groups faced discrimination among first-generation immigrants and often lived in 
concentrated urban slums in “ethnic enclaves,” access to educational resources, immigrant 
networks, and niches within the general economy provided means for assimilation into the 
mainstream American economy (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Waldinger 1996).  These 
assimilation processes eventually allowed connections with “native” American society to include 
acculturation and inclusion (via intermarriage, high social prestige, and economic affluence) into 
traditional non-minority groups (Alba and Nee 1997; Alba and Nee 2003; Gans 1979; Gordon 
1964). 
The path of assimilation for racial groups of non-European origin historically has differed 
substantially from the path of European immigrants.  While non-European racial minorities born 
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on American soil were granted citizenship rights (though it is important to denote that treatment 
of such minority-group members created a “second class” citizenship with discrimination similar 
to those of blacks), non-European immigrants were not eligible for citizenship until the 
Immigration Act of 1965 (Alba and Nee 1997).    Though the first significant numbers of Asians 
arrived in the U.S. during the 1860’s, these groups remained segregated in “Chinatowns” and 
“Little Tokyo’s” on the West Coast; assimilation into general American society began in the 
post-World War II era (Takaki 1989).  The assimilation of many Asian nationalities into “Asian 
American” status continues, with Chinese, Japanese and Koreans residing in the U.S. for many 
generations alongside new influxes of Chinese, Vietnamese, and other Asian immigrant 
nationalities (Lee and Bean 2004; Takaki 1989; Waldinger 1996).  Native Americans historically 
have been driven off native territories with the U.S. expansion, often driven onto reservations.  
Today, the economic success of Native Americans is contingent on movement away from tribal 
reservations (Nagel 1994).   
The history of Hispanic assimilation demonstrates how racial treatment of immigrants 
has been based on historical context and skin coloration. Prior to the 19th century, Mexicans were 
heavily populated in the Southwest, but were driven out of American territories in the decades 
following the Mexican War of 1848.  Not until after World War II did migratory workers begin 
entering the U.S. (Sowell 1982).  Beginning in the 1960’s, the movement of Mexicans, Puerto 
Ricans and other Latin Americans began to occur significantly in the Southwest and major urban 
areas such as New York, Miami, and Chicago (Waldinger 1996; Alba and Nee 1997).  These 
“Hispanic” or Latino populations represent a combination of many nationalities and generations 
of immigrants; with pressure to claim Hispanic identity an ethnic label, many Hispanics claim 
secondary racial identities (e.g., Native American, Black, or white) (Harris and Sim 2001; Lee 
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and Bean 2004).  Depending on biological markers such as skin color, Hispanics more readily 
assimilate over generations into a majority population or become classified as native black 
citizens.  The segmented assimilation for different Hispanic groups, such as West Indians and 
Cubans, illustrates how some immigrant groups will largely assimilate into mainstream 
American economic and social outcomes, while others will predominately move into highly 
segregated and impoverished conditions experienced by those classified as African Americans 
(Gans 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waldinger 1996; Waters 1994).  Thus, the case of 
Hispanic immigrants illustrates how race may lead to a delayed but divergent set of economic 
and social outcomes that correlate with discrete differences in criminal propensity.   
By placing crime in the context of segregation of blacks and the segmented assimilation 
of immigrants, it is possible to better contextualize crime and immigration in the U.S. with racial 
theory.  Geographically, historical segregation and discrimination against black migrants from 
the South persisted throughout the twentieth century.  For international black immigrants, 
acculturation has predominately implied movement into U.S.-born black populations, with 
resulting disparate economic and educational outcomes compared to non-black immigrants.  
Concentrated in economic disadvantage, urban centers have generated structural poverty and 
lack-of-opportunity associated with criminal behavior (Anderson 1990b, 1999; Blau and Blau 
1982; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001; Sampson et al. 2005; Wilson 1987, 1996a).  The 
barriers to opportunity contrast with ethnic economies and social networks that generate 
pathways among other immigrant nationalities towards economic prosperity and educational 
success in the mainstream economy (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Waldinger 1996).   
By including a more nuanced test that includes both immigration and measures of 
segregation, I hope to more generally test how segregation and immigration may predict crime 
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and arrest.  By analyzing the effects of immigration on crime, along with structural variance in 
segregation, I will expand Sampson et al.’s (2005) and Butcher and Phiel’s (2006) work by more 
fully examining how segmented assimilation and race may explain changes in arrest rates.  
Usage of panel data for major U.S. cities that controls for the effects of international migration 
and black segregation on arrest can provide a general test for associations between crime and 
immigration that is lacking in analysis by Reid et al. (2005).  
Given the historical precedent of immigration and segregation discussed above in 
explaining crime, along with the limitations of existing research, the analysis of panel data that 
measures crime, race, and immigration helps to better inform research on contemporary 
relationships between race, immigration and crime.  FBI Uniform Crime Reports provide 
measures of annual arrest in county areas that can be combined with U.S. Census data to 
examine how ten-year changes in immigration and black populations correlate with arrest and 
employment data.  Given the growth of the Hispanic immigrant population throughout the U.S. 
since 1980 (Landale and Oropesa 2007), data from the last three decennial U.S. Censuses capture 
large changes in metropolitan-area immigrant populations.  Resident black populations in most 
urban areas have remained both constant and segregated during this period.  Thus, a test for 
concurrence of black segregation and immigration in explaining arrest should indicate positive 
and statistically significant interaction between native-resident and immigrant blacks when arrest 
is the dependent variable. 
The proceeding argument suggested that racial segregation and immigration may be 
separate processes, but a test for significance of immigration in metropolitan areas on arrests 
may provide clarification of the relationship between crime and immigration, separate from 
crime and black segregation.  In such a situation, existing spatial mismatch between black 
22
 
 
populations and employment may operate independently from employment of immigrant groups 
in metropolitan areas.  In such a case, the historical legacy of discrimination and structural 
conditions of poverty and unemployment may explain racial differences in arrest, consistent with 
results from Sampson et al. (2005).  The non-significance of immigration along with the 
significance of poverty and unemployment would provide further support for more traditional 
arguments for structural causes of crime argued by Wilson and empirically demonstrated by Reid 
et al. (2005).  Evidence for relevance of segmented assimilation and crime would be associated 
with different arrest rates across racial and ethnic groups as Rambaut et al.’s (2006) research 
showing varying incarceration rates across Hispanic nationalities would suggest.    
Empirical results with panel data combining arrests and the decennial census help to 
better understand the relationship between crime, changes in immigration, and segregation in 
U.S. metropolitan areas.  Thus, most broadly I address whether the effects of immigration on 
crime and segregation may be generalized beyond urban ethnographies (e.g., Anderson and 
Wilson) and single-city studies (Wilson 1987, 1996; Sampson et al. 2005; Waldinger 1996) that 
presently comprise this body of research.   
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
To test for links between crime, assimilation, and racial segregation, I utilize population 
data from the decennial U.S. Census (Ruggles et al. 2005) and metropolitan arrest reports from 
the FBI’s annual Uniform Crime Reports (Chilton and Weber 2000; U.S. Dept. of Justice 2006).  
For population data, I will utilize 5% state samples from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Censuses 
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to create representative populations for metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the United 
States.  The combination of Uniform Crime Reports with the U.S. Census’ Integrated Public–Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS) data provides a unique source for longitudinal data pertaining to 
metropolitan area-specific information on crime, population counts of race and ethnic immigrant 
populations, and employment.  This data allows for analysis with fixed-effects models at the 
MSA-level to test if changing patterns in immigration correlate with black-resident populations 
to predict crime.  As discussed below in the methodology section, this provides controls of time-
constant, unobserved characteristics and focuses on time-varying demographic and crime trends.   
 
Population 
Census data has been frequently utilized in analysis examining links between crime and 
population characteristics, particularly in the study of violent crime and inequality (Land, 
McCall, and Cohen 1990b).  Most recently, Reid et al. (2005) and Parker, Stults and Rice (2005) 
use combinations of Census data with Uniform Crime Reports to examine issues of crime and 
social control in urban cities and counties.  These methodologies rely on cross-sectional data, 
which may be used to examine differences across units of observation.  Because of the long-
term, intergenerational nature of immigrant assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964; 
Lieberson 1980; 2005; Sampson et al. 2005) and the development of concentrated and segregated 
populations of blacks in urban ghettoes (Cayton and Drake 1945; Lieberson 1980; Massey and 
Denton 1993; Wilson 1987, 1996), longitudinal data better captures resulting effects of these 
trends by allowing for statistical analysis of effects within units of observations (e.g., MSAs).  
Thus, representative panel data for urban counties provides another form of testing potential 
links in assimilation, black populations, and crime within counties.  The 5%-state 1980, 1990, 
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and 2000 IPUMS data samples provide representative populations measures that may be created 
and analyzed (Ruggles et al. 2005).   
 
Segregation 
 Massey and Denton’s (1994) American Apartheid represents a classic work on continued 
black/white segregation at the end of the twentieth century.  In a sample of major U.S. 
metropolitan areas, the authors found African American segregation levels at between 70-80% in 
1980.  The authors also identified several underlying dimensions of segregation, including (1) 
social isolation, the extent to which minority members are exposed only to members of their own 
racial group; (2) index of dissimilarity, the percentage of a group's population that would have to 
change residence for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as the 
metropolitan area overall; and (3) spatial proximity, the average intra-group proximities for the 
minority and majority populations, weighted by the proportions each group represents of the total 
population.  These measures of segregation are used to capture the amount of ‘exposure,’ 
‘concentration,’ and ‘clustering’ of African Americans relative to non-Hispanic whites within 
census tracts at the MSA level. 
 Recently, the U.S. Census Bureau released data on residential segregation for 220 MSAs 
(Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2004) for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses.  The findings 
from the data indicate that African American dissimilarity decreased by 12%, African American 
isolation decreased by 10%, and African American spatial proximity decreased by 5% between 
1980-2000.  MSA-level scores for the African American isolation index, the African American 
dissimilarity index, and the African American spatial proximity index relative (each index with 
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non-Hispanic whites as the reference group) are utilized as potential sources for African 
American segregation within cities.   
 
Immigration 
Sampson, et al. (2005) empirically associate convergence in crime rates with each 
subsequent generation of immigration.  In analysis, distinguishing between resident populations 
of first-generation foreign-born and native-born populations is possible using IPUMS data.  I 
include these measures in analysis.  Due to a high degree of correlation between foreign and 
U.S.-born racial and ethnic groups, I estimate separate models for native and foreign-born 
populations.     
 
Arrest 
Analyses utilizing the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports have been a well-established 
tradition in empirical research (Baller et al. 2001; Blau and Blau 1982; Land et al. 1990b; Myrdal 
1944/1945; Parker et al. 2005). Arrest counts represent official statistics of police agencies for 
known offenses cleared by arrest that are compiled annually by the FBI.   The amount of crimes 
are likely downwardly biased relative to total crime actually committed (Thornberry and Krohn 
2000).   Using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey , Baumer (2002) has shown 
that neighborhood structure and composition do not alter reporting of violent crimes to police, 
suggesting that violent crime rates are consistent across racial groups and socioeconomic 
structures.  The Uniform Crime Reports primarily report violent crimes and property theft, and 
hence represent a limited subset of total crime occurring within a given area.  While arrest rates 
may remain correlated with forms of social control and acts by the state to deter crime (Levitt 
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2004; Parker et al. 2005), UCR total arrest counts are for all criminal activities and hence likely 
represent a broader array of offenses sanctioned by arrest by law enforcement agencies in a given 
MSA.  Arrest data is widely known to provide an undercount of crime occurring with a given 
area, but it may still be used as a conservative estimate of total crime occurring within a given 
area. 
 
MSA-level Analysis 
 The use of metropolitan-level data from the census captures a larger geographical region 
than neighborhood and census-tract areas.  Recent work by Lynch and Sabol (2001) has found 
that ex-felons are often concentrated within particular urban communities where lack of jobs and 
poverty are thought to increase levels of criminal activity (Anderson 1990b; Johnson 2003; 
Wilson 1996a).  Sampson et al. (2005) utilize data from the Project on Human Development in 
Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) collected from 1995-2002 to analyze effects of immigration 
and social structure on violent crime rates.  The PHDCN is a unique set of data in a long tradition 
of research examining race and assimilation within Chicago (dating to the early studies of Robert 
Park and W.I. Thomas) because it contains a rich set of community, individual, and familial-
level variables with a wide variation in race and ethnic background.  Their analysis of the 
PHDCN uses a multilevel random effects model to examine differences occurring between 
neighborhoods and focuses on individual-level propensities for an individual to commit crime in 
a given neighborhood.  The data is excellent for observing variance between neighborhoods and 
testing for differentials in risk based on variance in social structure.  
 The focus on MSA-level data can be explained by some of the limitations of the PHDCN 
data.  The analysis of PHDCN findings is limited to Chicago neighborhoods, while also 
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representing a period of fairly large economic growth and general declines in crime rates.  
Immigrant and racial/ethnic populations are also measured on an annual basis for the PHDCN; 
given that immigrant groups and communities form and evolve over extended periods of years or 
decades, the use of decade-intervals provides an alternative angle for viewing consequences of 
long-term immigration.  The analysis also measures individual propensity to commit crime based 
on reports from Chicago police departments and does not use individual based self-reports or 
criminal records commonly associated in analysis of criminal activity to calculate propensities to 
commit crime.   
My analysis differs because it examines changes that occur over the course of three 
decades.  By using metropolitan-level data, I also attempt to focus units of analysis where 
immigrant populations and native blacks may form communities within a given geopolitical 
region.  The analysis of crime and violence (especially homicide) has focused on the city level to 
examine social and economically linked levels of analysis (Land et al. 1990b; Messner 1982; 
Reid et al. 2005).  By examining changes in crime and arrest at the MSA-level over the course of 
three decades, I will be able to better document if immigration or economic variables, such as 
employment and poverty, influence crime and arrest.  
 
MSA Dataset 
To generate MSA data with population-specific counts, arrests totals, and segregation 
data, data were aggregated using a using a number of sources listed in Appendix 1.  To obtain 
MSA population data, 5% samples of the U.S. population were drawn from the IPUMS state 
samples for each year of the decennial census in the sample.  Due to large file size, these micro-
samples were sorted using the University of North Carolina’s research computer Emerald.  The 
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data were then collapsed from 5% micro-samples into MSA areas using MSA-county definitions 
generated by the Missouri Census Data Center’s MABLE software [available online at:  
http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html].  MSA level data were then combined with 
measures of African American segregation from the U.S. Census and FBI arrest rates for MSAs.  
The aggregated dataset yielded a sample of 269 cities and 654 MSA-year observations.  
However, due to IPUMS data incompletely reporting MSA observations and incomplete reports 
from law enforcement agencies, a large number of observations were discarded.2  A sample of 
112 MSAs with a total of 276 MSA/year observations were found to yield consistent results with 
smaller sub-samples.  To address incomplete data, MSA arrest and population data were adjusted 
to reporting and IPUMS estimated population rates, respectively, for a given MSA-year 
observation.  A definition of these variables is provided in Table 1.   
The number of missing MSA/year observations arise from incomplete or missing 
population data.  One source of missing data arises from low population estimates in FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports, where jurisdiction populations are weighted as zero during periods 
when law enforcement agencies fail to voluntarily report arrest information.  A second source of 
missing data arises from shifting MSA boundaries; portions of MSAs lying outside of census 
boundaries are excluded from population counts.  Within the 5% IPUMS samples, a number of 
individual records are missing MSA identifiers [a complete listing is provided at: 
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/incompmetareas.shtml], resulting in artificially low population 
counts for a number of MSA/year observations.  Finally, sampling areas created by the U.S. 
Census may lie only within an MSA boundary. 
                                                 
2 After experimentation, cases where FBI arrest populations, Census MSA populations, and IPUMS representative 
populations were within 10% were found to yield consistent results in regression models with a sub-sample 
containing with less than 1%.  Biases in MSA population data occur due to incompatible county and census 
observations.  FBI population differences arise from incomplete reporting by law enforcement agencies.   
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Means and standard deviations for relevant variables are provided by year and for the 
overall MSA sample in Table 1.  A listing of the cities is provided in Appendix 2.  Due to high 
collinearity, not all descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.1 are utilized in analysis.   
 
Methods 
In a large comparative study of variables used to predict macro-trends in homicide, Land 
et al. (1990) found that unit-of-analysis and regression methods substantively alter study findings 
for effects of poverty and community variables in predicting crime rates.  Recent work by both 
Reid et al. (2005) and Parker et al. (2005) utilized U.S. Census data and MSA arrest/crime 
variables from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.  Though I will utilize U.S. Census and FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports data, my work will differ in two ways: 1) I will aggregate decennial micro-level 
census data for metropolitan statistical areas (MSA’s) with arrest data from 1980-2000 to create 
a longitudinal sample for crime and population characteristics, and (2) I will utilize fixed effects 
error models to observe how changes in immigration and U.S.-born black populations correlate 
with arrest patterns.  The usage of longitudinal data for analysis and statistical methods may test 
for concurrent effects of immigration and residential segregation on changing arrest patterns over 
three decades.  Similar methods have been employed in tests for spatial mismatch (Dworak-
Fisher 2004), but remain largely untried in the conventional criminological literature.   
To test if relationships exist between black segregation, immigration, and crime in 
metropolitan areas, I utilize fixed effects models.  As Allison (2005a) and Halaby (2004) note, 
fixed effect regression models allow for consistent and unbiased measurement of longitudinal 
data while controlling for time-invariant characteristics.  Because of the large variation in 
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regional and local economic conditions, population characteristics, and immigration patterns at 
the MSA level, MSA-specific error would likely bias OLS and multilevel model estimates of 
regression coefficients. Because I also utilize all available counties for analysis, the use of an 
MSA-specific error term also allows for analysis of generalized trends of hypothesized links in 
the MSA sample.   
By using a fixed effects model with error components for individual cities, it is possible 
to test if immigration and segregation distinctly occur within MSA’s.  While it is possible to 
draw a ‘random’ cross-section of counties in MSA’s, as done by Reid et al (2005), cross-
sectional OLS regression techniques the authors employ have several limitations: (1) cross-
sectional regression does not employ a longitudinal design to determine whether immigration 
actually affects crime, (2) the estimation techniques do not take into account the 
intergenerational characteristics of immigrants that seem to be associated with criminal behavior, 
(3) the limited number of MSAs and missing data from IPUMS sub-sample create a limited and 
incomplete population from which to draw samples, and finally, (4) cross-sectional models do 
not determine how segmented assimilation may empirically lead to differential outcomes across 
different racial and ethnic populations. 
The basic fixed-effects framework I will utilize may be more explicitly discussed in 
equation format as: 
 
Yit= β0t+ Σ(βjt * Xjit )+ + Σ(γkit * zkit ) + εit, 
 
where i and t represent the ith Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) at time t, Yit is the arrest rate 
recorded in MSA i at time t, β0t is a constant, Σ(βjt * Xjit ) is the set of time-varying predictors and 
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coefficients, Σ(γkit * zkit ) is the set of time-invariant predictors and coefficients, and εit is the 
error terms in the equation such that  
 
εit= eit+ui + wt, 
 
where ei t represents a random disturbance term, ui is an error term representing specific error for 
the MSA i, and wt represents an error component for measuring arrest at time t. 
 As Allison (2005) demonstrates mathematically in the two-time period model, fixed 
effects models examine first differences in the dependent variable (e.g., Yt=2,is -Yt=1,is) for the ith 
MSA.  As a result, the set of all time invariant variables Σ(γkit * zkit), where zki,t=1= zki,t=2 = 
zki,t=3=… zki,t=n, cancels out of the regression equation.  For studies such as Reid et al., (2005) 
cross-sectional analyses with OLS regression do not, in contrast, eliminate the set of time-
invariant characteristics Σ(γkit * zkit) from the sample.  While Reid et al. (2005) attempt to draw 
on a “random and representative set of MSAs,” their analysis rests on the premises that: 1) no 
correlation exists between predictors and errors that may bias estimation and 2) unobserved 
characteristics do not correlate with observed variables.  By eliminating Σ(γkit * zkit ), the fixed-
effects model eliminates these issues for all time-invariant variables. 
 The error structure of a fixed-effect model is also important to note.  By incorporating 
error components for each specific MSA (ui) and year of data (wt), this error structure provides a 
mechanism to control for error that may be due to time or MSA-specific components.  The fixed-
effects model measures error within MSAs and not between MSAs.  As a consequence, it is 
possible to determine if crime and arrest are correlated with changes in immigration and 
segregation in the specific MSA over three decades to more accurately test patterns of 
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immigration, not simply observe if changes are a result of correlations observed across cities at a 
given time t.  This error structure allows for random and MSA-specific errors to occur; 
consequently, the assumptions of equal weighting and independence of MSA units are needed 
for OLS regression.  
 It should be noted that one- and two-way fixed effect models are not without limitations.  
Fixed effect modeling provides consistent and unbiased standard errors, but it is an inefficient 
estimator.  Hence, there remains significant potential for Type II (false negatives) errors relative 
to more efficient estimators like OLS regression and random effects models.  Work by Sampson 
et al. (2005) and Baller et al. (2001) utilizes random effects models when controlling for, 
respectively, community and county level errors, in addition to a random disturbance term.  
When these models approximate random and identically distributed populations through such 
error structures, they are preferred.  However, as in the case of cities in this sample, unobserved 
characteristics generate results which fail the Hausman test across all estimated models, implying 
the need for fixed effect errors for reliable inference (Allison 2005a; Halaby 2004).   
 Table 2.1 lists the major variables I propose to test in analysis.  As previously discussed 
above, use of arrest and crime data for metropolitan areas allows for measurement of reported 
crimes and arrests as a function of the sampled population.  An identifier for a given year and 
metropolitan area provides mechanisms for generating error components in the fixed effects 
model for time and geography.  Measurements for population growth, single-parent households, 
and poverty rates provide tests for structural   conditions that may influence poverty rates in a 
given metropolitan area. 
Land et al.’s (1990) analysis established a robust set of common variables predicting 
homicide in geographic data at the state, county, and MSA level from the years 1950-1980.  
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Using principle component analysis, the authors construct a set of variables that have low 
collinearity and explain a high proportion of variance.  These common variables include: a 
measure of relative deprivation/affluence within a geographic unit, a measure of the geographical 
population structure, the unemployment rate of the geographical unit, and the divorce rate of a 
geographic unit.  These components were widely adopted and effectively used as base models in 
research on homicide, violence, and crime across geographical areas (Baller et al. 2001; Parker et 
al. 2005; Reid et al. 2005).   
The wide adoption of Land et al.’s (1990) work is a testament to the study’s robustness 
and scope.  However, two limitations of this framework apply to this analysis.  The first is that 
observations for this established work relate to modeling between geographical units, and not 
within geographical units.  In unreported analysis, principle components for population and 
relative deprivation failed significance tests when year and MSA level fixed effects were applied.  
However, models measuring differences between MSAs were found to remain significant in 
OLS and models with MSA-level random effects.  From a theoretical standpoint, this would 
imply that the effects of factorial variables for population structure and relative deprivation had 
time invariant influence on arrest rates within MSAs.    
 A second limitation is that predictor variables analyzed directly relate to population 
structure and relative deprivation.  High correlations were observed between African American 
segregation and relative deprivation.  Empirical analysis has observed that African American 
segregation correlates extensively with structural components such as poverty, low educational 
attainment, and single-parent families (Haynie, Silver, and Teasdale 2006; Land et al. 1990b; 
Massey and Denton 1994; Western and Pettit 2005; Wilson 1987, 1996a).    
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As a solution to these issues, I attempt to use variables centered around Land et al.’s 
(1990) criteria for variable selection by 1) selecting variables for usage where collinearity is 
minimized (e.g., correlations between variables remain below 30% in estimated models while 
generating spurious results) and 2) minimizing variable usage while selecting variables that 
roughly meet the dimensions established by Land et al. Experimentation yielded four variables 
which were generally found to meet these criteria:  the sex ratio, the divorce rate, unemployment 
rate, and the percentage of individuals residing below the poverty line.  The sex ratio is used as a 
population structure variable that has been found to be empirically correlated with arrest rates 
(Messner and Sampson 2005).     
The concept of relative deprivation may be linked with (lack of) economic opportunity.  
Becker’s (1968) hypothesis that crime is an outcome related to labor market opportunities is 
widely accepted in existing economic research, with empirical studies indicating a negative 
correlation between macroeconomic growth and crime rates (Edelman et al. 2006; Freeman 
1996, 2000b).  Economic expansions are also empirically linked to crime (Edelman et al. 2006; 
Freeman 2001; Holzer and Offner 2006).  Poor outcomes in the labor market may explain 
differences in crime rates observed across groups, making segregation, immigration and crime as 
spurious.  Recent work by Butcher and Phiel (2006) has used U.S. Census data to argue that 
increased penalties for immigrants encoded into U.S. law creates a rational deterrence effect for 
behaviors leading to detention/arrest.   
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Results 
Bivariate Regression 
Tables 2.2 to 2.5 present results from MSA-level fixed effect models of arrest and 
population change.  These models provide basic null hypothesis tests if, controlling for 
unobserved MSA-level time-invariant effects, changes in a race/ethnic population are associated 
with differing arrest rates.  In the MSA sample, high correlation between immigrant and U.S. 
native populations was observed.3  Consequently, estimation of population changes of foreign 
and native-born groups are presented for each race and ethnic group in the census data.    
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 list bivariate regression results for changes in arrest rates and racial 
populations within MSAs.  Native-born populations are presented in Table 2.2.    For native-born 
Hispanics, a one percentage increase in proportion of MSA composition is associated with a net 
decline of 208 total arrests (p<0.01) and 59 property arrests (p<0.001) per 100,000 population.  
Significant declines in property arrest rates were also observed for Asian groups (p<0.001), 
while increases in property crimes were observed with increases among native whites (p<0.001).  
Excluding Hispanics, changes in race and ethnic populations were not found to be significant for 
violent and overall arrest rates.   
 Table 2.3 presents results for changes in arrest associated with changes in foreign-born 
immigrant groups.  Overall, a one percent increase of immigrants living within an MSA is 
associated with no significant change in total arrest rates, an increase of 375 violent crimes 
(p<0.05), and a decline of 2400 property crimes (p<0.001) per 100,000 population.  These 
values not only suggest that the effects of immigration may vary by types of crime, but high 
                                                 
3 Correlation between U.S. born and foreign born Hispanics, for example was 0.95.  This makes simultaneous 
estimation almost impossible within regression models.   
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standard deviations may also result from significant variation among immigrant populations.  
Breakdown of immigrants demonstrates this result.   Increases in percentage of Hispanic 
immigrants within an MSA are significantly associated with increased violent arrest rates 
(p<0.05), but decreases in property arrest rates (p<0.05).  Similarly, the proportion of Asian 
immigrants residing in an MSA is associated with an increase in violent crime rates (p<0.05), 
but is also associated with highly significant (p<0.001) property arrest rates.  Black immigrants 
are associated with a significant increase in total arrests (p<0.01), but a decline in property rates.   
 Across immigrant populations, arrest rates are most consistently associated with 
decreased property arrest rates.  Only black immigrants are associated with increased rates of 
total arrest, which prior research links to a mechanism of social control (Parks et al. 2005).  
Overall, some variance among immigrant groups is observed based on immigrant’s racial 
classification.   
Both native-born and immigrant Hispanics are associated with decreased property crime 
rates.  But increases in native-born Hispanic populations are associated with decreased total 
arrest rates (p<0.01), while Hispanic immigrants are not associated with changes in total arrest 
rates.  Given the 0.95 correlation between Hispanic native-born and immigrant populations 
across MSAs, this difference is somewhat surprising.  Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present bivariate 
regressions for four Hispanic racial sub-classifications available by the U.S. Census: Puerto 
Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, and other [primarily Central and South American].  As I will discuss 
later, ethnic distinctions of Cubans, Mexicans, and Hispanics are associated with segmented 
assimilation theory in existing research (Portes and Raumbaut 2001; Waters 1994, 1999). 
Table 2.4 presents changes in MSAs’ proportion of these four Hispanic groups, without 
considering immigration status.  While the 'other Hispanic’ category is associated with decreased 
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total arrest rates (p<0.05) and property crime rates (p<0.001), no significant coefficients are 
observed with changes in an MSA’s proportion of residents identified as Mexicans, Cubans, and 
Puerto Ricans.  
Table 2.5, however, yields highly significant results when Hispanic groups are 
differentiated by immigration status.  Increases in U.S.-born Mexican populations are associated 
with a highly significant increase in violent crime rates (p<0.001), while foreign-born Mexicans 
are associated with decreased total arrest rates (p<0.10) and property arrest rates (p<0.05).  
Changes in the proportion of native and foreign-born Cubans are not associated with changes in 
arrest rates within MSAs.  Changes in the proportion of foreign-born Puerto Ricans are 
associated with highly significant increase in violent arrest (p<0.001) and an increase in total 
arrests (p<0.05).  In contrast, native-born Puerto Ricans are associated with decreases in total 
arrest rates (p<0.05) and violent crime rates (p<0.01).  For those in the ‘other Hispanic’ 
category, immigrants are uniformly associated with decreases in total arrest rates (p<0.001), 
violent crime rates (p<0.01), and property crime rates (p<0.001); in contrast, changes native-
born ‘other Hispanic’ categories are significantly only with a decrease in property crime rates 
(p<0.01). 
The results from bivariate regressions using MSA-level fixed effects indicate two general 
empirical trends: (1) Overall, changes in arrest patterns within MSAs are associated with influxes 
of immigrants that vary by racial groups group.  (2) Among ethnic subgroups, changes in native 
and foreign-born Hispanic populations are associated with different arrest outcomes.  These 
results indicate that immigration is a significant predictor of arrest, but immigration results vary 
by race and ethnic classification.  In the next section, I introduce measures of segregation and 
controls to rigorously test and contextualize these results.   
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Results from Fixed Effect Modeling 
The bivariate regression models given above suggest that changes in immigrant 
populations have significant effects on arrest patterns within MSAs, but vary by race and 
Hispanic ethnicity.  These bivariate results lack controls that may also explain results, but also 
result from a simplified error structure.  Finally, these results do not take historic African 
American segregation into account as a predictor of arrest.   
In this section, controls for MSA population and relative deprivation are incorporated 
into the regression framework, fixed effects for both year and MSA are incorporated into 
regression models, and measures of African American segregation are added.  These results are 
presented first for native-born and immigrant population variables.  Finally, arrest rates that 
examine Hispanic ethnic origin and immigration status are presented.   
 It is also important to note that both one- and two-way fixed effects models are used in 
analysis.  In one-way fixed effect models, MSA fixed effects are used to remove time-invariant 
MSA-level effects that impact regression results.  In two-way fixed effect models, MSA and year 
fixed effects are used to remove both MSA and period-specific effects which impact regression 
results.  Hence, when presenting results from one and two-way fixed models, I essentially am 
presenting results with and without period effects.  I do this because immigration during the 
period from 1980-2000 led to almost uniform increases in MSA immigrant populations during 
the period.  Removing invariant, period-specific effects in regression models tests changes in 
race/ethnic groups within MSAs affected arrest rates during time of study, but this removal has 
costs of increasing standard errors and removes traits of immigrants that may decrease crime 
which lie outside the period of study.  In contrast, using only one-way fixed effects for MSAs 
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decreases standard errors and allows for invariant, non-period effects of immigration to be 
measured, but does fully test how period-specific changes in race/ethnic groups within MSAs 
affect arrest rates.  I include both one and two-way effects models to more closely examine how 
changes in race/ethnic populations predict changes in arrest within MSAs.   
  
Models including Immigration, Race, African American Segregation 
Tables 2.6-2.8 present results using fixed effect error components that control for year 
and MSA level.  At the MSA level, a Hausman specification test rejected a random effects model 
in favor of a fixed effect model.  Year fixed effects terms were also found to be significant.  The 
two-way fixed effects presented in these tables show relatively large standard errors, but 
substantially diminish the possibility of bias resulting from unobserved, time-invariant effects for 
year and MSA.    
As discussed in the methods section above, measures of African American segregation at 
the MSA-level are on the dimensions of social isolation, dissimilarity, and spatial proximity.  
The results below present these measures of segregation from the U.S. Census when native and 
foreign-born racial groups are estimated as co-predictors of arrest. 
Table 2.6 presents regression models predicting changes in arrest rates for total arrest 
rates within MSAs.  Among Asians and Hispanic immigrants, there was found to be no 
correlation between changes in population and changes in arrest.  This finding is consistent with 
Reid et al.’s (2005) findings using cross-sectional data, and it indicates that increases in 
percentages of immigrants do not correlate with increased arrest rates in MSAs.  Black 
immigrants, in contrast, were found to be associated with increased arrest rates.  Interestingly, 
among measures of African American segregation, social isolation was found to be a significant 
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predictor of crime.  When changes in Hispanic, Latino, and black immigrant populations were 
taken into account, a one point increase in the social isolation index was found to be associated 
with an aggregate increase of 75 arrests per 100,000 population (p<0.001).  The co-significance 
of black immigrants and social isolation with increases in total arrest rates is consistent with 
analysis by Parks et al. (2005), suggesting that arrest functions as a mechanism of social control.   
 For native-born populations, increases in native Hispanic populations are associated with 
a significant decline (p<0.05 for baseline and social isolation, p<0.01 for social dissimilarity and 
spatial proximity) in total arrest rates.  Social isolation is also a significant predictor of increased 
arrest rates (p<0.05).  It is interesting to note that, despite the ~95% correlation between native 
and immigrant Hispanic groups, changes in the proportion of native-born Hispanics are 
associated with significant declines in arrest, while no significant correlations is found among 
Hispanics.   
 Table 2.7 presents regression models predicting changes in arrest rates for violent crimes 
within MSAs.  A positive but marginally significant correlation exists between changes in 
Hispanic immigrants and violent arrest rates.  However, among both native and immigrant racial 
groups, changes in population do not correlate with changes in violent crime.  While these results 
are not consistent with the findings of Sampson et al. (2005), it should be noted that large 
standard errors and the low frequency of violent crime may lead to type II errors in analysis.   
 Table 2.8 presents regression models predicting changes in arrest rates for property 
crimes within MSAs.  Increases in native-born Hispanic populations are marginally associated 
with decreases in property arrest rates.  However, property arrest rates are not associated with 
changes among both native and foreign-born populations.  A correlation in social isolation is 
found to be a significant, positive association (p<0.05) when examining foreign-born racial 
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groups.  Lack of correlation between changes in foreign born population and property arrest rates 
differs from bivariate regression results presented in Tables 2A and 2B.  It is possible that large 
standard errors may lead to type II errors; however, it should also be noted that no evidence is 
found to suggest that changes in immigrant racial groups within an MSA increase property 
crime.   
 In presenting the models above, shifts in immigrant populations remain largely 
uncorrelated with changes in total, violent, and property arrest rates within MSAs.  Among black 
immigrants, increases in black immigrant populations are associated with an increase in total 
arrest rates.  This significance is particularly strong when measures of African American social 
isolation within MSAs are also introduced and are consistent with measures of using arrest as a 
measure of social control of African American communities.  The results occur despite the 
general lower rates of incarceration of immigrants relative to non-immigrants observed in U.S. 
census data (Raumbaut et al. 2006).  Given that social isolation is a measure of interracial contact 
of African Americans with other racial groups, these results suggest that a lack of integration for 
native-born blacks and assimilation of black immigrants is different relative to other racial 
groups.   
For total arrest rates and property crimes, increases in native-born Hispanic groups are 
associated with significant declines in total arrest rates (p<0.05) and property arrest rates 
(p<0.10).  These correlations provide some evidence that increases in Hispanic populations may 
be associated with declines in arrest rates within MSAs.  However, as prior research has 
suggested, arrest rates (as a proxy of crime) should negatively correlate with immigrant groups.  
Findings by Sampson et al. (2005) and Reid et al. (2005) suggest that differences in crime may 
vary by ethnic origin.  To further examine if variances exist across ethnic groups within Hispanic 
42
 
 
origin, I use the U.S. Census categories of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Other Hispanic to 
test if arrest varies by ethnic subgroups.      
 
Hispanic Ethnic Origin 
 As discussed above, segmented assimilation theory has argued that immigrant groups will 
differentially assimilate into mainstream society based on racial classification.  Empirical 
analysis by Lieberson (1980) empirically demonstrated that South, Central, and Eastern (SCE) 
European immigrants experienced intergenerational declines in residential segregation, gains in 
educational attainment, and upward socially mobility in a sample of major U.S. cities between 
1880-1960; in contrast, African Americans experienced little decline in segregation, lack of 
educational attainment, and upward mobility.  Work by Mary Waters (1996, 1999) has found 
that West Indies immigrants in the U.S. experience lack of opportunity and discrimination that 
leads intergenerational assimilation into African Americans.  Waters has suggested that ethnic 
identities are primarily optional for white immigrants who have experienced assimilation into 
mainstream U.S. culture.  
Work by Portes and colleagues (Portes et al. 2005; Portes and Hao 2004; Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993, 1996) has utilized data from Hispanic immigrants to 
determine assimilation patterns among immigrants.  Among ethnic groups, Portes et al (2005) 
find that Cubans have higher relative incomes and educational attainment, while West Indies and 
Haitian immigrants have lower education, income, and relatively higher incarceration rates.  
Portes and Hau (2004) examine Asian and Hispanic immigrants, finding that Mexican 
immigrants often wind up in inner city areas and experience relatively low educational 
achievement outcomes in the second generation.  Portes and Raumbaut (2001) have found that 
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ethnic origin significantly alters outcomes of immigrant groups, with differential outcomes 
varying by an immigrant’s race and ethnic status.  Hispanic immigrants are found to experience 
segmented assimilation based on racial classification systems that individuals fall in.   
Empirical research into differential incarceration rates has found that Hispanic 
incarceration rates vary significantly by incarceration status.  Sampson et al. (2005) report that 
first-generation Mexican immigrants in Chicago are associated with significantly lower violent 
crime rates.  Raumbaut et al. (2006) find that Hispanic immigrants have uniformly lower 
incarceration rates relative to non-immigrants, with lower rates for Mexican Hispanics and 
higher rates among Latinos from Puerto Rico and Caribbean locales.  Similar findings are found 
for incarceration rates in U.S. Census data by economists Butcher and Phiel (2006), though these 
authors argue that laws increasing criminal sanctions and deportations create a “deterrence 
effect” that uniformly reduces crime among foreign-born populations relative to native-born 
populations.   
Using IPUMS data, it is possible to examine how changes in Hispanic populations of 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban and ‘other Hispanic’ [largely Central and South American] ethnic 
origin correlate with changes in arrest rates.  Tables 2.9-2.13 present one and two way fixed 
effect models with separate estimations for native and foreign born immigrant ethnic groups.  
These separate models allow for comparison of ethnic origin as a function of immigration status.   
In the Tables presented in this section, I provide results for MSA [one-way] and MSA 
and Year [two-way] fixed effect models.  The results are presented because of issues specifically 
related to the influx of Hispanics in the U.S. between 1980-2000.  While immigration of Puerto 
Ricans and Cubans has had historical associations before 1980, a rapid increase of Mexican and 
Central/South American Hispanics has occurred from 1980-2000.  At present, Mexican (58% of 
44
 
 
Hispanics), Puerto Rican (10% of Hispanics), and Cuban (4% of Hispanics) ethnic origins 
comprise the largest Hispanic subgroups in the U.S. (Landale and Oropresa 2007).  Year fixed 
effects control for large, positive increases in Mexican and other Hispanic populations occurring 
from 1980-2000.  This may lead to better controls for period effects that are unobserved and 
invariant across observations, but it also eliminates potential historical issues associated with 
crime.  If the immigration effects hypothesized by Sampson (2006), for example, have an 
invariant period effect in reducing crime rates between 1980-2000, the year fixed effects may 
cancel out immigration effects.   
Table 2.9 and Table 2.10 present models where changes in the proportion of Hispanic 
ethnic subgroups predict total arrest rates in MSAs.  For the models presented in Table 2.9 using 
year and MSA-level fixed effect terms, no significant effects for race are found at the p<0.05 
level.  However, a highly significant (p<0.01) correlation is found between social isolation and 
arrest; across the estimated models, a one point increase in social isolation is associated with 65 
to 75 arrests per 100,000 population.   For the models estimated in Table 2.10 using MSA fixed 
effects only, social isolation becomes much less significant (significant at the p<0.05 level), 
while Hispanic ethnic subgroups are associated with varying rates of significance.  Among 
native-born Hispanics, statistically significant declines in total arrest rates are associated with 
increases in the proportion of Puerto Ricans (p<0.01) and ‘other’ Hispanics (p<0.05) living 
within an MSA.  Among foreign-born ethnic groups, an increase in the proportion of Mexican 
immigrants is associated with a significant decline in total arrest rates (p<0.05).   
Table 2.11 and Table 2.12 present regression output for how changes in Hispanic ethnic 
subgroups predict changes in violent arrest rates.  Table 2.11 presents output with fixed effect 
error terms for both year and MSA level.  With two-way fixed effects, no significant effects were 
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found for the social isolation index.  Among Hispanic ethnic subgroups, an increase in the 
proportion of Puerto Ricans is associated with an increase in violent crime rates (p<0.05).  Table 
2.12 contains one-way fixed effect models at the MSA level only, with similar results.  Social 
isolation is not found to be a significant predictor of violent crime arrest, while increases in the 
proportion of Puerto Rican immigrants are associated with a highly significant increase in violent 
arrest rates (p<0.001).  Interestingly, increases in the proportion of native-born Puerto Rican 
Hispanics are associated with a marginally significant decline (p<0.10) in violent arrest rates.   
Table 2.13 and Table 2.14 present regression output for how changes in Hispanic ethnic 
subgroups predict changes in property arrest rates.  For the models with year and MSA-level 
fixed effect rates presented in Table 2.13, no significant correlations were found for changes in 
the proportion of Hispanic ethnic subgroups.  For all models estimated, marginally significant 
associations (p<0.10) were observed for increases in the segregation index and property arrest 
rates.  This suggests a weak association between changes in black social isolation and property 
arrest rates.  For the models presented in Table 2.14 that contain MSA-level fixed effects only, 
no significant associations between black social isolation and property are observed.  However, 
the one-way fixed-effect models yield significant results for racial groups.  One-way fixed effect 
models, however, yield positive associations between Hispanic ethnic subgroups and property 
arrest rates.  Among native-born subgroups, an increase in the proportion of ‘other’ Hispanics is 
associated with a significant (p<0.01) decline in property arrest rates.  Among immigrant groups, 
a highly significant association (p<0.001) was found predicting that a one point percentage 
increase in Mexican immigrants was associated with a decline of 71 property arrests per 
100,000; no significant effect was found among native-born Mexican Hispanics, which is 
consistent with Sampson et al.’s (2005) findings.  Interestingly, a marginally significant 
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association (p<0.10) between increases in the proportion of Puerto Rican immigrants and 
increases in property arrest rates was observed; though not significant, native-born Puerto Rican 
Hispanics are associated with decreases in property arrest rates.  
The results of one-way and two-way fixed effects models presented above provide 
interesting insights into the general issues associated with immigration and segregation.  In the 
period from 1980-2000, measures of black social isolation declined by an average of 10% in 
MSAs (Iceland et al. 2004), while the proportion of Hispanics in the U.S. population grew from 
4% in 1980 to 13% in 2000 (Landale and Oropesa 2007).   Evidence for an effect of social 
isolation on total arrest and property rates within MSAs occurs when both year and MSA fixed 
effect terms are added, but are not significant when one-way fixed effects are calculated.  This 
suggests that, when controlling for effects of social isolation, unobserved, invariant period 
effects lead to type I (false-negative) errors in hypothesis testing of social isolation.  In contrast, 
changes in the proportion of Hispanic subgroups are more frequently significant when fixed 
effect error components at the MSA-level only are utilized relative to both year and MSA level.  
The historic increases in Hispanic populations from 1980-2000 are time-dependent and 
associated with the non-random characteristics and issues these populations face.  Such issues 
include a response to increased threat of deportation for immigrants relative to native-born 
populations (Butcher and Phiel 2007), the formation of ethnic enclaves and niches that socially 
impact individual behaviors (Waldinger 1996), and social response [through discrimination or 
social control] possessed by specific ethnic subgroups due to their classification by native-born 
populations.  As a result, including fixed-effect terms for year may cancel out period-specific 
effects that lead to correlations between changes in subgroup populations and arrest rates.   
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The above analysis also suggests usage of year and MSA fixed effect error components 
may substantively alter findings.  However, the models presented above estimate the separate 
effects of Hispanic subgroups.  To examine how immigrant subgroups may separately impact 
arrest rates, I estimate the effects of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Ricans subgroups on arrest 
rates.  As Landale and Oropesa (2007) note, these groups represent approximately 75% of 
Hispanics immigrants residing in the U.S.  In the sample, the proportion of Mexican, Cuban, and 
Puerto Rican Hispanics within an MSA were not found to have collinearity sufficient to 
substantively alter results in analysis. 
Table 2.15 and Table 2.16 present results on crime rates using, respectively, two- and 
one-way fixed effect models.  Table 2.15 reports results for Asian and Hispanic ethnic subgroups 
using year and MSA fixed effects.  In models with U.S.-born populations, African American 
social isolation positively correlates with increases in total arrest rates (p<0.05).  In models with 
immigrant variables, social isolation is found to be a significant positive predictor for both total 
arrest rates (p<0.001) and property arrest rates (p<0.05).  Among U.S.-born and foreign-born 
groups, an MSA’s proportion of foreign-born Puerto Ricans is associated with an increase in 
violent arrest rates (p<0.001).  An increase in the proportion of Mexican Hispanics within an 
MSA is also associated with a decline in property arrest rates (p<0.05).  These results suggest, 
generally, that including both year and MSA fixed effects shows statistical significance for 
measures of black isolation in predicting arrest, but relatively little correlation is observed 
between Hispanic ethnic subgroups and arrest rates. 
Table 2.16 presents results where fixed effects at the MSA-level only [e.g., ‘one-way’] 
were used.  Among all models tested, no significant relationship was observed for MSA black 
isolation and arrest rates at the MSA level.  For total arrest rates, U.S.-born Puerto Rican 
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(p<0.01) and foreign-born Mexican Hispanics (p<0.05) were associated with declines in arrest; 
in contrast, Puerto Rican-born Hispanics were associated with a significant increase in total 
arrest (p<0.001).  For violent arrest rates, Puerto Rican-born Hispanics were associated with 
increase in total arrest (p<0.001).  For property arrest rates, U.S. born Asians and foreign-born 
Mexican immigrants were associated with decreases in arrest rates (p<0.001); Puerto Rican-born 
Hispanics were associated with increases in arrest (p<0.01).  In all models, no correlation was 
found between changes in the proportion of both immigrant and U.S.-born Cuban Hispanics.  In 
all models, a highly significant correlation (p<0.001) was also observed between increases in the 
proportion of individuals living below the poverty line and increases in arrest rates.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined Sampson and colleagues’ (Sampson et al. 2005; Sampson 2006) 
assertion that immigration has influenced arrest in the U.S., but it is contextualized in the 
framework of segmented assimilation theory and spatial segregation of African Americans.  
Using panel data for 112 U.S. MSAs, fixed effect models suggest that changes in the proportion 
of a particular race and ethnic population of an MSA predict changes in arrest rates.  Bivariate 
regression models find that immigrants generally and particular immigrant race & ethnic groups 
correlate with decreases in total arrest and property arrest rates.  Results from estimates of one-
way fixed effect models with additional controls also suggest that increases in Mexican-born 
Hispanic, foreign-born ‘other’ Hispanics and foreign-born Asians are associated with declines in 
property arrest rates.  These results contrast with changes in U.S.-born populations, where little 
or no effects for comparative populations are observed.   
49
 
 
While results suggest that immigration changes have correlated with changes in arrest 
within U.S. MSAs, it is equally import to note that these correlations vary across race and ethnic 
groups.  Results from the two-way fixed effect models in Tables 2.9 2.11, and 2.13 suggest that 
increases in foreign born black immigrants are associated with increases in total arrest rates 
(p<0.05), while increases in foreign-born Hispanics are associated with marginally significant 
increases in violent arrest rates.  Results from Table 2.16 suggest that increases in Puerto-Rican 
born immigrants are associated with increases in total arrest rates (p<0.001), violent arrest rates 
(p<0.01), and property arrest rates (p<0.001); in contrast, increases in U.S.-born Puerto Rican-
Hispanics are associated with declines in total arrest rates (p<0.001) and non-significant 
decreases in violent and property arrest rates.  These findings are consistent with prior research 
on using arrest as a mechanism for the social control of blacks (Parker et al. 2005) and research 
on segmented assimilation of immigrant groups (Portes and Rambaut 2001; Rambaut et al. 
2006).  While some economists such as Butcher and Phiel (2006) have argued that threat of 
deportation deters immigrants from delinquency relative to U.S.-born populations, the results 
presented above suggest that arrest varies by immigrant race and ethnic status.  These findings 
are consistent with differential associations observed in studies by Sampson et al. (2005) and 
Reid et al. (2005) where different effects by race and ethnic status of immigrants are observed. 
The usage of MSA and year fixed effect models also presented differential findings.  
Models with both MSA and year fixed effects found that increase in social isolation significantly 
predicted increases in total arrest (p<0.001) and property arrest rates (p<0.05) when variables for 
foreign-born race and ethnic Hispanic groups were used.  However, social isolation was not 
found to be significant in the one-way fixed effect at the MSA-level were used.  Given that a 
nearly universal decline in African American segregation occurred between 1980-2000 (Iceland 
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et al 2004),  the significance of social isolation in the two-way fixed effect models suggests that 
eliminating invariant period effects is needed to find the effects of segregation on arrest.  A 
decline in social isolation of African Americans in MSAs may also be a factor in explaining 
general decreases in crime and arrest observed between 1980-2000. 
In contrast to segregation, race and ethnic variables seem to be generally more significant 
when MSA-level fixed effects are only used.  The one-way fixed effect models presented in 
Tables 2.10, 2.12, 2.14, and 2.16 show significance for ethnic Hispanics and foreign-born Asians 
that are not present in the two-way fixed effect models presented in Tables 2.09, 2.11, 2.13, and 
2.15.  These results generally suggest the significance of invariant period effects for race and 
ethnic Hispanic groups.  Given the rapid increase in Hispanics from 1980-2000 in the U.S. 
population, issues such as laws mandating deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes, 
characteristics/culture unique to foreign-born groups, and economic niches filled by ethnic 
groups may be examples of invariant period effects specific to these groups.   
Hence, this work finds that both segregation and immigration impact overall MSA-level 
arrest rates.  For segregation, the degree to which African Americans were exposed to other 
racial groups was found to be the significant predictor of changes in arrest rates.  For immigrant 
groups, changes in arrest rates were found to vary significantly by racial classification and ethnic 
subgroup.  An increase in the proportion of Asian and Mexican immigrants decreased arrest 
rates; in contrast, increases in Puerto Rican and black immigrants were associated with increases 
in arrest rates.  If arrest is a measure of assimilation into U.S. norms, these differences across 
race and ethnic groups may point towards segmented assimilation that is consistent with general 
findings by Portes and Colleagues (Portes and Hao 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and 
Zhou 1993, 1996) and Mary Waters (1994, 1996, 1999).   
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It should also be noted that, while this work provides some of the first longitudinal tests 
for the effects of segregation and immigration on arrest in existing research, much is lacking in 
empirically validating the issues proposed above.  Incomplete representation of individuals 
residing within MSAs and incomplete arrest data greatly reduce MSA sample size.  Likewise, 
missing data also may lead to wide variances in arrest rates.  The IPUMS data also only tracks 
first-generation immigrants into the U.S. and lacks data to estimate individual propensities across 
immigrant groups.  Further research using state data, increased number of time periods, and 
better measurement of race and ethnic origin would allow for more precise and accurate 
statistical analysis.  These critiques provide a framework for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1:  Means and standard deviations for Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) in sample 
Variable 1980 1990 2000 Composite 
     
     
Criminal Justice Variables     
Total Arrest Rate 4968.3 
(2739.1) 
5524.5 
(2096.3) 
4854.9 
(2419.5) 
5215.7 
(2331.5) 
Violent Crime Rate 208.2 
(125.7) 
265.1 
(178.8) 
214.3 
(150.5) 
230.6 
(152.6) 
Property Crime Rate 1218.7 
(437.1) 
1403.0 
(567.3) 
1088.5 
(532.3) 
1242.4 
(533.3) 
     
Racial Classification     
Proportion Black 9.46 
(8.76) 
9.29 
(8.63) 
9.57 
(9.02) 
9.43 
(8.8) 
Proportion White 80.4 
(14.5) 
76.3 
(16.9) 
69.6 
(19.6) 
75.3 
(17.7) 
Proportion Hispanic 
 
7.5 
(1.22) 
10.3 
(14.9) 
15.1 
(17.4) 
11.1 
(15.3) 
Proportion Asian 1.98 
(6.89) 
3.34 
(6.77) 
4.73 
(8.57) 
3.42 
(7.50) 
Proportion Native American 0.59 
(0.72) 
0.71 
(0.97) 
0.91 
(1.05) 
0.73 
(0.95) 
Hispanic Ethnic Subgroup     
Percent Mexican Foreign Born 4.23  
 (8.23) 
5.34  
  (9.82) 
6.61  
  (9.71) 
5.45  
 (9.37) 
Percent Puerto Rican Foreign Born 0.73   
  (1.81) 
0.47    
 (0.89) 
0.59   
 (1.10) 
0.59   
  (1.28) 
Percent  Cuban Foreign Born 0.061  
   (0.157) 
0.081  
   (0.18) 
0.061  
   (0.12) 
0.069      
(0.15) 
Percent Other Hispanic Foreign 
Born 
0.95   
 (1.74) 
0.80   
 (1.15) 
2.04    
 (2.89) 
1.25  
 (2.10) 
     
Immigation Variables     
Percentage Foreign Born 5.56 
(4.89) 
9.05 
 (7.82) 
12.2 
(9.76) 
9.08 
(8.26) 
Immigrant Race Variables     
Percentage Foreign-Born Asian 
Immigrant 
0.89 
(1.51) 
2.00 
(2.58) 
2.93 
(3.72) 
2.03 
(2.95) 
Percent Foreign Born White 
Immigrant 
2.68 
(1.92) 
2.93 
(1.82) 
2.83 
(1.81) 
 
2.83 
(1.84) 
Percent Black Foreign Born 0.19 
(3.4) 
0.42 
(0.89) 
0.54 
(1.06) 
0.83 
(0.78) 
Percentage Foreign-Born Hispanic 
Origin 
1.74 
(3.12) 
3.61 
(5.30) 
5.81 
(6.63) 
3.80 
(5.56) 
Hispanic Ethnic Subgroup     
Percent Mexican Foreign Born 1.22   
(2.96) 
2.39 
  (4.68) 
4.084  
  (5.65) 
2.62 
   (4.75) 
53
 
 
Percent Puerto Rican Foreign Born 0.017    
(.042) 
0.41 
 (0.870) 
.040 
  (0.82) 
0.29 
  (0.73) 
Percent  Cuban Foreign Born 0.19    
 (0.81) 
0.157 
 (0.61) 
0.097   
  (0.45) 
0.147    
(0.635) 
Percent Other Hispanic Foreign 
Born 
0.363 
 (0.77) 
0.69  
(1.37) 
1.25  
   (2.03) 
0.78    
  (1.54) 
     
African American Segregation 
Measures 
    
Dissimilarity 0.619 
(0.148) 
0.549 
(0.152) 
0.491 
(0.15) 
0.550 
(0.160) 
Isolation Index 0.403 
(0.254) 
0.33 
(0.241) 
0.313 
(0.24) 
0.347 
(0.245) 
Concentration Index 1.21 
(0.208) 
1.17 
(0.193) 
1.16 
(0.19) 
1.18 
(0.186) 
     
 Population Variables     
Log Population 12.82 
(1.10) 
12.94 
(1.12) 
13.07 
(1.13) 
12.95 
(1.11) 
Percentage of Population Aged 15-
29 
28.49 
(4.59) 
24.2 
(4.90) 
22.6 
(4.64) 
24.9 
(5.31) 
Percentage Of population Above 
Age 65 
11.2 
(4.22) 
12.34 
(4.2) 
11.67 
(2.52) 
11.76 
(3.72) 
     
Measures of Relative 
Deprivation/Affluence 
    
Percentage of Individuals with 
Incomes above 500% of poverty 
level 
17.8 
(5.24) 
21.3 
(7.85) 
24.33 
(8.19) 
21.3 
(7.68) 
Percentage of Residing Below 
Poverty Line 
15.06  
   (4.96) 
16.41 
  (6.57) 
15.89  
  (5.86) 
15.85 
   (5.92) 
Unemployment Rate 7.1 
(2.45) 
6.9 
(2.24) 
6.9 
(2.57) 
6.95 
(2.33)_ 
Proportion of Population over 25 
and with college Degree 
9.11 
(2.59) 
12.4 
(4.08) 
14.9 
(17.9) 
12.27 
(4.51) 
Percentage of Population over 25 
and lacking No High School Degree 
17.67 
(4.64) 
12.1 
(4.39) 
9.60 
(3.89) 
12.97 
(5.32) 
Percentage of Single Mothers in 
Population 
4.00 
(0.81) 
4.63 
(1.04) 
2.08 
(0.56) 
3.60 
(1.38) 
Sex Ratio (males per 100 females in 
population) 
95.97 
  (5.95) 
98.95  
  (9.21) 
100.02    
(6.42) 
65.4    
 (16.59) 
Divorce Rate  
(per 1,000 individuals) 
50.48 
   (11.4) 
67.2  
  (13.2) 
75.98  
   (14.5) 
98.5  
  (7.65) 
     
N 79 106 91 276 
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Table 2.2:  Bivariate fixed-effect relationship between changes in  MSA arrest rates 
and native born populations, by race 
 
 Native Born 
Hispanic 
Native Born 
White 
Native Born 
Asian 
Native 
Born  
Black 
Native Born Native 
American 
Native 
Born 
Other Race 
Total crime rate -207.9** 
(70.1) 
36.7 
(26.2) 
183.1 
(181.0) 
22.5    
(132.4) 
493.6    
(922.4) 
-3612.0+    
(2158.5) 
Violent Crime 
Rate 
-0.879 
(4.53) 
1.58 
(1.35) 
11.8 
(10.4) 
0.3 1   
(10.1) 
-16.3    
(59.2) 
-100.9    
(142.6) 
Property Crime 
crate 
-58.3*** 
(17.1) 
18.3*** 
(5.14) 
-140.4***    
(40.3) 
11.1   
(36.3) 
121.4    
(221.2) 
-1179.5+    
(644.4) 
+p<.10 *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 [two-tailed test] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3:  Bivariate fixed-effect relationship between changes in  MSA arrest rates and immigrant 
populations, by race 
 
 Percent 
Immigrant 
Immigrant 
Hispanic 
Immigrant 
White 
Immigrant 
Asian 
Immigrant 
Black 
Total crime rate -2623.6 
(3655.8) 
-54.36    
(60.04) 
29.6 
(252.0) 
-52.1    
(81.92) 
314.7*    
(166.4) 
Violent Crime Rate 375.0*    
(192.2) 
5.89*   
( 2.98) 
-9.80   
(17.01) 
9.01*   
(4.41) 
10.3    
(17.01) 
Property Crime crate -2393.9***   
(717.8) 
-32.5*    
(13.36) 
9.47   
(63.02) 
-56.5***    
(14.3) 
-89.3*   
 (44.75) 
+p<.10 *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 [two-tailed test] 
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Table 2.4:  Bivariate fixed-effect relationship between changes in  MSA arrest rates and Hispanic 
ethnic subgroup 
 
 Percent 
Mexican 
Percent  
Cuban 
Percent 
Puerto Rican 
Other,  
Hispanic 
Total crime rate -38.98 
(41.72) 
-361.4    
(680.4) 
-65.3 
(290.3) 
-183.3**   
(60.37) 
Violent Crime Rate 5.98*  
(2.56) 
23.94 
(42.37) 
19.03 
(18.02) 
-7.26+   
(3.82) 
Property Crime Rate -18.33+ 
(10.33) 
165.18    
(169.3) 
-15.7 
(72.4) 
-65.40*** 
(14.60) 
+p<.10 *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 [two-tailed test] 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5:  Bivariate fixed-effect relationship between changes in  MSA arrest rates 
and Hispanic origin, by immigrant status 
 
 Percent 
Mexican 
Native 
Percent 
Mexican  
Immigrant 
Percent  
Cuban  
Native 
Percent 
Cuban  
Immigrant 
Percent 
Puerto 
Rican 
Native 
Percent  
Puerto 
Rican 
Immigrant 
Percent  
Other 
Hispanic 
Native 
Percent 
Other 
Hispanic 
Immigrant 
Total 
crime 
rate 
34.72   
(82.8) 
-128.6+ 
(73.8) 
1684.8   
(2932.7) 
-592.9   
(744.8) 
-534.6* 
(226.7) 
412.1*    
(207.8) 
-334.2 
*** 
 (85.2) 
-9.2 
(148.8) 
Violent 
Crime 
Rate 
16.52*** 
(4.99) 
5.68   
(4.61) 
347.7+   
(180.8) 
-3.96 
(46.4) 
-
36.70** 
(14.07) 
42.5***   
(12.6) 
-15.6** 
(5.01) 
 2.32 
(9.28) 
Property 
Crime 
Rate 
-6.65 
(20.64) 
-45.31*   
(18.2) 
581.7  
(730.6) 
176.94   
185.6 
-34.7 
 ( 57.4) 
41.87 
 (52.4) 
-
92.6*** 
(22.0) 
-105.6** 
36.2 
+p<.10 *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 [two-tailed test] 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
 
 
The Effects of Race and Incarceration on Labor Market Outcomes 
of Less-Skilled Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background 
Why do less-skilled4 African American and Hispanic men continue to experience 
disparities in employment outcomes relative to whites?  In answering this question, 
neoclassical economists generally suggest that disparities stem from skill differences, 
while many racial theorists commonly assert discriminatory practices.   The rise of 
incarceration as a lifecourse event among less-skilled minorities, particularly African 
American men, has made involvement in the U.S. criminal justice system a critical factor 
in evaluating racial employment disparities.  By examining how race and incarceration 
history jointly predict employment disparities within individuals while controlling for 
racial differences in skills, this paper empirically examines employment theories of 
neoclassical economists and racial theorists. 
Audit studies and employer surveys have found penalties for both a criminal 
record and race in the labor market (Holzer et al. 2004; Holzer 2007; Pager 2003; Pager 
and Quillian 2005; Pager and Western 2005), with disparities present even when 
employers express no preference against hiring ex-offenders or African Americans.  
Pager’s (2003) audit study dramatically shows these results.  In matched pairs 
interviewing for jobs, white ex-felons were as likely to receive callbacks as black men 
without a criminal record.  Rate of callbacks received by black ex-felons was close to 
zero, with study size possibly suppressing full differences between black men with and 
without a criminal record.     
                                                 
4 Here, I define ‘less-skilled’ as those who have at most a high school education and no extended college or 
educational training.  Morris and Western (1999) document the decline in real wages for the bottom 80% of 
income earners in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.   
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Neoclassical economists such as the Nobel Laureate James Heckman (1998) have 
discounted the findings of audit studies as evidence of discrimination, viewing statistical 
racial differences in wages as approximate “markers” for average racial differences in 
AFQT or SAT scores (Becker 1957; Neal 2005; Neal and Johnson 1996).  Relative to 
employers who do not perform criminal background checks, research of employers by 
Holzer, Offner, and Stolls (2004) has found that employers who perform criminal 
background checks are statistically more likely to hire African Americans.  Such research 
suggests that race may be used as a proxy for not hiring those with criminal histories. 
The extension of incarceration to racial disparities in employment results, in part, 
from incarceration becoming increasingly common among less-skilled minorities.  
Approximately16 million men, including 5.5 million black men, are estimated to have 
possessed a felony conviction in 2004 (Uggen, Manza, and Thompson 2006).  At current 
incarceration rates, Bonczar (2003a) has estimated that one-third of black males, 17% of 
Hispanic males, and 5% of white males will spend one year or more in state or federal 
prison.  Pettit and Western (2004b) have found that incarceration disproportionately 
impacts less-skilled men and minorities; black high school dropouts remain at greatest 
risk, with 60% spending one year or more in prison by age 44.  Work by urban 
ethnographers (Anderson 1990b, 1999; Duneier 1999) and quantitative researchers 
(Holzer 2007; Western 2002; Wilson 1996b) have documented how issues of poverty, 
homelessness, wage penalties, and unemployment occur for ex-offenders.  Western and 
Pettit (2005) have argued that as much as 60% of the wage gap between blacks and 
whites may be explained by wage penalties leading black ex-offenders to choose  
unemployment..   
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Among neoclassical economists, these wage and employment disparities are 
interpreted as derived from skill differentials or perceived discrimination.  James 
Heckman (1998, 2000) argues that an individual’s internalization of perceived 
discrimination creates behaviors and sorting that drives down mean earnings and wages.  
In studies of wages and labor-market outcomes (Donohue and Heckman 1991; Neal and 
Johnson 1996), empirical evidence supports the view that perceived discrimination alters 
both performance and decisions to enter labor markets.  Extending the statistical 
discrimination models of Gary Becker, Holzer, et al (2004) interpret reluctance of small 
firms to hire black men as a proxy for risks associated with hiring ex-felons. 
Countering neoclassical interpretations, urban ethnographies (Anderson 1990b; 
Newman 2000; Wilson 1996b) and audit studies (Pager 2003; Pager and Western 2005) 
provide evidence that effects of race and a criminal record hinder less-skilled workers in 
the labor market. However, empirical research on how race and incarceration may jointly 
impact incarceration is currently lacking.  Sociological research by Western (2002) and 
Johnson (2003) document wage differentials by race and criminal background, but 
sample size and quantitative methods limit applicability to findings from audit studies 
and ethnographic research.  In researching the effects of incarceration in the transition to 
adulthood,  Raphael (2006) utilizes advanced modeling techniques to determine how 
incarceration impacts employment, but fails to investigate how race impacts labor market 
outcomes. Traditional fixed effect modeling also assumes normally-distributed outcomes, 
predisposing analysis to continuous variables such as wages. 
This paper augments existing audit studies and prior empirical research.  Using 
panel data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), I focus on 
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how labor force participation and unemployment may differ for minorities and ex-felons.  
By starting with a sample of less-skilled men (e.g., no more than a high school degree or 
GED at age 22), I attempt to empirically test if unemployment and labor force 
participation vary for populations more closely resembling audit studies of less-skilled 
men.  By estimating fixed effects models using negative binomial regression, I am able to 
(a) address critiques suggesting that disparities in employment reflect natural differences 
in productivity,  (b) model non-normal distributions for weeks unemployed and not in the 
labor force during a calendar year, and (c) observe whether blacks and Hispanics differ 
from whites in employment outcomes given prior incarceration.   
 
Theory/Hypotheses 
 
In this section, I examine prior theoretical and statistical research using the 
NLSY79 to formulate hypotheses for examining how race and history of incarceration 
impact employment of less skilled men.  Hence, this section contains three subsections in 
which I (a) examine existing theoretical debates relevant to wages and incarceration, (b) 
discuss limitations of prior statistical research on analysis, and (c) discuss hypotheses 
tested in analysis.  In the first subsection, I discuss audit studies and critiques.   A review 
of this literature suggests that a more nuanced interpretation of employment outcomes 
varying by race and incarceration is needed to empirically verify if race and incarceration 
jointly impact incarceration.   
In the next subsection, I discuss prior analysis of NLSY79 data to estimate 
consequences of incarceration on employment.  Prior statistical methods and modeling 
techniques are discussed, with the goal of constructing methods used in data analysis.   
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By doing so, I attempt to more fully take advantage of NLSY79 data to test the effects of 
race and history of incarceration on employment outcomes.    
Finally, I discuss hypotheses I will test in this study.  This subsection is generated 
from the reviews in the prior two sections, with the intent of framing the theoretical and 
statistical methods I later use in analysis.   
 
Current Theoretical Issues 
Audit Studies and the Neoclassical Critique 
 
Recent audit studies by Pager (2003) and Pager and Western (2005) have found 
that potential employers initiate callbacks to whites and non-offenders more frequently 
than for blacks and those with a criminal record.  By careful matching and inclusion of 
secondary variables, these new audit studies attempt to address validity claims made by 
neoclassical econometricians (Heckman 1998, 2000; Heckman et al. 1998; O'Neill, 
Sweetman, and Van de gaer 2006).  These critiques argue that unobserved heterogeneity 
and lack of extended testing severely draw into question claims that the audit methods 
reveal any form of discrimination, while racial differences are largely explained by skill 
differences observed between racial groups in empirical analysis.  Heckman’s (1998) 
argument, in particular, strongly asserts that perceived returns for skill are causal for 
observed disparities in wage differences and unemployment in the labor market. Research 
in this vein suggests that differences in hiring and wages, based on “average” group 
differences, explain relative disparities observed for  blacks and ex-offenders (Edelman et 
al. 2006; Neal and Johnson 1996).    
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Neoclassical theory underlying this critique and associated empirical research can 
be traced to Becker’s (1957) notion of “statistical discrimination” and Becker’s (1975) 
theory of human capital.  Regarding the former, Becker’s theory of discrimination has 
been extensively utilized by economists to argue that no employer actively discriminating 
against African Americans can stay in business.  Modern reinterpretations of this thesis 
(e.g., Heckman 1998) interpret “actively discriminate” as “above accepted norms,” yet 
still maintain that discrimination is nearly non-existent in the Post-Civil-Rights Era.   
Countering this argument, contemporary racial theorists such as Bonilla-Silva (2001, 
2003) and Bobo (1999) argue that discrimination may reside in group-differences which 
lie beyond conscious or individual-based prejudice.  For these racial theorists, 
discrimination by employers lies in group-based norms and practices, such as adopting an 
industry-wide standard of background checks or using skin tone as a proxy for observed  
productivity of African Americans.  As Loury (1998) also notes, the use of racial 
stereotypes may also create practices and policies which influence employee-applicant 
pools; for example, more productive ex-felons may enter the informal labor market and 
not apply to jobs due to an understanding that wages will not be based on skills, but a set 
of socially-defined norms. This would downwardly bias productivity among applicants 
with criminal records, generating outcomes that are not reflective of all ex-felons. 
Such theories are also used to explain differential treatment of ex-offenders; thus, 
it is important to consider how patterns may form based on both the hiring patterns of 
employers and the behavior of individuals.  Regarding employer practices, some 
empirical research has begun to address the issue of employer behavior and treatment of 
ex-offenders.  In a national survey of employers, Holzer et al. (2004) find that: (a) smaller 
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firms who do not use background checks are less likely to hire blacks; (b) employers in 
service and finance industries are less likely to hire offenders; and (c) employers are more 
likely to hire ex-felons through networks or referrals than through help wanted ads or 
agencies.  In surveying firm behavior, Pager and Quillian (2005) have found that 
employers, even while expressing no objection to hiring either non-convicted African 
Americans or felony drug offenders, make fewer callbacks to job candidates who are 
black and ex-felons.  In a review of the literature on employer preferences for hiring 
whites and non-offenders, Edleman et al. (2006) argue that these employer preferences 
typically result from variation in the skill gaps of African Americans and other groups, 
with fears of increased liability due to hiring ex-felons also listed as a reason for hiring 
decisions.  Similar to Holzer et al. (2004), African Americans are viewed to suffer in the 
labor market relative to whites through a combination of low skills and disproportionate 
rates of incarceration.    
At the other side of the employer-employee relationship, the behavior of potential 
employees who are black and possess a criminal record must also be considered.  The 
work of urban researchers has provided evidence that chronic unemployment leads to 
criminal activity and work in the informal labor market.  Anderson’s (1990b, 1999) 
research into black urban ghettoes in Philadelphia finds that black males engage in 
criminal activities to generate income.  Wilson (1987; 1996b) argues that crime, extended 
social networks, and subsistence on government support are survival strategies employed 
by those in urban ghettoes.  Duneier’s (1999) study of “men without accounts” (i.e., men 
unable to find employment in the formal economy)  found these individuals engage in 
selling and collecting magazines, books and other re-sellable items, thus creating work 
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and labor markets outside the formal economy.  Given the structural and cultural 
mechanisms that have led to the physical and social segregation of minorities (in 
particular, blacks) from non-minority regions of economic growth and job networks 
(Massey and Denton 1994; Mouw 2000, 2002; Wilson 1996b), such urban research 
suggests that strategies of crime, welfare receipt and self-employment in the formal or 
informal labor market become employment sources for less-skilled blacks. 
  
Race, Incarceration Status & Labor Market Outcomes  
These racial disparities in both employment and wages are well established in the 
empirical literature.  Independent of incarceration status, both African American males 
and females are disproportionately regulated into the secondary labor market (Bonacich 
1972; Edwards 1976; Handel 1999; Kalleberg, Reskin, and Hudson 2000; Morris and 
Western 1999; Waldinger 1996).  Empirically, non-incarcerated blacks males have been 
adversely impacted relative to low-skilled whites and Hispanics for both earnings and 
employment levels in the 1980s and 1990s (Darity and Meyers 1998; Holzer and Offner 
2006; Johnson 2003; Tomaskovic-Devey, Thomas, and Johnson 2005).  The relegation of 
blacks to secondary labor markets regardless of criminal record has been well 
documented among sociologists (Handel 1999; Kalleberg et al. 2000; Morris and Western 
1999).  Western and Pettit (2005), in an analysis of the black-white wage gap with 
NLSY79 data, use a two-stage Heckman model to impute that up to 60% of black-white 
earnings may be explained by employment issues related to criminal histories.   
Given Holzer et al.’s (2004) finding that employers often express preference for 
hiring non-offenders to those with criminal records regardless of racial classification, ex-
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felons are also likely delegated to the secondary labor markets.5  For black ex-felons who 
might traditionally have been employed within secondary labor markets, observed 
employer preference against hiring blacks and ex-felons may imply this group is 
especially disadvantaged over white ex-felons and black non-felons.  As a result, black 
ex-felons may turn to informal or illegal economic activities if limitations in labor market 
opportunities are too severe.  Johnson’s (2003) analysis of cumulative unemployment and 
labor force experience among minorities and ex-offenders finds that incarceration status 
is associated with increased unemployment and decreased work experience across the 
lives of low-skilled men.  Western’s (2002) analysis of NLSY79 data finds that 
incarceration substantially penalizes wage trajectories for all males, reporting similar 
findings for other racial groups for unemployment.   
By Becker’s (1975) standard theory of skills (i.e., human capital), individuals 
accumulate both general and job-specific skills through education and work that 
determine an individual’s labor market wage.  Neoclassical economists argue that race 
and gender differences in wages are a proxy for average differences in productivity (Neal 
2005; Neal and Johnson 1996; Sowell 1982), while sociologists argue that standard 
human capital theory justifies discrimination in work and employment against women 
and minorities (Becker 1975; Budig 2001; Johnson 2003; Reskin 1998; Tomaskovic-
Devey et al. 2005).  Standard human capital models predict that human capital may 
stagnate or depreciate while individuals undergo incarceration (Western 2002).  While a 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that “secondary labor market” here refers to the category of low-wage, part-time, and 
low-skilled work defined by Edwards (1979) as a peripheral labor market. Edwards classifies secondary 
labor markets as part of the “industrial reserve army” of workers for labor not requiring training that may 
vary by day. The secondary labor market is also part of the formal economy, whereas the term “informal 
economies” discussed elsewhere in this essay is reserved for jobs outside the formal labor market (e.g., 
work falling outside state/federal law and formal GDP estimates). 
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criminal record has been shown to correlate with negative earnings (Edelman et al. 2006; 
Freeman 1996; Western 2002), recent research has suggested that length of incarceration 
does not impact wage penalties (Kling 2006).   
Experiences and research of former felons-turned-academics suggests that barriers 
to rehabilitation, such as memory of societal norms, accumulation of legal debt and child 
support, untreated drug habits, and legal barriers to being employed within industry 
sectors, impact the ability to work (Richard and Jones 2004).  Yet, as a recent report by 
the Urban Institute indicates, incarceration may provide opportunities for further 
educational or vocational attainment.  Soloman et al (2004) have found that a majority of 
state and federal prisoners receive formal education or vocational training while in 
prison; in 2000, almost 1.2 million of the 1.4 million individuals serving time in state and 
federal prison participated in some type of inmate labor (e.g., farm labor, general work, 
or contract work with private firms).  Paired with inmate labor, the educational and 
vocational training suggests that general human capital and work experience likely does 
not decline or stagnate during incarceration, contrary to normal assumptions.  Rather, 
structural issues, such as lack of drug treatment, debt and child support, and legal barriers 
to work, act against ex-offender’s reintegration into society.  These issues suggest that the 
general benefits of work in desistence from crime reported for long-term, high paying 
jobs (Sampson and Laub 1993; Uggen 2000) may be generally counteracted by social 
stigma and labeling due to incarceration (Johnson 2003).  Edleman et al. (2006) conclude 
that ex-offenders obtain inferior GED credentials and have criminal records that 
eliminate possible employment in security, health care, education, and financial 
industries; the lower-skilled credentials and legal barriers to various industries combine 
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to produce these results, not social stigma.  Some research suggests that the wide array of 
disadvantages and obstacles faced by ex-offenders may “saturate” offenders in a manner 
that prevents social reintegration6 (Hannon 2003).  If the incarceration effect prevents 
changes in educational attainment and substance abuse from influencing employment 
outcomes, empirical results would lend support to this thesis. 
One of the most important identified characteristics of current and former ex-
felons is formal educational attainment.  Among African American males, for example, 
60% of high school dropouts versus 10% of college graduates will serve one year or more 
in state or federal prison (Pettit and Western 2004b).  Lack of skill is generally 
hypothesized to play a major role in wage trajectories and labor market decisions to 
engage in illegal activities (Becker 1968; Neal and Johnson 1996); during the 1980s and 
1990s, changes in returns-to-education were generally found to increasingly divide low-
skilled and college-educated males (Darity and Meyers 1998; Holzer, Offner, and 
Sorensen 2005; Morris and Western 1999).  Western and colleagues (Western and 
Beckett 1999; Western and Pettit 1999, 2005) have argued that the convergence of black-
white earnings observed during the economic boom of the 1990s occurs artificially due to 
exclusion of incarcerated populations and ex-felons from the formal labor market.  While 
other factors identified above, such as substance abuse, social stigma, lack of family 
stability, and impoverished neighborhoods may be underlying causes, educational 
attainment represents a key factor in distinguishing “at risk” populations.    
   
                                                 
6 Hannon’s (2003) usage of “disadvantage saturation” extends McLeod’s (1995b) argument that a lack of 
cultural capital may create impermeable barriers to assimilation for impoverished, inner city black men.  
Here, I similarly use “saturate” to imply that environmental factors may prevent reintegration of ex-
offenders into formal labor markets and society in general. 
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Prior Empirical Research Using the NLSY79 
 
As with most publicly-available national datasets, prior research on employment 
outcomes and incarceration informs the scope of this paper. In this section, I discuss prior 
statistical research using the NLSY79 dataset to examine links between employment and 
incarceration.   
Freeman (1993) analyzes NSLY79 data to determine effects of incarceration on 
employment outcomes in interview years of 1980 and 1983.  This analysis relies on a 
single-period incarceration measure as a pseudo-experiment.  Freeman uses two other 
datasets (The Boston Youth Survey and Inner City Survey) to replicate findings that 
incarceration reduces number of weeks of employment for 15-20 weeks during a calendar 
year.  Use of multiple datasets helps to validate findings.  However, the NLSY sample of 
those incarcerated in 1980 and 1983 represents less than 20% of reported total jail 
interviews, substantially limiting range of sample data, and does not include effects of 
multiple incarceration spells or the large economic expansion of the 1990s.  Nevertheless, 
Freeman’s analysis with multiple data sets is convincing evidence that incarceration 
negatively impacts employment outcomes of ex-offenders.   In analyzing predictors of 
incarceration from early deviance and arrest patterns, Freeman (2000a) tabulates 
differences among current and former ex-felons but does not conduct further regression 
analysis extending his 1992 work on employment or wages.     
  For statistical analysis, Freeman (1993) also adopts usage of an instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation approach to control for estimation bias which may result from  
unobserved respondent’s personal characteristics prior to incarceration.  Instrumental 
variable techniques are used to obtain estimators or predictors thought to correlate with 
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individual error terms.  As Greene (2003) notes, IV methods do not allow for estimation 
of potential correlation between predictors and unobserved error terms; additionally, 
choice of instrument may also be highly normative.  Freeman’s IV approach assumes a 
single random error component (ei) and does not include panel analysis where repeat 
incarceration spells may occur.    
Work by Western and colleagues (Western 2002, 2006; Western and Beckett 
1999; Western, Kling, and Weinman 2001; Western and Pettit 1999, 2005) has attempted 
to estimate labor force participation, wage trajectories and unemployment among 
incarcerated men.  Early work by Western and Beckett (1999) uses random effects 
models to show that incarcerated males have lower employment rates relative to non-
incarcerated males after a seven-year period.  These models create “lagged incarceration 
effects” through pooled time series analysis.  This sample focuses on labor supply effects 
for juvenile offenders in analysis (Western, Kling, and Weisman 2001), while treating 
later incarceration spells as a control variable.  Given the substantive difference in 
treatment of juvenile and adult offenders (Mauer 2003; Uggen and Massoglia 2003) and 
the differences observed among offenders that commit crimes only in adolescence versus 
also in later adulthood (Moffitt 1993b; Nagin and Land 1993; Sampson and Laub 1993; 
Sampson and Laub 2003a), differences in adult and juvenile incarceration may 
substantively alter results in measured unemployment and labor force participation rates.   
Additionally, random effects models assume a normally-distributed error term for 
individuals that does not eliminate time-invariant effects. 
In addition to the work cited above, Western’s (2002) paper warrants additional 
discussion.  That study’s analysis of the effects of incarceration on wage trajectories 
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using NLSY79 data addresses the effects of multiple periods of incarceration on labor 
market outcomes, while also employing fixed-effect models to analyze panel data.  
Western estimates models separately for blacks, whites, and Hispanics.  While Western 
notes that labor market outcomes for employment and incarceration are modeled, he does 
not discuss these results.  Western’s analysis explores the possibility that criminal careers 
may disrupt earnings trajectories and finds that, on average, ex-offenders earn about 16% 
less than non-offenders, when controlling for differences in age, education, and multiple 
incarceration spells.  Consistent with Grogger’s (1995) findings that length of 
incarceration does not significantly alter the effects of incarceration, Western finds the 
effects of incarceration on wages are largely incurred after incarceration takes place.  It is 
important to note that Western’s approach to analysis (a) assumes that individuals “at 
risk” for incarceration are chosen from those with self-reported criminal behavior at the 
beginning of each sample; (b) includes analysis of all males, regardless of educational 
level; and (c) estimates separate trajectories for blacks, whites, and Hispanics.  These 
assumptions deviate from assumptions in the audit surveys conducted by Pager and 
colleagues (Pager 2003; Pager and Western 2005).     
In her dissertation analysis, Johnson (2003) utilizes NLSY79 data to estimate 
individual-level fixed effect models for wage and employment trajectories of individuals.  
Johnson’s analysis estimates cumulative employment experience over the working lives 
of adult males, with educational level, current and prior incarceration status during each 
wave of interview, age, AFQT score, and race-prior incarceration interactions as 
independent predictors.  On average, Johnson finds that prior incarceration decreased 
cumulative employment experience by 70 weeks by 2000 (ages 35-43), with uniform 
93
 
 
decreases in cumulative unemployment for prior incarceration across all racial groups.  In 
Johnson’s sample, blacks also experience two fewer weeks of employment than whites 
for every year of aging.    
 It is important to note that Johnson’s sample omits data when zero or negative 
earnings are reported.  Unlike Western (2002), Johnson’s analysis does not restrict 
sample selection to offenders committing criminal activity at time of initial interview, 
and it includes all educational levels from 1979-1998.  Her use of cumulative 
employment and wage trajectory models assumes that human capital increases with work 
experience, with incarceration marking periods where work experience does not 
accumulate.  She interprets employment and wage penalties incurred from incarceration 
as resulting from discrimination by employers, with effects also occurring by race.   
Recent work by Raphael (2006) analyzes NLSY79 data to examine the effects of 
incarceration on transition to adulthood.  Raphael’s findings suggest that a history of 
incarceration substantively decreases the likelihood of subsequent employment.  Raphael 
incorporates two-way fixed effect models at the individual and year level, eliminating 
time-invariant characteristics for individuals and periods that may impact employment in 
the process.  Raphael’s statistical methodology addresses limitations of studies discussed 
above but lacks focus on two key issues.  First, by using the full sample of men and 
incorporating racial differences into age-race interaction variables of his sample 
population, Raphael fails to test findings of audit studies where joint effects of race and 
incarceration are found.   Second, Raphael assumes the effect of an incarceration is 
uniform over time and across racial groups.  
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Hypotheses for Analysis 
 
 In this subsection, I summarize the literature reviews for (a) theoretical links 
between race, incarceration, and employment and (b) prior work in the NLSY79 linking 
employment and incarceration.  The section on theoretical hypotheses extends results 
from audit studies to analysis of panel data in this study, while also addressing 
neoclassical economic arguments.  The section on prior work on the NLSY79 also frames 
the methodological hypotheses that extend prior research in data analysis.   
 
Theoretical Hypotheses 
 
 Current statistical research has not fully examined the results from recent audit 
studies which find that penalties for race and incarceration may jointly impact 
employment outcomes among less-skilled men.  In this study, I attempt to test for these 
joint effects in a longitudinal sample of men.  To address neoclassical arguments that 
racial differences in skills may underlie observed differentials in unemployment, I also 
incorporate educational variables.  I include measures of both history of incarceration and 
length since last prior incarceration to more closely model long-term employment 
outcomes of less-skilled men. 
One key hypothesis is that, controlling for educational level, African American 
and Hispanic ex-felons will experience higher rates of unemployment and being out of 
the labor force relative to white ex-felons.  By selecting my sample based on educational 
levels instead of race, I focus on observed differences among less-skilled ex-offenders in 
the labor market.  This methodology more closely replicates audit studies.      
Audit studies suggest that penalties in hiring exist for both African Americans and 
ex-felons in employment.  The sociological literature suggests that African Americans 
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operate in secondary labor markets, where little or no educational attainment and skill are 
normally required for employment.  Employers also express strong preference against 
hiring ex-offenders.  To test for independent effects, I test for employment differentials 
that may result due to incarceration.  Within individuals, obtaining a history of 
incarceration should result in significant employment penalties.  If race and incarceration 
effects on employment occur, significance of race and incarceration interaction should 
show that black and Hispanic ex-felons will have higher unemployment and lower labor 
force participation relative to non-incarcerated blacks and ex-felons.  I also test for 
interactions between race and years since last incarceration to examine if, relative to 
whites, employment disparities linger among blacks and Hispanics with a history of 
incarceration.    
To test if returns to education vary by race and incarceration for employment 
outcomes, I will include interaction terms for race and educational attainment.  
Significance of interaction for race and education in predicting employment suggests 
differential returns for low-skill workers.  If race and incarceration exert joint effects on 
employment when controls for changes in racial variances of skills are included in 
analysis, this would suggest that racial variances in employment for ex-offenders are not 
simply skill-based. 
 
Statistical Methods 
Within sociology, lack of systematic analysis of panel data also has prevented full 
utilization of panel data within the discipline (Allison 1994, 2005b; Halaby 2004).  As 
Hallaby (2004) notes, empirical analysis by Western (2002) and Western and Pettit 
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(1999) did not fully take advantage of the analysis of random and fixed-effect models in 
systematically analyzing panel data for incarceration effects.  Fuller’s usage of statistical 
models allows for comparison of effects in non-random assignments within individuals to 
assessment of causal inference.  By analyzing populations where dependent variables 
mimic randomized experiments of incarceration effects given sets of control variables, 
quantitative research may further validate outcomes from randomized experiments 
(Heckman et al. 1998; Western et al. 2001).  This paper will focus on the differential 
labor force participation and unemployment outcomes among minorities and those with 
histories of incarceration.  This provides an empirical test of audit surveys that have been 
heavily criticized by some economists (e.g., Heckman 1998). 
By using all available years of incarceration and dividing error components to 
include (a) individual-level fixed effects (ui); (b) year fixed-effects (wt); and (c) a random 
disturbance term that varies by year and individual (eit), I will address limitations of 
Freeman’s analysis.  Individual-level (ui) and year (wt) fixed effects eliminate all 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics that may vary across individuals and periods.  
By eliminating these components in modeling, individual characteristics and period 
effects that may determine employment outcomes cancel out, avoiding issues associated 
with using the instrumental-variable approach. 
Western (2002) and Johnson (2003) select individuals based on self-reports of 
delinquent acts in 1979.  However, human capital theory and demographic studies 
suggest less-skilled individuals are much more likely to engage in criminal behavior and 
enter the criminal justice system (Becker 1968; Pettit and Western 2004).  Audit studies 
examining the effects of incarceration and race also focus on less-educated groups.  By 
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selecting a sample of less-skilled men (i.e., with no more than a high school education) I 
analyze individuals most likely to be “at risk” for entry into the criminal justice system 
and face long-term employment outcomes similar to those studied in recent audit studies. 
Western (2002) also estimates separate models for African Americans, whites, 
and Hispanics. This does not fully integrate findings that differences in skill are observed 
in analysis by economists (Neal and Johnson 1996) who analyze NLSY79 data to find 
that racial variation in skills (measured by AFQT scores) explains almost three-fourths of 
observed variance in wages.  I will place all racial groups into the same data pool for 
analysis and use interactions to determine wage penalties for race and incarceration 
instead of estimating separate group models.  Separate models for black, white, and 
Hispanic subpopulations will also be estimated for comparative outcomes.   
 Johnson’s (2003) analysis focuses on differences in career wages and earnings, 
focusing on the differentials in human capital that occur over the life-course.  My 
analysis differs by using count-data to model the effects of incarceration on annual weeks 
of unemployment and time out of the labor force to test if repeated cross-sectional data 
mimics audit studies.  Johnson’s analysis also assumes that differences in human capital 
determine wages; based on empirical and theoretical issues outlined above, I focus on 
whether or not increased formal education and training my benefit populations of low-
skill ex-offenders and blacks7.  I also test if differences in racial returns to education do 
not substantially impact race-incarceration effects on employment.   
                                                 
7 Please note that the use of individual-level fixed-effect models assume away constant or unchanging 
education that an individual may have.  The fixed-effect model thus measures the effect of changes in 
education on subsequent unemployment.  By using interactions, I test if increased educational attainment 
for blacks and ex-felons differentially predicts unemployment.   
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 Finally, the modeling techniques mentioned above closely resembles those used 
by Raphael (2006) in studying employment as an outcome variable for individuals 
transitioning to adulthood after undergoing incarceration.  My analysis differs from 
Raphael in three ways.  First, to model the effects of incarceration, I utilize negative 
binomial fixed effect models (vs. traditional GLS fixed models used in analysis by 
Raphael).  This better the highly models the highly non-normal distribution count of 
weeks of unemployment and being out of the labor force during a calendar year.  Second, 
I test for race and incarceration interactions to test for joint effects of race and 
incarcerations on employment.  Raphael uses a pooled sample of racial groups, but 
assumes the effects of incarceration on employment are identical across groups.  Third, 
Raphael uses a collapsed dependent variable for weeks unemployed during a given year.  
I aggregate raw counts of weeks unemployed during a calendar year from work histories 
of employers. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
For analysis, I will analyze data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.  
The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 individuals ranging in age 
from 14-22.  From 1979-1993, a comprehensive set of survey questions was asked 
annually for all participants in the sample; biannual surveys were also asked to all 
respondents from 1994-2004.  As of 2004, approximately 7,661 of original respondents 
were interviewed (~79% of all original interviewees).  Of the 5,025 cases not interviewed 
in 2004, approximately 2,600 were military and non-minority poor dropped from the 
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sample, 421 individuals were deceased, 1134 refused interview, 800 were listed as being 
either difficult cases or “other,” and 80 individuals were listed as incarcerated.  It should 
be noted that 2004 marks the first year in the NLSY79 that incarceration is listed as a 
reason for non-interview.  While non-response and lost cases may also downwardly bias 
estimates due to disproportional representation among those living in poverty or 
incarcerated (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 2004), panel data analyzed with 
fixed-effect models allows for testing within persons and observed time periods.   
The structure of the NLSY79 allows for panel data analysis of respondents with 
twenty-one waves of data collection on social and economic variables.  A NLSY79 
appendix file for respondent work histories includes weekly data for unemployment and 
labor force participation.  I utilize both the main dataset and work history appendix in my 
analysis.   
 
Respondents  
As discussed in the previous section, this paper focuses on the analysis of less-
skilled men.  Individuals selected for analysis were individuals who had completed no 
more than twelve years of education at age 22.  This selection of individuals mimics audit 
studies such as Pager (2003) where college-age students have been used. By eliminating 
individuals who complete more than twelve years of education at age 22, this selection 
captures individuals who, as young adults, spend substantial time as “at risk” for 
incarceration relative to those who complete post-secondary education8 (Pettit and 
                                                 
8 While more highly educated groups commit crimes and undergo incarceration, eliminating individuals 
with higher education levels help reduce effects of incarceration on employment outcomes though 
mechanisms such as increased wealth, participation in the primary labor market, or obtaining jobs through 
social networks.  Additionally, examination of individuals with lower levels of education selects a 
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Western 2004).  Of the original sample of NLSY79 respondents, a sample of 4,610 men 
had completed no more than twelve years of education at age 22, including 2,599 white 
males, 1,244 black men, and 767 Hispanic men.  The 1979 sample characteristics of the 
respondents are presented in Table 1.   
 
Employment 
    As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, unemployment arises when an individual 
does not have a job but actively seeks employment in the formal economy.  Labor force 
participation occurs when an individual either works or seeks employment within the 
formal economy; those who do not participate in the labor force do not participate in the 
labor market of the formal economy.  The disparities in unemployment and labor force 
participation among both minorities (Darity and Meyers 1998; Holzer and Offner 2006) 
and those with histories of incarceration (Raphael 2006; Western and Beckett 1999) have 
been documented.  Hence, by analyzing measures of unemployment and labor force 
participation, this study more closely examines the dynamics of race and history of 
incarceration on the labor market outcomes of less-skilled men. 
 The number weeks of unemployment and labor force participation during a given 
calendar year in the general NLSY79 dataset are provided in categorical levels.  To 
generate count data for annual weeks of unemployment and labor force participation, 
weekly labor force participation and unemployment of respondents are drawn from the 
NLSY79 “Work History” variables.  Weekly work history variables are constructed in 
                                                                                                                                                 
population where work is essential to generate earnings for survival.  Racial differences in the effects of 
incarceration may also be obscured among more highly educated groups, due to the enforcement of equal 
opportunity laws among employers in the primary labor market.   For such reasons, removing individuals 
with higher levels of education allows for better measurement of the effects of race and incarceration on 
employment.     
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the NLSY79 data from a respondent’s self-reports on periods unemployed, not working, 
or employed in a given job.  Details on the work history files may be found online at:    
http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/workhist.htm. 
Table 3.2 presents means and standard deviations for annual weeks of 
unemployment and weeks outside the labor force among less-skilled men in the sample.  
Annual weeks of unemployment and annual weeks out of the labor force reported in 
Table 3.2 are similar to those published by the NLSY for men during each calendar year 
of interview (for descriptive tables, see NLSY79 employment history summary tables 
available online at: 
http://www.nlsinfo.org/nlsy79/docs/79html/79text/workhist.htm#descriptive ).   
   
History of Incarceration 
 The NLSY measures incarceration by noting if individuals are interviewed in jail 
or prison.  While this form of incarceration data does not capture the full range of 
criminal justice contact (e.g., arrests, jail sentences served between interviews, etc.), this 
methodology provides certainty of incarceration, while providing conservative 
(downwardly biased) estimates of effects of incarceration on wages and unemployment9 
(Freeman 2000; Western 2002).  While non-response and lost cases may also 
downwardly bias estimates due to disproportional representation among marginalized 
populations such as the homeless or the poor, data analysis by Western (2002) and 
                                                 
9 The NLSY79 does not report spells of incarceration occurring between interviews.   Consequently, 
downwardly biased estimates of a incarceration are likely to result due to the fact that the NLSY79 is likely 
to miss individuals serving sentences less than one year in prison, but suffering the effects of a criminal 
record. 
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Raphael (2006) find that incarceration patterns closely follow those of published Bureau 
of Justice statistics estimates.    
Table 3.3 provides annual measures for the incarceration variables used in 
analysis for both the full sample and each racial group.  “Currently Incarcerated” 
measures whether an individual is interviewed in jail during a particular interview-year.  
“Ever incarcerated” indicates an individual has been interviewed in jail/prison during a 
current or former interview-year.  “Years since last prison interview” measures years 
since an individual was last interviewed in prison, where those with no prior history of 
incarceration have are coded as zero.   
 
Education 
In creating the sample, individuals who have completed more than thirteen grades 
of education at age 22 are removed from the dataset.  However, some individuals in the 
dataset pursue postsecondary education in later life or obtain a G.E.D.  To control for 
changes in education, I estimate models with indicators where individuals are high school 
dropouts, possess a GED, are high school graduates, or have completed postsecondary 
education in years after unemployment.  A control variable is also used to control for 
periods when individuals are in school fulltime during a particular interview-year. 
As Neal and Johnson (1996) and Neal (2005) document, racial differentials in 
AFQT scores explain about 75% of wage differences between blacks and whites in the 
NLSY79.  Completing a G.E.D. versus a high school diploma is one key measure for 
measuring these differentials.  If skill differentials explain racial differences in 
employment outcomes, these factors may explain racial variances in the effects of 
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incarceration on employment outcomes.  To control for this outcome, I estimate models 
with race and educational outcomes.  My measures for educational attainment are 
variables for highest grade completed and completion of a G.E.D.  Yearly means and 
standard deviations for educational attainment and the proportion of the sample with a 
G.E.D. are provided in Table3.2 2.   
 
Control Variables 
 Table 3.1 provides variable definitions for control variables used in analysis, 
along with 1979 means and standard deviations for full sample population and by racial 
classification.  These controls are measured across all interview-years in the sample and 
include region, urbanicity, welfare receipt, age, marital status, and work disability.   
Similar controls are used by Raphael (2006); like Raphael, I use second- and third-order 
polynomials to model nonlinear age patterns in employment.   
 
Methods 
Most empirical analyses of the effects of incarceration involve analysis of wage 
trajectories or wage penalties incurred as a result of incarceration (Grogger 1995; Holzer 
2007; Johnson 2003; Western 2002; Western and Pettit 1999, 2005).  But recent 
employer surveys (Holzer et al. 2004; Pager and Quillian 2005), audit studies (Pager 
2003; Pager and Western 2005) and urban ethnographies (Anderson 1990b; Duneier 
1999; Wilson 1996b) indicate that an inability to locate employment in the formal labor 
market also hinders ex-felons.  By analyzing patterns of labor force participation and 
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unemployment as dependent variables instead of wages, I examine if joint effects of race 
and history of incarceration are observed among less-skilled men. 
As discussed above and in the previous section, my aim is to test the extent to which 
incarceration of individuals, measured by interviews occurring in prison or jail, affects 
unemployment and labor force participation.  To conduct this analysis, I utilize the basic 
statistical model  
 
ln(Yit)= ln(β0t+ Σ(βjt * Xjit )+ + Σ(γkit * zkit )+ εit,),  
 
where i  and t represent the ith individual at time t, Yit is count data for number of weeks 
out of labor force participation or weeks of unemployment during a given year, β0t is a 
constant, Σ(βjt * Xjit ) is the set of time-varying predictors and coefficients, Σ(γkit * zkit ) is 
the set of time-invariant predictors and coefficients, εit represents the sum of error terms 
in the equation such that  
 
εit= eit + ui  + wt.   
 
Here, εit is an error component consisting of a random disturbance term eit, an individual-
level error term ui , and wt is an error term for period effects at time t.  Across all the 
models estimated, Hausman tests were found to be highly significant (e.g., p<0.001) 
versus random effects models, indicating a need for usage of a fixed-effect model to 
define ui as a fixed effect term.  Similarly, inclusion of fixed effect terms for sample 
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years were found to be highly significant, indicating the need for wt to control for 
unobserved period effects.    
In analysis, the statistical model described above differs from similar work by 
Freeman, Johnson, Raphael, and Western in key ways.  I describe these differences 
below, to summarize both current work and my contribution to existing literature.   
Unlike Freeman (1993), the adoption of panel data allows for multiple years of 
incarceration and extending from 1979-2004.  The use of repeated cross-sections to 
identify effects within individuals is one of the chief benefits of analyzing panel data 
(Halaby 2004).  By incorporating incarceration in predicting employment outcomes 
(versus significance of only a single incarceration spell), I better capture if incarceration 
plays a role in labor market outcomes. 
In analysis, I also make use of two-way fixed effects as repeated cross-sections 
and control for unobserved time invariant characteristics for individuals and time periods.  
Halaby (2004) and Allison (2005) note that fixed-effect models allow for repeated 
measurement for effects of a ‘treatment variable” such as incarceration.  Freeman’s 
(1993) instrumental variable approach is problematic in that choice of instrument and 
error-bias cannot be measured.  The analyses conducted by Western (2002) and Johnson 
(2003) utilize fixed-effect error components at the individual level, but lack year fixed-
effect error terms controlling for time invariant period effects.10  Time-invariant effects 
are utilized by Raphael (2006) to examine employment.   
Prior research does not utilize fixed-effect regression modeling for count data.  In 
prior research, Western (2002) examines real wages, Johnson (2003) examines 
                                                 
10 Examples of time-invariant effects are individuals being more likely to be arrested in early years of the 
sample due to crime-age effects, a constant effect of economic growth/recession on individuals predicting 
unemployment, and increased job search times due to spatial mismatch.   
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cumulative weeks of employment, and Raphael (2006) examines employment.  These 
studies all use fixed-effect modeling with a continuous dependent variable.  As Allison 
(2005) documents, fixed effect modeling may be similarly utilized for analyzing Poisson 
and Negative Binomial regression techniques.  Given employment in the labor force is 
measured in weeks out of labor force during a calendar year, I adopt negative binomial 
regression to model the repeated annual labor experiences of offenders and non-
offenders.  
It should be noted that the use of two fixed-effect models is not without 
limitations.  In contrast to the fixed-effect models cited above, random-effect models 
assume that the individual-level error term ui is from a common distribution (e.g., 
normally distributed) and uncorrelated with disturbance terms and independent 
predictors.11  Western and Pettit (1999) use a random-effect model to estimate effects of 
incarceration on employment by adding an error-component for individuals.  This method 
generates increased efficiency in estimation and allows for covariance parameters to be 
estimated for incarcerated and non-incarcerated groups.  However, unlike the fixed-
effects models discussed above, unobserved heterogeneity for individuals is assumed to 
be uncorrelated with random disturbance term and independent predictors.  In general, 
random-effect models are more efficient in estimation of predictors and standard errors, 
but are inconsistent when significant correlation exists between unobserved heterogeneity 
                                                 
11The distinction between either fixed effects or random effects is a somewhat artificial argument, though 
an assumption commonly made in the social sciences (Halaby 2004).  In general, it may be shown that 
random-effects models are a special case of fixed-effects models when the random error term ui is altered.  
In the random-effects model, time-invariant unobserved variables are unrelated to predictive variables and 
random disturbance terms, either by direct correlation or heteroskedasticity.  When ui is assumed to have 
correlation with predictor variables or disturbance terms, the model error structure alters to that of the fixed 
effect model (Allison 2005; Mundlak 1978).     
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across and independent predictors or disturbance terms in the specified regression model 
(Allison 2005; Halaby 2004).   Hence, the fixed-effect models I utilize result in increased 
potential for Type II errors (falsely rejecting a true hypothesis), and lack of measurement 
of observed time-invariant characteristics that accompanies the fixed effect model are 
costs of estimation.   
 
Results 
Unemployment: Main Effects 
 Table 3.4 presents results for unemployment for the full sample of less-educated 
men and racial subgroups.  In the estimated models, weeks unemployed during a calendar 
year are predicted by educational, incarceration, and demographic control variables.  By 
estimating results for the pooled sample of all less-skilled men, along with whites, blacks, 
and Hispanic sub-samples, I examine if models estimated across racial groups by 
Western (2002) substantially impact results. 
When controlling for years interviewed in prison, individuals with a history of 
incarceration are 1.65 (p<0.001) times more likely to spend additional weeks 
unemployed during a given year relative to those without history of incarceration.  These 
effects do not differ significantly differ by race, with a history of incarceration increasing 
risk of weeks unemployed by a factor of 1.65 among whites, a factor of 1.53 among 
blacks, and a factor of 1.69 among Hispanics.  For each consecutive year those with 
histories of incarceration remain out of prison, the effect of incarceration on weeks 
unemployed declines by 2.7% (p<0.001).  White men see an annual decline of 4.1%, 
which contrasts with an annual decline of 2.5% among blacks and 0.1% of Hispanics. 
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The results for these incarceration variables do not substantially change when educational 
categories are substituted for years of education.   
As neoclassical economists predict, variation in skills levels is a strong predictor 
of unemployment.  In the pooled sample, relative to high school graduates, risk for 
experiencing additional weeks of unemployment is 29% higher for high school dropouts, 
24.5% higher for those who have completed a G.E.D., and 12.7% lower for those who 
complete one or more years of postsecondary education.  In an alternative model 
considering years of education with a dummy variable for obtaining a G.E.D., each year 
of education completed is associated with a 4.5% decline in risk for increased 
unemployment, while a G.E.D. is associated with a 16% increased risk in unemployment.  
In contrast to incarceration variables, the effects of education on unemployment vary 
substantially across racial groups.  Educational attainment is found to vary most 
substantially among white men, with white high school dropouts and those obtaining a 
G.E.D. being ~45% more likely to experience additional weeks of unemployment.  In 
contrast, blacks who have dropped out of high school or obtained a G.E.D. are only 12% 
more likely to experience unemployment, while Hispanic high school dropouts are 24% 
more likely to experience unemployment; no effect is found among Hispanics obtaining a 
G.E.D. 
 Control variables were also associated with significant changes in risks for 
unemployment.  In the pooled sample and across all racial group subgroups, risk for 
married individuals declines by a factor of ~0.650 (p<0.001).  Receipt of public 
assistance increases risk for unemployment by a factor of 1.95 (p<0.001) for the pooled 
sample; this risk varies by race, where risk of unemployment increases by a factor of 2.16 
109
 
 
for whites, 1.71 for blacks, and 1.81 for Hispanics.  Similarly, an increase in the level of 
neighborhood unemployment increases risk of unemployment by 12% (p<0.001) for the 
pooled sample; the effects of level of neighborhood unemployment on individual risk of 
unemployment vary by race, with increases of 15% for whites and Hispanics, and only 
9% for blacks.  Moving to the Midwest is associated with an increased risk of 
unemployment, with varying effects across racial groups. 
 The results above indicate that a history of incarceration increases risk of annual 
weeks of unemployment by a factor of 1.65 (p<0.001); the effect of incarceration does 
not vary significantly by racial group.  For each year since an interview in prison, an 
individual’s risk for unemployment declines by approximate 2.7% (p<0.001), with 
whites facing the most substantial declines (4.1% per year, p<0.01) relative to blacks 
(2.5% per year, p<0.05) and Hispanics (0.1% per year).  These effects occur when 
controlling for marriage, age, neighborhood unemployment, receipt of public assistance, 
region and urbanicity, and educational attainment.  In estimating alternative models of 
educational attainment, the effects of incarceration variables on unemployment remain 
similar across racial groups, suggesting that differential skills resulting from a G.E.D. do 
not mitigate the link between incarceration and unemployment.   
 
Labor Force Nonparticipation, Main Effects 
 Table 3.5 presents results for unemployment for the full sample of less-educated 
men and racial subgroups.  In the estimated models, annual weeks of unemployment are 
predicted by education, incarceration, and demographic control variables.  As with the 
unemployment models discussed above, nonlinear effects for age are included in the 
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model; a second-order polynomial, however, was found to better fit labor force 
trajectories in analysis.  By estimating results for the pooled sample of all less-skilled 
men, along with whites, blacks, and Hispanics sub-samples, I examine if racial 
classification fundamentally biases results.   
 Relative to results from unemployment, a history of incarceration results in a 
much greater risk of spending time outside of the labor force; when controlling for 
interviews in prison, individuals with a history of incarceration are 2.31 times more likely 
to spend time outside of the labor force.  These results vary substantially by race, with 
whites 1.89 times more likely to spend time outside of the labor force, African Americans 
2.54 times more likely to spend weeks outside the labor force, and Hispanics 2.38 times 
more likely to spend weeks outside the labor force.  For each additional year after release 
from prison, the risk of spending additional time outside the labor force declines by 1.9% 
(p<0.001).  These results vary substantially by race, with no decline associated for 
whites, an annual decline in risk by 3.4% for blacks, and a decline of 3.6% for Hispanics.  
Hence, these results suggest that a history of incarceration significantly increases risk for 
spending time outside of the labor force, with outcomes differing significantly across 
racial groups.   
 Educational attainment is also associated with significant changes in weeks spent 
outside the labor force.  In the pooled sample, dropping out of high school makes 
someone 44.6% (p<0.001) more likely than a high school graduate to spend time outside 
the labor force; individuals with a G.E.D. are 35.6% (p<0.001) more likely to spend time 
outside the labor force.  These results vary significantly by race; relative to whites and 
Hispanics, African Americans with a G.E.D. are less likely to experience increased risk 
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for spending time outside of the labor force.  Relative to obtaining a high school degree, 
African Americans who drop out of high school are 38.3% more likely to spend time out 
of the labor force (49.5% for whites, 51.0% for Hispanics) and 18.5% more likely to 
spend time out of the labor force (50.5% for whites, 40% for Hispanics).  In alternative 
models where highest grade of educational attainment is used, similar effects for a G.E.D. 
are observed.   
 Results for controls are similar to those obtained for unemployment.  In the 
pooled sample, having a work disability (p<0.001), receipt of public assistance 
(p<0.001), level of neighborhood unemployment (p<0.001), and moving to an area 
outside of the Northwest (p<0.05) are all associated with an increased likelihood of being 
out of the labor force during a calendar year.  Being married significantly decreases risk 
for spending time out of the labor force.  Racial variances in risks are associated with 
neighborhood unemployment, welfare receipt, and regional location.       
 The results from Table 4B suggest that individuals with a history of incarceration 
are 2.31 times more likely not to participate in the labor force, with risk of being out of 
the labor force declining by 1.9% for every year since last interviewed in prison.  In 
contrast to unemployment, increased risk for being out of the labor force varies 
substantially across racial groups, suggesting that joint effects for race and incarceration 
may hold.  Even with controls for neighborhood unemployment, welfare receipt, age, 
marriage, work disability, urbanicity and regional location, and neighborhood 
unemployment, the effects of history of incarceration and years since last prison 
interview on labor force nonparticipation hold.  When controlling for educational 
attainment and G.E.D. completion, the effects of incarceration on being out of the labor 
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force also hold, suggesting that human capital skills do not mediate the link between 
incarceration and being out of the labor force.   
 
Unemployment, Joint Race and Incarceration Effects 
 Table 3.6 presents interaction models for race and incarceration in predicting 
unemployment.  For race and incarceration, interactions are tested for history of 
incarceration and years since last prison interview.  Interactions for race and history of 
incarceration are not found to be significant, while being black or Hispanic is associated 
with lingering effects of incarceration on employment relative to whites (p<0.05).  In 
testing interactions for (a) race and history of incarceration and (b) race and years since 
last interview, similar results are found.  These results suggest that the effects of 
incarceration on increased unemployment are similar for whites, blacks, and Hispanics, 
but risk of unemployment in years since last interview remains significantly higher for 
blacks and Hispanics.   
 To examine if any differences are explained by differences in human capital, I test 
if racial differences for incarceration variables are mediated by changes in interactions of 
race and interaction models.  Relative to whites, the baseline model shows that racial 
differences in educational attainment are significant; blacks are found to be at higher risk 
for unemployment than whites.  These results are consistent with human capital theories 
advanced by neoclassical economists.  When the interaction effects tested above are 
added to the models with race-education interactions, however, results for incarceration 
do not significantly change for race-incarceration variables.  This suggests that lingering 
113
 
 
effects of incarceration faced by blacks and Hispanics are not explained by differences in 
racial returns to education.   
 
Labor Force Nonparticipation, Joint Race and Incarceration Effects 
 Similar to the results presented above for unemployment, Table 3.7 examines the 
joint effects of race and incarceration on labor force participation.  In models for race and 
incarceration, interactions show that blacks and Hispanics with a history of incarceration 
are much more likely to spend additional time out of the labor force (p<0.001) relative to 
whites.  As a single set of interactions, blacks and Hispanics are statistically no different 
than whites in how years since last prison interview predict employment.  However, 
when interaction terms for (a) race and history of incarceration and (b) race and years 
since last prison interview are considered, both terms become highly significant.  Blacks 
and Hispanics with the history of incarceration are much more likely to spend additional 
time out of the labor force (p<0.001) relative to whites.  As years since last jail interview 
increase, blacks and Hispanics are also significantly more likely (p<0.01) than whites to 
participate in the labor force.  Thus, in order to explain the racial variances in how years 
since last year of prison interview predicts risk for being out of the labor force, controls 
are needed for the increased risks, relative to whites, faced by blacks and Hispanics with 
a history of incarceration in being out of the labor force. 
  To examine if any differences are explained by differences in human capital, I 
also test if racial differences for incarceration are mediated by changes in interactions of 
race and educational attainment.  Relative to whites, the baseline model shows that racial 
differences in educational attainment place blacks at higher risk for being out of the labor 
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force.  These results are consistent with human capital theories advanced by neoclassical 
economists.  When the interaction effects tested above are added to the models with race-
education interactions, however, results for incarceration do not significantly change 
effects for race-incarceration variables.  These findings suggest that increased, lingering 
effects of incarceration faced by blacks and Hispanics are not explained by differences in 
racial returns to education.   
 
Conclusion 
 Recent audit studies suggest that incarceration and race play a role in the hiring of 
less-skilled workers by employers.  While recent empirical research has documented that 
a history of incarceration plays a role in wages and employment, current work has not 
fully taken advantage of statistical methods and available data to investigate if race and 
history of incarceration determine employment outcomes.  In this paper, I examine a 
panel of less-educated men from the NLSY79 using negative binomial regression models 
with fixed-effect error terms for individuals and periods.  Controlling for marriage, 
education, urbanicity, welfare receipt, neighborhood unemployment, age, and work 
disability, I investigate the effects of race and incarceration on unemployment and labor 
force nonparticipation.  Findings indicate that race and incarceration exert joint effects on 
employment outcomes. 
Among less-skilled men, a history of incarceration increases likelihood of being 
unemployed during a calendar year by a factor of 1.65 (p<0.001), with the risk of 
unemployment declining by approximately 2.7% (p<0.001) for every consecutive year 
not interviewed in prison.  Table 3.8 presents the results from interactions models 
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estimated above for (a) race and history of incarceration and (b) race and years since last 
interview on unemployment.  The effects of a history of incarceration do not vary 
significantly across racial groups; however, racial differences are seen for unemployment 
in years after last jail interview.  For each consecutive year not interviewed in prison, the 
risk of unemployment declines by 4.5% per year among whites, 2.1% among African 
Americans (p<0.10), and 0.5% among Hispanics (p<0.05).  These results suggest that 
being incarcerated has a similar impact on unemployment across racial groups, but that 
blacks and Hispanics are more likely to face increased risk for unemployment relative to 
whites in years after release from prison. 
Among less-skilled men, a history of incarceration increases risk of being out of 
the labor force during a calendar year by a factor of 2.31 (p<0.001), with the risk of 
unemployment declining by approximately 1.9% (p<0.001) for every consecutive year 
not interviewed in prison.  Table 3.9 presents the results from interactions models 
estimated above for (a) race and history of incarceration and (b) race and years since last 
interview on unemployment.  Significant racial variances are observed for both history of 
incarceration and years after last jail interview.  Given a history of incarceration, the risk 
for spending time out of a labor force during an interview year increases by a factor of 
1.92 for whites, 2.59 for blacks (p<0.001), and 2.38 for Hispanics (p<0.01).  For each 
consecutive year not interviewed in prison, the risk of unemployment declines by 0.1% 
per year among whites, 2.7% among African Americans (p<0.01), and 3.3% among 
Hispanics (p<0.01).  These results suggest that blacks and Hispanics are significantly 
more likely to be out of the labor force during a given year relative to whites, but that risk 
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for being out of the labor force declines more rapidly relative to whites in years since last 
jail interview.   
 In alternative model specifications, I also estimate alternative educational models 
to determine if racial differences may be explained by differences in human capital.  
These results find that racial differences in education explain unemployment and being 
out of the labor force, but that these differences do not impact the joint effects of race and 
incarceration on employment outcomes.  Consequently, these models support arguments 
that other factors, such as discrimination or racial perceptions in ability to find work, may 
impact employment.  Because less-educated men, in particular minorities, lack wealth 
(Conley 1997; Oliver and Shapiro 1995), stable family structures (Edelman et al. 2006; 
Mincy 2006; Western, Lopoo, and McLanahan 2004), and public assistance (Blank 
2001), these individuals most likely must find some form of subsistence for survival.  
Work by urban ethnographers suggests that those with criminal histories, in particular 
minorities, wind up homeless and working in informal or illegal labor markets (Anderson 
1990b, 1999; Duneier 1999; Edelman et al. 2006; Edin, Nelson, and Paranal 2004). 
Limitations of this analysis point to potential avenues for future research.  For 
example, measuring incarceration through interviews conducted annually in jail or prison 
from 1979-1994 and biannually from 1994-2004 underestimates criminal justice 
involvement.  Data analysis of research where incarceration histories are supplemented 
through self-reports and background checks would lead to more precise measurement of 
incarceration effects.  Additional variables, such as measuring delinquent activities across 
multiple waves and annual measures of substance abuse, would provide more robust 
controls and alternative sampling frames.  Likewise, a more extensive set of racial 
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categories (including multiracial identification) would provide a better context for 
measuring the effects of incarceration across racial groups.   
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Table 3.1:  NLSY79 sample characteristics among less-skilled men for 1979 
interviews, by race and for full sample 
Variable Full Sample Whites Blacks  Hispanics 
Demographic Variables     
Age  17.80 
(2.31) 
17.95 
(2.37) 
17.69 
(2.27) 
17.5 
 (2.24) 
Respondent Married  (0.083)    
 (0.276) 
0.107   
(0.308) 
0.0346    
(0.182) 
0.082   
  (0.274) 
Health Disability limiting work 0.0245 
(0.156) 
0.026 
(0.160) 
0.0241  
  (0.153) 
0.0225    
(0.148) 
Respondent Family Received Some 
form of Public Assistance [TANF, Food 
Stamps, AFDC, public housing, etc.]  
 0.036   
 (0.185) 
0.031   
(0.172) 
0.041  
  (0.198) 
0.043 
 (0.203) 
Respondent Lives in Urban Area 0.645 
(0.478) 
0.537 
(0.498) 
0.724  
  (0.447) 
0.884 
(0.320) 
Region of Country  Respondent Resides     
North  0.198 
(0.398) 
0.202   
  (0.402) 
0.186  
   (0.388) 
0.202   
  (0.402) 
South 0.355 
(0.478) 
0.299   
  (0.459) 
0.544 
(0.498) 
0.236   
  (0.424) 
West 0.204 
(0.405) 
0.180 
(0.387) 
0.088  
  (0.286) 
0.471   
   (0.499) 
Midwest 0.224 
(0.414) 
0.297 
(0.454) 
0.164  
  (0.374) 
0.073  
  (0.253) 
     
Education Variables     
High School Diploma 0.281 
(0.00) 
0.336   
  (0.476) 
0.236   
   (0.401) 
0.166   
  (0.387) 
G.E.D. 0.034 
(0.181) 
0.042 
(0.200) 
0.030  
  (0.169) 
0.015 
 (.121) 
High School Dropout 0.216 
(0.408) 
0.195 
(0.393) 
0.204 
(0.431) 
0.307   
  (0.461) 
More Than High School 0 0 0 0 
Proportion In School 0.482 
(0.499) 
0.441 
(0.496) 
0.544   
  (0.498) 
0.526  
   (0.499) 
Highest Grade Completed in May 1979 9.98 
(1.83) 
10.25 
 (1.78) 
9.98 
 (1.72) 
9.35 
(2.01) 
     
Incarceration Variables     
Respondent History of Incarceration 0.005 
(0.0691) 
0.004 
(0.063) 
0.006 
(0.079) 
0.005   
  (0.072) 
Respondent Interviewed in Jail 0.005 
(0.0691) 
0.004   
  (0.063) 
0.006 
(0.079) 
0.005 
(0.072) 
Years Since Prior Incarceration 0 0 0 0 
     
Employment Variables     
Weeks Unemployed in Calendar Year 4.74 
(9.408) 
3.71 
(7.98) 
6.65 
(11.54) 
5.15 
(9.53) 
Weeks Not in Labor Force 10.85 
 (15.85) 
 
8.96 
(14.35) 
14.11   
  (17.55) 
13.35   
  (16.61) 
Self-Employed in Unincorporated 
Business 
0.014 
(0.118) 
0.019 
(0.136) 
0.0048    
(0.068) 
0.0138   
  (0.116) 
Local Unemployment Rate 
 
2.56 
(0.736) 
2.63 
(0.710) 
2.384      
(0.601) 
2.635   
  (0.921) 
N 4610 2599 1244 767 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
 
 
 
Genetic, Individual, Familial, and Community Mediators of the 
Association between Father’s History of Incarceration and Adult 
Delinquency/Arrest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 As Gottfredson and Hirashi (1990) have noted, intergenerational patterns of crime 
and delinquency are well documented in existing literature.  Early studies by Glueck and 
Glueck (1950) and Robins (1966) observed correlations between child’s 
delinquency/arrest and parental incarceration with basic statistical correlations.  More 
recent methods have replicated these findings in intergenerational studies of crime using 
more advanced statistical methods (Rowe and Farrington 1997; Thornberry 2005; 
Thornberry et al. 2003) and in national samples (Murray, Janson, and Farrington 2007; 
Roettger 2006).  
 While the correlation between intergenerational crime and incarceration is well 
established, a wide number of possible causal factors have been attributed to the 
phenomenon.  Notable factors include pervasiveness of poverty and lack of opportunity 
in inner-city neighborhoods (Thornberry et al. 2003; Wilson 1996b), genetic propensities 
(Beaver 2006; Rowe and Farrington 1997; Rowe and Osgood 1984),  issues of family 
(Beaver 2006; Rowe and Farrington 1997; Thornberry 2005; Thornberry et al. 2003), 
class-like structures (Hagan and Palloni 1990), and relative disadvantage of individuals 
(Sampson and Laub 1997; Sampson and Laub 2003a).  Comparative studies examining 
intergenerational crime and arrest in the context of these associations may hence provide 
empirical insight into explaining observed father-child links in incarceration.   
At the societal level, intergenerational incarceration may play a large role in 
perpetuating inequality.  In recent decades, incarceration in the U.S. has become a 
lifecourse event among less-educated and minority men. At over five times the rate of 
other developed nations, the extent of incarceration in the U.S. is unique among Western 
societies (Gottshalk 2006; Pettit and Western 2004b; Western 2006; Western and Beckett 
1999).  As Harper and MacLanahan (2002) note, relatively little work has focused on the 
long-term effects of incarceration on children of incarcerated parents.  Currently lacking 
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 in the literature is the use of contemporary and representative datasets to document if 
intergenerational patterns of crime/incarceration hold.   
 Using twin and nationally representative sub-samples from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health), I test if father’s incarceration is 
linked to delinquency and arrest among young men.  I use multilevel models to examine 
how the effect of father’s history of incarceration may change when molecular genetic, 
individual, family, and community variables are introduced.  Using a nationally-
representative sample, I test how individual, family, and community variables also alter 
the effect of father’s incarceration in predicting deviance and arrest.  Through this 
analysis, I explore if father’s incarceration remains a unique and robust predictor in 
explaining son’s delinquency and arrest.   
 
Intergenerational Crime & Incarceration:  Theoretical Links 
 
 To date, a number of studies find intergenerational patterns of crime and 
delinquency.  These studies find a link between paternal incarceration and adult son’s 
delinquency and arrest but attribute these outcomes to a variety of mechanisms.  The 
goals of this paper are (a) to demonstrate that father’s incarceration is robust in predicting 
adult son’s delinquency and arrest given a number of factors in a nationally-
representative dataset and (b) to identify possible explanatory mechanisms for why 
intergenerational patterns of father-son delinquency and arrest may exist.  In this section I 
discuss leading theories and their implications for the empirical analysis that follows. 
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 Genetic Propensities for Crime 
 Prior research suggests that correlations in father-son arrest may result from 
genetic propensities to commit crime.  Two major research initiatives that have addressed 
this potential issue are Robins’ (1966) study of sociopathic behavior among children and 
analysis by David Rowe and colleagues (Rowe 1983; Rowe and Farrington 1997; Rowe 
and Osgood 1984).  
To study delinquents with high rates of antisocial (sociopathic) behaviors, Robins 
(1966) analyzed a sample of delinquents referred to a St. Louis psychiatric clinic in the 
1920’s.  Among Robins analysis were findings that, given a father’s sociopathic 
diagnosis, 32% of her sample had a sociopathic diagnosis, compared with only 16% of 
delinquents diagnosed as sociopathic among non-sociopathic fathers.  Among children 
with sociopathic diagnosis, 35% of fathers had a history of arrest.  A strong correlation 
also existed between number of antisocial behaviors exhibited by fathers and sons.  
Robins interpreted this evidence as consistent with a genetic explanation of crime, along 
with other associations such as family structure, parental supervision, and neighborhood 
characteristics.   
Using data from the Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development and twin 
datasets, David Rowe and colleagues have argued that genetic factors may underlie 
causes of crime and delinquency (Rowe 1983; Rowe and Farrington 1997; Rowe and 
Osgood 1984).  Rowe and Osgoode (1984) analyzed a set of 530 school-age twins, 
estimating up to 47% of delinquency was attributable to heritability.  Rowe and 
Farrington (1997) used a set of 344 families with two or more children from the 
Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development, finding a strong linkage between same-
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 sex family convictions among fathers and sons, mothers and daughters, and sibling pairs. 
Work by David Farrington and colleagues has replicated the significance of family 
convictions between siblings in the U.S. and Sweden, with results suggesting 
neighborhood poverty, age of mothers, and other familial variables as possible 
explanatory variables, in addition to possible genetic causation (Farrington 1995; 
Farrington et al. 2001; Murray et al. 2007).      
These studies suggest that genetic causation may underlie crime and delinquency 
found among some families.  However, determining general heritability of 
intergenerational delinquency is highly problematic in empirical research.  As Rowe and 
Osgood (1984) note, delinquency is likely a result of a complex set of genetic 
combinations, while gene-environment interactions are also important mediating 
mechanisms that remain poorly understood (Moffitt 2005).  Because estimates of 
heritability among sibling and family-pairs are commonly estimated as proportions of 
total variance observed in samples, this methodology has been criticized as providing 
unreliable measures of heritability due to limitations of constructing heritability estimates 
in twin and sibling samples (Goldberger 1978, 1979).  This may be illustrated due to the 
way heritability and environment are also mathematically derived by the general 
relationship: 
 
(sibling-type’s shared genetic variance) * (heritability)² + (environment)² = (observed correlation)²,  
 
where sibling-type is MZ twin, DZ twin, full-sibling, half-sibling, etc. and the observed 
correlation is the respective correlation for a given sibling-type.  Heritability and 
environment are assumed to explain between 0 and 100% of the total variance, with 0 ≤ 
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 (heritability)² + (environment)² ≤1.  As Arthur Goldberger (1978) also notes, classic 
behavioral genetics models estimating heritability assume four conditions: a) no 
correlation of genes and environment, b) random mating, c) additive genetic effects, and 
d) identical similarity of environments across sibling types.  Generating models with 
these four assumptions raises validity issues for heredity and environmental estimates.   
Assuming random mating and additive genetic effects, Goldberger also demonstrated that 
heritability and environmental estimates are largely functions of observed correlations, 
leading to analytical bounds that do not represent random error.  The positions 
demonstrated by Goldberger, along with the general rarity of twin samples, have limited 
application of twin studies in many social science disciplines.       
To deal with these criticisms of traditional behavioral genetics models, recent 
research on genetics and human behavior has turned to analyzing specific genotypes in 
human behavior through molecular genetics (Guo 2006).  Molecular genetic studies of 
delinquency remain rare in humans, resulting, in part, from a lack of datasets containing 
genetic markers and a skepticism among criminologists and sociologists about traditional 
methods for estimating genetic influence (Beaver 2006).  While testing for association of 
specific genotypes with deviance does not estimate total heritability, this methodology 
allows for testing specific genotypes associated with crime and the possibility of gene-
environment interactions.  Molecular genetics studies of crime/delinquency remain rare 
in human populations.   
Capsi et al. (2002) analyzed a sample of New Zealand men, finding a relationship 
between violence and low-promoter activity (2, 3.5, and 4.5 repeat polymorphisms) in the 
monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA).  Guo, Roettger and Shih (2007) utilized 
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 multilevel models from a sample containing DNA markers in the National Longitudinal 
Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) to empirically link delinquency and violence 
scale scores with dopamine transporter gene DAT1 and the dopamine receptor gene 
DRD2.  Employing basic regression models for delinquent with Add Health data, Beaver 
(2006) explores associations with five genes (MAOA, DAT1, DRD2, DRD4, and 5HTT) 
across race and gender groups.  Beaver’s (2006) analysis found some evidence for direct 
effects of genes on environment, but gene-environment interactions were found to have 
much greater significance.12   
Consistent with research from Caspi, et al. (2002), Haberstick et al. (2005), and 
Guang Guo and colleagues (Guo et al. 2007; Guo et. al 2008; Guo et al forthcoming), I 
will test for significance of the 10R/10R and 10R/9R  genotypes of DAT1, the A1/A2 
genotype for DRD2, and the 2R, 3R, and 5R genotypes of MAOA along with father’s 
history of incarceration.  Using genotypes and father’s history of incarceration in 
predicting respondent’s delinquency, effects may be observed through main effects.  
Statistical significance of main effects for genotypes and father’s history of incarceration 
would suggest that both genotypes and father’s history of incarceration are each 
significant predictors of a respondent’s delinquency.  In contrast, if significance of 
father’s history of incarceration declines with inclusions of genotypes, this would suggest 
that an effect from father’s history of incarceration may be explained by individual 
genotype.  It should here be noted that thousand of single genes or combinations of genes 
may be responsible for intergenerational patterns of delinquency.   This implies that 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that Beaver’s analysis reports over six hundred regression models across five 
dependent variables, raising the significant issues of type I errors (e.g., false positives) when he claims 
significant results at the p<0.10 and p<0.05 significance levels. 
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 results for single molecular genetic markers should be interpreted as simply a genotype 
acting as a potential pathway for genetic transmission of genetic propensities for 
delinquency.   
 
Father-Son Incarceration and Family Structure 
 From intergenerational studies of crime patterns within families and from studies 
of risk factors of delinquency, predictors of adult son’s delinquency appear to be family 
structure, paternal involvement, and parenting styles.  As discussed above, Robins (1966) 
found that father’s arrest and antisocial diagnosis correlated highly with child’s antisocial 
diagnosis.  More recent work by David Farrington and colleagues has found that familial 
correlations in arrest and crime occur in wide variety of datasets over time and across 
nations, with trends showing strong father-son, mother-daughter, and sibling correlations 
(Farrington 1995; Farrington 2002; Farrington, Gundry, and West 1975; Farrington et al. 
2001; Murray et al. 2007; Rowe and Farrington 1997).  In related literature, the following 
factors may all play a role in creating an intergenerational father-son incarceration: 
father’s absence, lack of emotional attachment, social labeling, and familial structures 
where parents are not present in the household.   
Early researchers of delinquency, such as Glueck & Glueck (1950) and Robins 
(1966), examined general relationships between delinquency among adult men and 
familial variables from childhood, using basic statistical tables and correlation tables to 
identify trends.  Robins (1966) identified relatively high degrees of correlation between 
parent-child rates of offending, along with risk factors of living in single-parent homes, 
residing with a large number of siblings, poverty, and a lack of parental discipline.  In 
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 their classic study Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency, Glueck and Glueck (1950) 
identified abusive parenting relationships with delinquency in Boston youth, including 
attachment to parents, recognition and punishment of deviant acts, being raised in a 
single parent home, and residing in violent households.   
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) have noted that family correlations in criminal 
behavior have been among the most robust findings in criminological research.  
Individuals such as Robins (1966) and West and Farrington (1977) have reported parent-
child and sibling correlations in antisocial behavior and arrest.  More recent work by 
Farrington and colleagues has extensively explored patterns of familial incarceration 
among national samples and datasets (Farrington 1995; Farrington et al. 1975; Farrington 
et al. 2001; Murray et al. 2007; Rowe and Farrington 1997).  Analyzing data from the 
Pittsburg Youth Study, Farrington et al’s (2001) study has found that incarceration of a 
father is a strong predictor of delinquency among adolescent males, mediated by 
variables indicating lack of awareness of behavioral problems, age of mother, family’s 
socio-economic status, and parental supervision.  In both the Pittsburg Youth Study and 
Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, father’s incarceration has been found to be 
a robust predictor of son’s delinquency when controlling for familial outcomes 
(Farrington et al. 2001; Murray and Farrington 2005).  Similarly, Thornberry and 
colleagues (Thornberry 2005; Thornberry et al. 2003) have used data from the Rochester 
Youth Development Study to report that father’s incarceration is highly predictive of 
son’s delinquent behavior, with paternal involvement and closeness as important 
mechanisms in transmitting delinquent acts.   
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 The father-son correlations in literature suggest that familial processes play a 
large role in generating incarceration, but the effects of incarceration may result from 
issues associated with basic family structure.  Currently, research has begun to examine 
the collateral consequences of the unprecedented expansion of the criminal justice system 
in the U.S.  Given that average incarceration in state prisons is approximately 60 months 
(Bonczar 2003b) and that nearly one half of incarcerated inmates are parents (Mumola 
2000), incarceration removes young fathers from interaction with children for extended 
periods.  Recent research on family structure and single-parent relationships has brought 
increased focus on the social role of the father in improving outcomes of children 
(Ginther and Pollak 2004; Lamb and Tamis-Lemonda 2003; McLanahan and Sandefur 
1994; Mincy 2006).  Incarceration of a father is known to break apart marriages and 
increase separation between parents and children (Harper and McLanahan 2002; Johnson 
and Waldfogel 2004; Western et al. 2004).  Ex-felons also face required alimony 
payments that, when paired with decreased net earnings, create legal barriers for 
visitation rights and father-child involvement (Edelman et al. 2006; Holzer, Offner, and 
Sorenson 2005).  Studies of criminal behavior among adolescents link single-parent 
families, father-child attachment, low social control (e.g., parenting) and abusive father-
child relationships with antisocial and delinquent behaviors in children (Harper and 
McLanahan 2002; Jaffee et al. 2003; Johnson and Waldfogel 2004; Sampson and Laub 
1993).  It should be noted that a number of factors may mediate father’s history of 
incarceration, including father’s absence, emotional detachment, and lack of involvement 
are associated with factors such as dropping out of school, ‘being idle’ (not working and 
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 out of school), and living in poverty. (Harris and Ryan 2003; King, Harris, and Heard 
2004).     
The research above suggests that familial structures and processes should be 
considered in research.  However, even though spending one year or more in jail or 
prison has become a life-course event (Bonczar 2003b; Pettit and Western 2004b), 
empirical research on long-term consequences of father’s incarceration is notably lacking 
in the context of the U.S.’s  rapidly expanding prison population (Johnson and Waldfogel 
2004).  
Thus, by examining familial factors with father-child incarceration and arrest 
patterns in a nationally-representative sample, it is possible to gain insights on how 
delinquency and arrest in young adults relate to family structure, paternal relationships, 
and intergenerational patterns of crime/arrest.  To capture the effect of paternal 
relationships, I will use an index measuring father’s involvement and closeness to the 
respondent, receipt of financial support, and Wave I family structure [in the form of two-
parent biological, remarried, single parent, and other family structures].  Testing 
characteristics of the respondent’s biological father (e.g., a father’s attachment index 
measuring involvement and reported closeness to child, along with alimony payment) and 
Wave I reported family structure serve as proxies for father’s absence.  To test the role of 
family structure and processes, I will include variables for adolescent familial structure in 
Wave I, family receipt of food stamps, parental strictness, and family structure.  These 
variables will help to identify correlations that may help to contextualize how a father’s 
incarceration may explain son’s adult delinquency and arrest.  
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Neighborhood Control Variables  
  The link between neighborhood factors and crime has had a long history of 
research in social science research.  Du Bois (1998 [1898]) found that disproportional 
arrest and incarceration among blacks occurred among Southern migrants living in 
impoverished areas of Philadelphia’s seventh ward.  Similarly, by investigating the plight 
of blacks centralized in Chicago’s “Bronzville” during the 1930’s, Drake and Cayton  
(1993 [1945], pp. 200-210) observed neighborhood associations between high 
concentrations of male juvenile delinquents, illegitimate births, high rates of disease and 
poor public health, and percentage of families on public relief.  In studies of deviance, 
Glueck and Glueck (1950) and Robins (1966) noted that neighborhood poverty was 
found to substantially correlate with delinquent activities.  The correlation between 
neighborhood deprivation and spatial relative inequality has been extensively 
documented in criminological research (Blau and Blau 1982; Land, McCall, and Cohen 
1990a; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson et al. 2005). 
In recent decades, one of the more controversial and debated of causes of crime 
has been Robert Sampson and John Laub’s (1997) proposal that individual, familial,  and 
community factors have additive effects on deviant behavior through the process of 
“cumulative disadvantage.”  Factors such as familial attachment, school quality, and 
neighborhood characteristics additively insulate or expose individuals to generating 
criminal propensities and committing criminal acts.  Sampson, Morenoff, and 
Raudenbush (2005) have recently demonstrated that racial disparities in violent crime 
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 rates decline substantially when residential segregation and neighborhood socioeconomic 
status are taken into account with individual and family-level variables in a sample of 
Chicago neighborhoods.  Based on Sampson and Laub’s theory of cumulative 
disadvantage, father’s incarceration would mediate community and individual 
demographic factors listed above to generate an individual’s propensity to commit crime. 
If father’s incarceration is a measure of intergenerational poverty or disadvantage, 
then intergenerational father-son links may spuriously capture disadvantage in 
neighborhoods.  Finding a nearly complete absence of upward mobility for both aspiring 
and non-aspiring groups of inner-city teenagers, MacLeod (1995a) argues that social and 
community variables create nearly impermeable barriers towards economic or social 
success with general society.  Individuals in these environments lack opportunities to 
earn decent wages and escape poverty, generating antisocial behaviors that become 
criminal behavior.  As similar work by Wilson (1987; 1996b) and Anderson (1990a, 
1999) on inescapable poverty and disadvantage that pervades inner city ghettoes and 
minority communities suggests, criminal behavior is assumed to be a function of 
widespread and inescapable social and cultural structures.  Hannon (2003) labels this 
position as “disadvantage saturation,” wherein social variables exclusively determine the 
social outcomes of individuals.   
 Analyzing data on father-son arrest and incarceration from the Cambridge Study 
of Delinquency Development, Hagan and Palloni (1990) conclude that social labeling of 
fathers and sons as “criminal” results in reproduction of a criminal class across 
generations.  From a structural standpoint, Thornberry (2005) similarly proposes that 
father’s unemployment and poverty are negatively associated with intergenerational 
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 patterns of crime and incarceration observed between father and son.  Farrington et al. 
(2001) suggest that increases in father-son correlations observed in their U.S. sample may 
be the extensiveness of deprivation within inner city areas.  If true, such studies would 
imply that “class-like” behaviors underlie father-son incarceration, with presence in poor 
inner cities explaining father-son links in crime.  Class-like structures are beyond the 
scope of this study, but they would imply a strength of neighborhood and familial 
variables explaining most of father-son correlations in crime and arrest. 
 Land, McCall, and Cohen’s (1990a) landmark study of neighborhood effects and 
violence suggests that community deprivation, population structure, and concentration 
effects provide three primary dimensions for capturing exogenous neighborhood effects.  
This methodology has been widely utilized in research (e.g., Rosenfeld et al. 2001; 
Sampson et al. 2005).  While factorial indices may be constructed to capture issues of 
deprivation and concentration (e.g., 2006), I adopt Sampson et al.’s (2005) usage of 
residential segregation and population density, along with a similar measure of 
professional educational attainment at the census tract level.  This helps to minimize 
potential endogeneity bias which may occur in correlated neighborhood measures such as 
the number of two-parent families and percentage of households headed by single 
mothers. 
 By testing if the effect of a father’s history of incarceration is reduced when 
neighborhood effects are introduced, it is possible to see  if father’s history of 
incarceration is mediated by neighborhood influences.  Significance of neighborhood 
variables and a father-child relationship in increasing behavior are more consistent with 
theories of cumulative advantage, while insignificance of father-son incarceration when 
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 community level variables are present would suggest evidence that external factors such 
as saturation disadvantage might provide a more parsimonious explanation.  For class-
like behaviors, familial and community variables might come into play, but economic and 
structural variables would be more consistent with theories discussed above. 
 
Individual Demographics and Crime 
 Individual variables also play an important role in predicting deviant behavior and 
arrest.  Basic demographic variables associated with delinquency and arrest include racial 
classification (Bonczar 2003), age (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983), lack of educational 
training or classification as a low-skilled worker (Edelman et al. 2006; Pettit and Western 
2004b), low social attachment to education (Nagin et al. 2003; Pagani et al. 2001), 
delinquent peer networks (Haynie 2001, 2003; Haynie et al. 2006), and a history of 
alcohol or substance abuse (Dawkins 1997; Ford 2005).  Conversely, general research has 
found that marriage, military service, and stable work have been associated with 
decreased delinquency (Sampson and Laub 2003b; Sampson and Laub 1993; Sampson, 
Laub, and Wimer 2006; Uggen 2000).  These individual effects exert a large influence on 
individual propensities to engage in criminal behavior. 
 To account for individual-level effects, I include basic controls for age, dropping 
out of high school, grade retention, and history of substance and/or alcohol abuse.  To 
minimize endogeneity issues for grade retention and substance abuse with other 
predictors of adult delinquency/arrest, these measures are defined as occurring during 
Wave I (five years prior to interview at Wave III).  Measures of dropping out of high 
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 school, romantic relationships, military service and job tenure are incorporated as 
contemporary influences on delinquent acts.  
The importance of peer networks in delinquency has been well documented in 
existing research, but analysis of peer effects with Add Health data in young adulthood is 
problematic.  Haynie (2001, 2003) used Add Health data to measure how adolescent 
delinquency was impacted by peer respondent behaviors such as smoking and painting 
graffiti.  Haynie’s analysis is insightful, but this methodology for measuring peer 
influence does not capture more serious delinquent behavior; furthermore, it focuses on 
pooled samples of male and female respondents to fully exploit friendship data.  
Delinquency in peer networks has been hypothesized to both help or harm individuals in 
later life, based on class status and type of delinquent activity (Hagan and Foster 2003; 
McCarthy and Hagan 2001).  Given that friendship data in Add Health is limited to 
measuring minor delinquency, while delinquent acts in adolescence may have an 
ambiguous impact on delinquency, I exclude measurements of peer networks from 
analysis.   
 
Data and Methods 
 As stated in the above section, the goals of this paper are (a) to test if significance 
of biological father as a predictor of son’s deviance and arrest may be explained by 
molecular genetic, community, familial, and individual variables and (b) to provide a 
contextual framework for using father’s incarceration as a risk factor in adult deviance 
and arrests.  To accomplish these goals, I make use of sibling and nationally 
representative samples of respondents in Add Health for analysis using: (i) 
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 HLM/multilevel models for delinquency using twins samples to estimate family, 
community, and individual-level effects with molecular genetics markers and (ii) 
evaluation of a nationally-representative sample with community, familial, and 
individual-level models in predicting adult delinquency and arrest through usage of, 
respectively, ordered logistic and logistic regression models.  The use of the twins 
samples allows testing of molecular genetics markers along with individual, family, and 
community variables to test comparative influence of father’s incarceration.  The 
limitations of the twin data in non-random selection and relatively small sample size 
prevent generalization of results.  Usage of a representative population of adult men from 
the general Add Health sample helps address non-random selection and small sample size 
in the twins sample, while also serving as an additional check of individual, family, and 
community models.  The data and methods employed for these sets of analysis are 
outlined below.  
 
Data 
For this paper, I utilize data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent 
Health (Add Health) to test if an incarcerated father increases propensity to engage in 
criminal behavior and incur arrest in later life.  Add Health is currently a three wave 
sample.  Initially, Wave I interviews consisted of approximately 90,000, 7th -12th grade 
adolescents in-school interviews and a subsequent, in-home interview of approximately 
20,000 students and separate interviews for parents.  Two follow-up studies of the in-
home sample were conducted a year later in the second wave of data collection and five 
years later during the third wave of data collection.  During the second wave of Add 
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 Health, approximately 15,000 interviews were conducted with respondents from Wave I 
enrolled in grades 8-12.  This sub-sample removed older individuals from the 
longitudinal sample, creating a cohort with five years of age variance in the process.  
During the third wave of Add Health, approximately 15,000 individuals were 
interviewed.  Respondents ranged predominately between ages 18 and 27 and were 
interviewed on all occasions when found by the funding agency.  Out of 20,000 
interviews, the number of non-missing interviews for three waves consists of 11,600 
individuals used to form the weighted longitudinal sample (Harris et al. 2003).   
 Add Health, as a data set with sections devoted to deviant behavior in both 
adolescence and young adulthood, provides the opportunity for measuring propensities 
for arrest and engaging in criminal delinquency in addition to containing data on father-
child incarceration.  Its measures of health, family variables, and community-level 
measures also make it a unique resource for analyzing individual, family, and community 
level predictors of delinquency.  Additionally, Add Health contains both a genetic sub-
sample that allows for estimates of heritability and environmental influences and a 
nationally-representative sample of respondents to test familial and structural variables 
generalized at the level of U.S. society (Harris et al. 2003).  Below, I describe the 
characteristics of both the twins and national data samples. 
Twins Data 
The Add Health genetic sub-sample consists of 3,129 twins and full-siblings 
during Wave IIII interviews. Of these, approximately 1175 males with non-missing data 
were found to be usable for analysis.  The twin and sibling pairs represent a national 
sample, with completed questionnaires identical to those utilized for the full sample.  
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 Although a national sample, small sample size, and lack of non-zero sample weights 
create increased risk for type I and type II errors.  Issues of sample stratification and non-
random sampling are also present.  Thus, the sibling sample provides a mechanism for 
determining the extent to which molecular genetic markers and basic environmental 
variables play a role in father-child delinquency correlations.  Unfortunately, due to 
sample size, generalization of father’s incarceration with Wave III biological child 
delinquency and arrest are uncertain. Table 4.11 provides descriptive statistics for the 
genetic sample.         
National Sample 
The Add Health household sub-sample consists of 15,000 respondents in the 7th-
12th grade sample during Wave I who possess complete data for a set of self-reported 
criminal behaviors for waves one and three.  Of these individuals, 7,050 males ages 18-
27 were present at time of the Wave III interview. 113 The available community and family 
variables present during period of first interview allows for a detailed assessment of how 
early family and community variables may explain links in father-child delinquency and 
incarceration.  The data structure of this design creates a sample of individuals ages 18-
27 at time of interview.  However, because of significant decline in the sample size of 
individuals over age 24 and a decline in mean probability of ever being arrested after age 
23,14 cases older than age 24 were removed from the dataset.   This action reduces sample 
                                                 
13 As Hagan and Foster (2003) document, the Add Health sample is a multi-stage clustered design that 
implies individual cases are neither randomly selected nor independent.  Using STATA 9’s survey 
commands, regional and school clustering are combined with individual probability weights to generate a 
representative population of males ages 18-23 for the U.S.  STATA 9’s ‘survey’ regression commands are 
used in data analysis to derive regression results for this population.  
    
14 Mean probabilities of ever being by arrested for ages 18-24 are, respectively, .123, .113, .166, .141, .169, 
.161, and .141.  The probability of ever being arrested for the sample population should increase 
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 bias, but selection factors downwardly biasing estimates of arrests and criminal behavior 
still remain.15  The sample population also decreased to 6,552 males, or 6,182 males with 
nonzero weights in the representative survey sample.  The resulting sample is evenly 
distributed by age, representing a male cohort ages 18-24 at time of the Wave III 
interview.  Means and sample deviations may be viewed in Table 4.2. 
 
Methods 
For this paper, I wish answer the following question: “How do community, 
familial individual, and molecular genetic constructs explain correlations between 
father’s incarceration and biological child’s delinquency/arrest?”  The combined usage of 
the sibling sample and full samples of Add Health allows for tests of significance and 
magnitude of effects among twins and young adult men.  The Add Health sample is 
unique in containing self-reported delinquency for both a sibling and nationally-
representative sample.  I attempt to make optimal use of Add Health data by testing if 
intergenerational patterns may result from spurious clustering in the twin sample, while 
the nationally-representative sample allows testing of significance in social and familial 
structures in father-child delinquency and contact with the criminal justice system.  For 
comprehensive analysis, I adopt separate strategies for analysis of the sibling and national 
                                                                                                                                                 
monotonically by age, as does the cumulative probability of incarceration for the general population 
(Bonczar 2003).  
 
T
15
P Chantala, et al (2004) estimate that selling drugs, carrying a weapon and shooting or stabbing someone 
are underrepresented by ~5% in the Wave III data relative to the Wave I population.  In general violence 
measures and criminal activities are, respectively, underestimated in the Wave III sample by an average of 
2.5% and 1%.  Approximately one-hundred individuals in Wave III were not interviewed due to 
incarceration.  Sample attrition due to non-response is disproportionately likely for chronic offenders and 
those incarcerated as adults, causing an age truncation of this population in the sample.  Our models of 
arrest and criminal behavior are hence downwardly biased in the sample for independent variables in the 
regression analysis that positively correlate with criminal behavior and arrest.     
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 sub-samples of the Add Health dataset.  I then proceed to discuss analytic strategies for 
each sample.   
It is important to note that measures of delinquency and arrest rely on self-reports 
of respondents.  Official measures are traditionally associated with underestimation of 
delinquency and crime (Harris et al. 2003; Hood and Sparks 1970; Murphy, Shirly, and 
Witmer 1946; Robison 1936; Thornberry and Krohn 2000) because official measures 
often reflect not only the behavior of offenders, but also by external factors such as 
policing, prosecution, and the judicial system.  For these reasons, many criminologists 
have turned to self-reports since the late 1970’s (Hindelang 1981; Hindelang, Hirschi, 
and Weis 1979; Thornberry and Krohn 2000).  Self-reports are a common method for 
sampling delinquency (Thornberry and Krohn 2000).  However, while generally 
considered reliable, racial differences in self-reports of delinquency and arrest have been 
observed  in studies such as the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Freeman 
2000a).  To increase validity and reliability of findings, Add Health interviews of 
respondents were conducted using computer-assisted self-interview (CASI) 
technology/methods.   
 
Measuring Respondent Delinquency & Arrest 
Respondent Delinquency.  The questions used to measure delinquent activities 
are given in 31 and capture activities potentially leading to sanctions of arrest and/or 
incarceration.  Because of separate modeling strategies and conventions incorporated into 
analysis of the twin and nationally-representative datasets, I adopt separate measures of 
delinquency.  To determine correlates leading to a wide variety of exhibited criminal 
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 behavior, I adopt a delinquency scale based on scales for Add Health data on delinquency 
utilized by Haynie (2001, 2003) and Hagan and Foster (2003).  These scales are a 
variation of a more-widely used set of 13 questions tested and used in contemporary 
research on criminal behavior (Farrington et al. 1996; Hannon 2003) and used in the 1979 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.     
For analysis of the twin’s sample, I adopt scales used by Guo et al. (2007) for 
analyzing the genetic sample in Add Health using a set of 12 items as a measure of 
serious delinquency along with a subset of eight items as a measure of violent 
delinquency.  By adopting Guo et al.’s scales and methods, my analysis uses genetic 
models that have been empirically demonstrated to not result from natural stratification 
within the sample population.  For serious delinquency, these items include stealing 
amounts larger or smaller than $50, breaking and entering a home, selling drugs, serious 
physical fighting that resulted in injuries needing medical treatment, use of weapons to 
get something from someone, involvement of physical fighting between groups, shooting 
or stabbing someone, deliberately damaging property, and pulling a knife or gun on 
someone. For violent delinquency, the scale excluded stealing, breaking and entering a 
home, and selling drugs.  A listing of the questions utilized for this analysis may be 
viewed in Appendix 3.   
For serious delinquency, Crombach’s alpha CAS score for Waves I-III were, 
respectively, 0.81, 0.79, and 0.73.  For violent delinquency, the Crombach alpha 
correlations for Waves I-III were 0.75, 0.74, and 0.66.  These alpha-values compare to 
criminal behavioral reliabilities for scales utilized by Hagan and Foster (2003), Haynie 
(2003), and Hannon (2003) in analysis of NYSL79 and Add Health data.  While Hagan 
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 and Foster (2003) use a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of α=0.86, their scale includes 
minor vandalism and lying to parents/guardian, acts more typically viewed as part of 
common adolescent deviance.  Both Hagan and Foster and Haynie utilized violence 
scales with Cronbach’s alpha of α =0.64.  By limiting measures to felony or 
misdemeanor-type behaviors, Guo et al.’s scale focused on criminal behavior potentially 
leading to arrest and conviction within the criminal justice system.  By adopting this 
methodology, I hope to capture criminal behavior “at risk” for adult arrest and conviction 
in the developmental trajectories of the twins genetic sample.  Individuals with two or 
more missing responses were excluded from analysis to increase data reliability. 116    
 For the nationally-representative sample, use of survey weights in STATA helps 
to create a random and representative population sample of individuals included in both 
Wave I and Wave III interviews.  To capture a broader range of delinquent acts, I expand 
the list of items from Guo et al.’s serious delinquency scale to include fifteen items by 
including whether or not an individual has held stolen property, used someone else’s 
credit or debit card without permission or knowledge, or deliberately written a bad check.  
A listing of the items used in this scale may be viewed in Appendix 3.   
When raw frequency of events is available for analysis, count-based regression 
models are commonly used to model the dependent variable (Haynie 2001; Long 1997; 
Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga 2006); however, self-reported delinquency items in 
Add Health are collapsed frequency counts, with right censoring for occurrences either 
                                                 
16 The scores of individuals with missing responses were also proportionally rescaled to fit a 12-item 
metric.  Individuals with more than two missing responses (those who either gave no-response or refused to 
answer the given question) were dropped from the sample.  These procedures, though more stringent than 
rescaling methods used by Hagan and Foster (2003), attempted to minimize cases with missing data while 
reducing bias due to non-response.  Comparing mean deviance between rescaled and non-adjusted scale 
scores, the mean rescaled deviance score is 1.407 while the mean non-adjusted scale score was 1.395 or a 
difference of 0.8%. 
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 occurring more than one time (pulling a knife or gun on someone, shooting or stabbing 
someone) or more than five times (other thirteen items).  To address the lack of frequency 
counts, I use ordered logistic regression methods to more conservatively represent 
frequency and occurrence of deviant behavior.  To facilitate this analysis, I adopt a 
classification scheme where violent acts are classified more seriously than non-violent 
acts.  The occurrence of both violent and non-violent activity was rated as a more serious 
category of offending, but reports of high overall rates of delinquency were classified as 
most serious.17  The classification for Wave III delinquency is numerically designated 
given as follows:   
‘0’ for respondents reporting no delinquency in the fifteen items 
‘1’ for respondents reporting one or more non-violent acts only, low incidence 
‘2’ for respondents reporting one or more violent acts only, low incidence 
‘3’ for respondents reporting one to three non-violent acts and one to three  
      violent acts 
‘4’ for respondents reporting high incidence and/or non-violent acts.   
 
Respondent Arrest.  In addition to self-reported delinquency, an important 
measure of intergenerational crime and incarceration is contact with the U.S. criminal 
justice system.  Unlike delinquency, arrest is a discrete event.  Using logistic regression, I 
look at how behaviors in adolescence may explain arrest incurred in adulthood.  By using 
data from self-reports, it is possible to look at behaviors beyond a 12-month time frame 
                                                 
17 Here, high incidence of delinquency was categorized when (1) a respondent reported three or more 
violent and non-violent acts or (2) a deviance score of nine or more when a score of nine or more was 
found using a scale similar to Guo et al. (2007) for fifteen Wave III items.     
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 and to examine how adolescent variables may explain entrance into the criminal justice 
system.   
Sibling Data 
For analysis of sibling data in Add Health, I adopt the methodology developed 
and utilized by Guang Guo and colleagues (Guo and Wang 2001; Guo and Tong 2006; 
Guo et. al 2007; Guo et. al forthcoming), with random error components for individuals, 
sibling type, and interview wave.  These models are extensions of basic multilevel 
models that treat kinship type among monozygotic (MZ), dizygotic (DZ), and full-
siblings as unique random error components contributing to delinquent activities (Guo 
and Wang 2001).  The modeling strategy is adapted from traditional mixed/multilevel 
models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Searle 1971).  Using panel data with multiple 
observations (e.g., “clustering”) occurring both at the individual and sibling-type, this 
statistical model may be written as a three-level multilevel model denoted as: 
 
Delinquencytij(s)= л0ij(s)+ л1ij*Agetij + л2ij*(Agetij)2 + Σ( лkij * Xkij )+ etij(s),  
 
where: 
 Delinquencytij(s) denotes observed delinquency for the individual i, at time t, in sibling-
pair j.  (s) denotes the type of sibling-relationship classified as MZ twins, DZ twins, or 
full-siblings.   
л0ij(s) is the mean delinquency of individual ii in sibling-pair j. 
л1ij and л2ij are coefficients, respectively, for the linear and quadratic age values at time t 
for respondent i in sibling type s. 
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 Σ( лkis * Xkis ) represents the sum of a set of  individual-level predictors Xkij, where k 
represents k=3,…,m, and corresponding regression coefficient лkis that occur at the 
individual-level.  Individual level predictors include genotype, father’s incarceration, and 
control variables.   
etij(s) is the random disturbance term for deviance from respondent tij(s)’s deviation from 
the overall mean score.  The disturbance term is normally distributed with mean zero.   
 
At the second level, the model specification is given as: 
л0is=β00j(s) + r0ij(s) 
л1ij= β10j(s)  
л2ij= β20j(s) 
 
and for all other coefficients: 
лLis= βL0s, where L=1,…,m 
where: 
β00j(s) represents the mean individual delinquency within sibling-pair j 
r0ij represents a random effect for individual i score from the mean predicted by each 
sibling-pair j.  
лLis= βL0j, where L=2,…,m, represents the general level-2 (e.g., individual-level) 
coefficient for the age, age², and the predictor variables Σ(βk0j * Xkis ), where k=3,..,m .  
Here, the level one and level-two coefficients are identical due the assumption that age 
and control variables are time-varying covariates at level-one and fixed effects at levels 2 
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 and 3 (e.g., age and controls vary by time, but are fixed effects at the individual level and 
sibling-type level). 
 
At the third-level, the model is given as follows: 
 
β00s=γo00 + u00(s)= + u00(MZ twins) + u00(DZ twins) + u00(full-siblings) 
and for all other coefficients: 
βL00 = γL00, where L=1,…,m 
where: 
γ00s represents the grand mean delinquency score for the sample, 
u00j(s) represents a random effect for sibling j given for each sibling type—MZ twins, DZ 
twins, and full-siblings.  Hence, random effects are calculated for three sibling types. 
γ lis= βL0j, where L=1,…,m, represents the general level-3 (e.g., sibling-level) coefficient 
for the age and control variables in the model.  Here, level-two and level-three 
coefficients are identical due the assumption that age, age², and the predictor variables 
Σ(βk0j * Xkis ), where k=3,..,m, are time-varying covariates at level-one and fixed effects 
at levels 2 and 3 (e.g., age and controls vary by time, but are fixed effects at the 
individual level and sibling-type level). 
 
Combining time, individual, and sibling-pair levels, I obtain the following 
conditional, three-level model: 
 
Delinquencytij(s)= л0ij(s)+ л1ij(s)*Agetij + л3ij*(Agetij)2 + Σ( лkij * Xkij )+ etij(s) 
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 = β00j(s) + r0ij + β10j*Agetij(s) + β20j*(Agetij)2 + Σ(β k0j(s) * Xkij )+     
   etij(s) 
  = (γ000 + u00j(s)) + γ10j*Agetij + γ20j*(Agetij)2 + Σ(γ30j * Xkij )+ r0ij + etij(s) 
 
= γ000 + γ10j(s)*Agetij(s) + γ20j(s)*(Agetij)2 + Σ(γk0j * Xkij )+    
   u00j(s=MZ twins) + u00j(s=DZ twins) + u00j(s=full-siblings) +r0ij + etij(s) 
 
where the error component is given as 
u00j(s=MZ twins) + u00j(s=DZ twins) + u00j(s=full-siblings) +r0ij + etij(s) 
 
These error components contain a random disturbance term, etij(s), and four random 
effects.  These four random effects contain four normally-distributed random intercepts 
with residuals, one at the individual-level and three at the sibling-level for MZ twins, DZ 
twins, and full-siblings.  The random-intercept terms have been found to significantly 
vary by sibling type (Guo and Wang 2001; Guo et al. 2007; Guo et. al 2008a Guo et. al 
2008b).  Given the individual and sibling-type random effects, the dependent variable is 
assumed to be normally distributed, with independent response categories.  These 
assumptions are consistent with the conditional three-level model outlined in Raudenbush 
and Bryk (2002) and employed by Guo et al. (2007).  As previously noted, I also assume 
that age and control variables are time-varying covariates that have fixed effects at the 
individual and sibling-type levels in the model.    
As discussed above, traditional twin studies have been met with heavy criticism, 
most notably by Goldberger (1978, 1979).  Goldberger’s basic critiques of twins studies 
concern assumptions of random mating, identical dispersion of genes within twins, 
additive effects of genes, and the range of outcomes associated with how heritability is 
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 calculated as a function of variance.18  Random effects models such as employed by Guo 
and Wang (2001) utilize random intercepts for individuals and sibling types, creating 
error components that adjust for complex problems such as differential treatment by 
sibling type and measurement of gene/environmental components, but still estimate 
results based on total heritability and environment as a function of variance.  The 
methodology employed by Guo et al. (2007) and outlined above assumes differences by 
individual and sibling type, while testing how individual genotypes may influence 
behavior.  This eliminates the possibility of estimating total heritability, but main genetic 
effects and interactions allow for testing if intergenerational patterns of father-son 
deviance may be explained as transmission of genetic propensities for criminal behavior.   
 
National Sample 
Unlike the sibling sample, Add Health’s longitudinal sample lacks genetic markers 
that might allow for estimates of heritability of father’s incarceration on adult child’s 
delinquency and arrest.  The national sample, however, contains a rich set of measures 
that allow for tests of community and familial variables in determining arrest.  As 
discussed above, the national sample also contains a much larger set of individuals 
                                                 
18 Goldberger’s (1978) paper specifies the standard mathematical model utilized in calculating heritability 
and environmental factors associated with outcomes among twins.  Goldberger also estimates potential 
ranges in variance for environmental effects, given calculations on heritability among twins.  The author’s 
conclusion is that social science should not rely on twin studies to inform research and social policy, citing 
examples of eugenicists in psychology such as Richard Herrnstein and Arthur Jenson.  Citing Goldberger 
as an example, Freeze and Powell (2003) argue widespread misunderstanding and fear of such labeling has 
prevented interaction between sociology and genetics.  Given that psychologists argue for some genetic 
basis of delinquency and violence (Caspi et al 2002; Moffitt 2005), my goal in estimating genetic effects is 
to understand the range of potential influence of heredity and environment in explaining the biological 
father-child empirical link.  Given that a number of genes likely influence deviance (Rowe and Osgood 
1984) and that deviance results from complex sets of gene-environment interactions (Moffitt 2005), I do 
not believe it is possible to aggregately estimate the role genetics plays in intergenerational 
crime/delinquency.  With potentially hundreds of genes as candidates, this is beyond existing research.    
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 arrested as an adult and with an incarcerated father than the sibling sample.  By analyzing 
the national sample, it is hence possible to (1) test how community variables 
(neighborhood employment, poverty, segregation, etc.) and familial variables (parental 
attachment, biological father’s absence, etc.) in adolescence may explain the link in 
father-son arrest patterns and (2) use population weights to determine the likelihood of 
respondent’s adult arrest given community and familial variables.   
The use of population weights allows for a general comparison of how community 
and familial variables may influence arrest when father’s incarceration is included as a 
predictor.  Given the rapidly increasing incarcerated population in the U.S., empirical 
analysis of how a father’s incarceration may influence son’s arrest within the context of 
adolescent family and community structures contributes to understanding what factors 
place individuals at risk for entering the criminal justice system.  Thus, I will utilize 
Wave III delinquency scores to examine how father’s incarceration may be mediated by 
individual, familial, and community-level effects traditionally associated with deviant 
activity.   
The arrest of individuals has the benefit of being a much easier measure to 
categorize and measure as a discrete event.  As Freeman (2000) notes, some researchers 
consider self-reported criminal behavior less accurate than arrest and conviction in 
measuring criminal behavior.  For the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79), Freeman notes that blacks underreport criminal behavior in self-reports, while 
whites tend to more closely self-report actual levels of criminal behavior.  In general, 
Freeman argues that self-reports do not appear substantially more biased than other forms 
of measurement of criminal behavior.  In previous analysis looking at both arrest and 
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 self-reported delinquency, significance of effects of father’s incarceration and other 
controls were found to be largely similar (Roettger 2006).  To model arrest, I hence 
utilize binary logistic regression in analysis.   
Since adult arrest is coded for any arrest above age eighteen, I also eliminate 
concurrent, time-dependent variables from the previous regression that may alter criminal 
behavior, such as adult relationship status and work history.  These variables also violate 
assumptions of time-order (if marriage at age 19, for instance, deters future arrest of an 
individual previously arrested at age 18).  This eliminates potential time-bias in the 
logistic regression (Long 1997), but removes potential explanations of concurrent 
explanations for crime.  I limit analysis to variables from adolescence, testing if Wave I 
individual or family variables predict adult arrest.  With these variables, I test to see if 
father’s incarceration is linked to increased probability of adult arrest.   
 
Results 
Twins Sample 
 Analysis of the genetic sample contains basic genotype, individual, family, and 
community estimates for serious and violent delinquency.  The fixed effects estimates for 
these models are presented in Table 4.3.  While not presented here, all estimated random 
effects slopes and intercepts between sibling pairs and repeated measures were found to 
be highly significant across the estimated models and to replicate general patterns 
reported by Guo et al.’s (2007) usage of sibling and repeated measures for the Add 
Health sample.   
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 To facilitate interpretation, I discuss the results for serious and violent 
delinquency across the baseline demographic, individual, family, and community models.     
Following existing research, along with father’s incarceration, main effects for the DAT1 
dopamine transporter, the DRD2 dopamine receptor, and the Monoamine oxidase A 
(MAOA) genotypes in individuals are simultaneously presented.  The significance of a 
genotype predicting in predicting individual delinquency is compared to a reference 
genotype.  The reference genotypes are 9R/9R or 9R/other for DAT1, A1/A2 for DRD2, 
and 3.5R, 4R for MAOA.  
In the baseline demographic model, father’s incarceration, race, age, and 
genotypes are presented.  For both violent and non-violent delinquency, father’s 
incarceration positively correlates with delinquency at the p<0.001 level.  Consistent 
with prior research (Hirashi and Gottfredson 1983, Gottfredson and Hirashi 1990; Haynie 
et al. 2006), a non-nonlinear relationship exists for age.  The 2R genotype for MAOA and 
the 9R/10R genotype in DAT1 are associated with increases in delinquency at the p<0.05 
level, while the A2/A2 genotype is associated with a significant decrease in delinquency 
at the p<0.05 level.  These genetic effects are consistent with Guo et al.’s (2007) 
findings.  Controlling for these genotypes, I thus find that father’s incarceration remains a 
robust predictor of serious and violent delinquency in the dataset. 
In the individual-level model, a likelihood ratio test with the additional variables 
yields a p-value of p<0.00001 for both violent and serious delinquency, suggesting that 
individual-level variables are significant additions to the baseline demographic model.   
For both violent and serious delinquency, the effect of father’s incarceration declines by 
~45% in magnitude but remains significant at the p<0.05 level.  Drug use at Wave I, 
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 dropping out of high school, and cohabitation are associated are associated with large 
increases in both violent and serious delinquency, which are significant at the p<0.001 
level.  The index for Wave 1 school attachment is also associated with a significant 
decrease of serious delinquency (p<0.001) and violent delinquency (p<0.01), and may be 
interpreted as a respondent’s delinquency declines and as satisfaction and involvement in 
education increases.  Excluding the relatively rare 2R genetic sequence, results for 
MAOA, DRD2, and DAT1 become largely insignificant.  These results suggest the 
importance of individual-level variables in predicting delinquent trajectories.  Caution is 
encouraged to remain skeptical about causal inference for all genetic results, as random 
effects models focus on correlations between individuals and sibling types.  
 With the addition of family variables added to baseline demographic variables, 
likelihood ratio tests for the estimated family models tests yielded p-values of p<0.004 
and p<0.016, respectively, for serious and violent delinquency.  For both violent and 
serious delinquency, the effect of father’s incarceration decreased by ~20% in magnitude 
relative to the baseline demographic model, with p-values significant at the p<0.01 level.   
This suggests that father’s incarceration is a significant factor  when family-level.  
Among family variables, father attachment, a scale measuring father’s involvement and 
closeness to the respondent, was found to significantly decrease delinquency (p<0.001).  
Being removed from a home by social services was also associated with higher levels of 
delinquent activity (p<0.05).  Measures of parental strictness, repeated incidence of child 
abuse, family structure, father’s payment of alimony, and receipt of public assistance 
were not associated with statistically significant changes in delinquency.  The 10/9R 
genotype for DAT1 and 2R genotype for MAOA were found to be significant predictors 
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 of increased delinquency (p<0.05), while the A2/A2 genotype for DRD2 was associated 
with decreased delinquency (p<0.05).  These data suggest that genotypes and father’s 
incarceration are significant predictors of delinquency when family variables are 
considered.   
 For both serious and violent delinquency, the set of Wave I community variables 
[measured at the census tract level] were found to have no significant correlation with 
deviance, while father’s incarceration and genetic effects remain similar to those of the 
baseline demographic model.  Models with one community variable and similar measures 
were not found to be significant predictors of delinquency.  Weak community 
neighborhood effects are commonly observed in quantitative research (Guo and Zhao 
2000) and are also documented in Haynie et al.’s (2006) analysis of neighborhoods.  The 
school-based sample design and relatively small number of individuals in the sample may 
also contribute to lack of significance within the model.   
 The results of these regression models illustrate that father’s incarceration is a 
robust predictor of young adolescent men along with statistically significant main genetic 
effects of three known genes.  These results do not rule out the possibility that genetic 
effects explain intergenerational patterns of crime; instead, they suggest that, in the three 
genes analyzed, genetic factors exert independent effects on delinquency along with 
father’s history of incarceration.  Moreover, the statistical significance of father’s 
incarceration on delinquency remained significant across all models, even when 
individual genotypes became marginally significant or non-significant.  Thus, the 
importance of father’s incarceration in explaining serious and violent delinquency held 
when individual, genetic, family, and community-level predictors were introduced.   
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 Conversely, individual and family predictors were found to reduce overall 
significance by 50% and 20%, respectively, suggesting that individual-level and family 
predictors explain a relationship between father’s incarceration and son’s deviance.  
Significance of individual and family variables also suggests that individual 
characteristics and family relationships are associated with differing levels of offending 
among individuals.  Factors such as father involvement, possession of A2/A2 genotype, 
and school attachment are associated with significant declines in deviance, while events 
such as adolescent substance abuse, possession of a 2R genotype, and cohabitation are 
associated with increases in deviance.  The coexistence of these predictors with father’s 
incarceration in the regression model suggest that additive factors are associated with 
increased and decreased levels of respondent delinquency.  Thus, the results from the 
twin’s model broadly support Sampson and Laub’s (1997, 2003) model of cumulative 
disadvantage.   
In assessing results, some cautions are in order.  While variables with large 
correlations were not used in this model to minimize endogeneity, caution should be 
made about causal inference, as nonlinear-growth models focus on correlations between 
individuals and sibling types.  The highly significant, nonlinear effects of age in 
predicting delinquency also emphasize that delinquency remains a developmental process 
that varies tremendously among individuals.  Significance of father’s incarceration and 
genetic effects along with cohabitation are predictors of delinquency, and are not causal 
in the sense of changing individual trajectories in offending.  Finally, small sample size 
increases likelihood of type II errors and limits generalization of results.  To address 
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 these last two issues, I present analysis from a nationally-representative sub-sample of 
Add Health.     
 
National Sample 
Adult Delinquency 
While lacking data genetic data, the nationally-representative subsample of males 
allows for comparative testing of the influence of individual, family, and community 
factors in determining delinquency.  Using the ordered logistic regression model outlined 
in the methods section above, I test the assertion that parental incarceration is associated 
with adult delinquency for young men.  These results provide an additional means of 
measuring influence of individual, family, and community-level variables.  A combined 
model of individual, family, and community effects also attempts to gauge comparative 
impact of factors.   Results are presented in Table 4.4. 
 In the model with individual-level characteristics, father’s incarceration is 
associated with a 61.7% (p<0.001) increase in delinquency, representing an 18% decline 
from the model estimating father’s incarceration only.  For other predictors in the 
individual model, respondent’s military service (p<0.05), Wave I incidence of binge 
drinking (p<0.001), and substance abuse (p<0.001) were also found to be significant.  
Relative to single individuals, marriage was associated with a 49% decrease (p<0.001) in 
incarceration relative to single individuals.  School attachment was also marginally 
statistically significant (p<0.10) and associated with a decline in offending rates.  
Consistent with existing research, each year of age was associated with an annual decline 
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 of 15% in deviance (p<0.001), though no significant nonlinear effects were found in 
models not presented here. 
 For the family-level models, father’s incarceration was associated with a 75% 
overall increase in deviance relative to respondents with a father lacking a history of 
incarceration.  For the family variables, familial measures include characteristics of the 
father’s relationship (father attachment index and payment of alimony to mother at Wave 
I), Wave I family structures, parental strictness, reported abuse and removal from home 
by social services, and Wave I receipt of food stamps.  Among these variables, living in a 
single household at Wave I was associated with a 26% (p<0.05) increase in deviance 
relative to individuals living with both biological parents.  In addition, physical abuse by 
a parent or caregiver was associated with a 40% increase in deviance, while those 
removed from a home by social services were associated with a ~300% increase in 
deviance scores (p<0.01).  No significant association was found for Wave I food stamp 
receipt, father’s attachment or alimony payment, and a measure of parental strictness.  
This suggests that father’s history of incarceration is not heavily mediated by a 
respondent’s relationship to his biological father, low socioeconomic status, family 
structure, physical abuse by a parent or caregiver, or removal from home by social 
services. 
 For community variables, no significant relationship was found between adult 
son’s delinquency/arrest and the following Wave I variables: the proportion of African 
Americans within a respondent’s census tract, the proportion of households holding a 
college degree, and a log transformation of urban density.  As discussed above, these 
variables reflect population structure, measures of residential segregation, and relative 
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 affluence or deprivation.  Though not presented, a factor score similar to one used by 
Haynie et al. (2006) to measure of relative deprivation was also attempted, but was 
similarly non-significant.  The 1990 community measures used to measure adult 
behavior, along with the general weak magnitude of community variables (Guo and Zhou 
2000) may explain these general results.  These findings generally contradict theory and 
evidence that neighborhood factors greatly influence individual criminal behavior.   
 In the final model, I use individual, family, and community variables to test their 
combined effects on father’s history of incarceration as a predictor of adult deviance.  In 
the combined model, respondents with an incarcerated father are 59% (p<0.001) more 
likely to have increased deviance scores relative to those without father’s deviance.  
These results hold when controlling for 1) individual-level variables for substance and 
alcohol abuse, age, race, military service, school attachment and relationship status; 2) 
family-level variables for father attachment and alimony payments in childhood, receipt 
of food stamps (low socioeconomic status), family structure, and repeated child abuse by 
adult or caregiver; and 3) community variables including residential segregation, 
community deprivation, and population structure.  In the combined model, age, substance 
abuse, repeated physical abuse, and marriage were also associated with significant 
changes in deviance scores.  These results broadly align with prior empirical research, 
while suggesting father’s history incarceration is found to be a highly significant and 
robust factor in predicting increased deviance among young men.   
 
Adult Arrest 
While delinquent activity measures propensity for criminal behavior, issues such 
as racial profiling, differential sentencing, criminal aptitude and transmission of 
172
 disadvantage my substantially affect a link between father’s history of incarceration on 
adult sons.  Arrest and incarceration also remain discrete events that lead to establishing 
having a ‘criminal record’ that forms the basis for differential treatment in later life.   
Hence, testing if incarceration by a father increases probability of a son incurring an adult 
arrest provides additional means for observing how incarceration influences adult arrest.  
To avoid issues of endogeneity, I exclude variables that may have occurred after arrest, 
such as marriage, military service, or work.  Thus, respondent’s history of adult arrest 
allows for measurement of how Wave I variables at the individual, family, and 
community levels influence entrance into the adult criminal justice system.  The results of 
these regression models are presented in Table 5. 
Among Wave I individual-level predictors, father’s incarceration was found to 
increase by 86% (p<0.001), a decline of approximately 12% relative to the baseline 
model.  Among individual-level variables, substance abuse increased likelihood of 
incurring arrest by a factor of 2.54 (p<0.001), binge drinking increased risk of arrest by a 
factor of 60% (p<0.001), and dropping out of high school increased probability of arrest 
by 58% (p<0.01).  Native Americans were marginally less likely to be arrested than 
whites, but blacks and Hispanics showed no difference in odds of arrest.  No significant 
effects were observed for both school attachment and age.  Given that approximately 100 
individuals were not interviewed due to incarceration at time of the Wave III interview, 
selection bias may explain lack of significance for age and race.      
 For Wave I family variables, a respondent with a father having a history of 
incarceration was associated with an 89% (p<0.001) increase in incurring adult arrest.  
Among family variables, an increase in parental strictness score was associated with a 9% 
(p<0.05) decrease in likelihood of arrest, while a history of child abuse was associated 
with a 38% increase in incurring adult arrest.  Adult arrest was not found to be 
statistically associated with Wave I low socioeconomic status (measured by receipt of 
food stamps), the respondent’s relationship to his biological father, alimony payment, or 
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 being raised in a household without both biological parents, though living with a single 
father was found to be marginally significant.   
 Among community-level variables, father’s incarceration was found to increase 
likelihood of incurring adult arrest by a factor of 2.15 (p<0.001) among respondents.  
Among community variables, no significant relationship existed between proportion of 
African Americans in a census tract, the proportion of individuals in census tract holding 
a college degree, and a log transformation of urban density.  As in the ordered logistic 
regression models for deviance, I found no significance in models with computed factor 
scores used by Haynie et al. (2006) to measure relative deprivation.   
 Combining individual, family, and community variables with father’s 
incarceration into a final model, father’s history of incarceration increased a respondent’s 
probability of incurring adult arrest by approximately 85% (p<0.001), a decline of 
approximately 13%.  Hence, respondent’s individual, family, and community variables 
were not associated with a major decline in overall deviance.  In the combined model, 
individual level variables were found to be of primary statistical significance in 
increasing likelihood of incurring adult arrest.  These factors include Wave I binge 
drinking (p<0.001), a history of Wave I substance abuse (p<0.001), and dropping out of 
high school (p<0.001).  Among racial groups, Hispanics and Native Americans were 
associated with marginally significant risks of arrest relative to whites.  Family structure, 
low socioeconomic status, respondent’s relationship with father, and history of child 
abuse were non-significant.  Community measures were also similarly found to remain 
non-significant in the combined model for predicting arrest.  
 
Discussion 
 This paper has analyzed data containing molecular genetic, individual, familial, 
and community-level variables to explain possible correlations between father’s history 
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 of incarceration and son’s delinquency and arrest.  In both a national twins sample of 
males ages 12-23 and a nationally-representative sample of adults ages 19-24, father’s 
incarceration was found to be robust predictor of self-reported delinquent behavior in the 
presence of individual, family, and community variables.  For the adult sample, father’s 
history of incarceration increased deviance by 58% (p<0.001) and increased likelihood of 
incurring arrest by 85% (p<0.001) when controlling for individual, family, and 
community variables.  These results broadly suggest that father’s incarceration is both a 
robust and significant predictor of adult delinquency, controlling for biological, 
individual, family, and community-level variables.   
 In the baseline demographic models, father’s history of incarceration was found 
to be an independent predictor when compared with genetics samples.  These results 
align with prior research linking 2R genotype in MAOA, the 10R/9R and 10R/10R 
genotypes in DAT1, and the A1/A1 and A2/A2 genotypes in DRD2 as predictors of 
delinquency (Guo et al. 2007; Guo et al 2007).  Along with father’s history of 
incarceration, genetic effects also remain statistically significant co-predictor of serious 
and violent delinquency. These results suggest that father’s incarceration remains an 
independent predictor along with these three genotypes.  Additionally, the results are 
consistent with Rowe and Osgoode’s (1984) postulate that many genotypes have an effect 
on delinquent behavior and that the three genotype predictors are independent of father’s 
history of incarceration.  The latter indicates that father’s history of incarceration is a 
strong predictor of delinquency not explained by three biomarkers directly linked to 
deviance in humans.   
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 Across both samples, individual-level variables showed the most explanation in 
reducing the effect of father’s incarceration, decreasing the magnitude by ~50% in 
explaining deviance in the twins sample, which was a ~20% decline in deviance among 
young adults and a ~12% decline in adult arrest.  In the twin sample, individual-level 
variables that were highly significant included dropping out of high school, school 
attachment, drug use, and cohabitation.  Among the national sample, alcohol and 
substance abuse, marriage, and age proved most significant.  For adult arrest, adolescent 
alcohol/substance abuse and dropping out of high school were highly significant 
individual-level predictors.  Empirically, differences in findings may result from 
differences in age of sample frame, scale construction, differences in factors associated 
with arrest and deviance, and/or usage of random effects and logistic regression models.  
Also, usage of variables such as marriage and dropping out of high school are empirical 
associations and do not indicate causality.  Usage of fixed effect models such as those 
utilized by Sampson et al. (2006) are useful in determining causation, but they eliminate 
time-invariant characteristics such as individual genotypes and the Wave III measure of 
father’s incarceration that do not change over time in the sample.   
For family-level variables, father’s incarceration was associated with an 
approximately 20% decline in significance in the twins dataset, a 10% decline in 
predicting adult deviance, and a 10% decline in predicting adult arrest.  No single 
variable stood out as uniformly significant across all sets of analysis, though being 
removed by social services was significant in all three sets of analysis.  For the twins 
sample, father’s attachment scale was significant in decreasing overall delinquency, while 
removal from home by social services was associated with an increase in delinquent 
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 activities.  For deviance among young adult respondents, being raised in a single parent 
household, a history of repeated child abuse, and removal from home by social services 
were associated with increased likelihood of deviant behavior.  For adult arrest, a history 
of child abuse and parental strictness were significant at the p<0.05 level, while being 
removed from a home by social services was significant at the p<0.10 level.  Across these 
models, father’s attachment was found only to be significant in the twins sample while 
low socioeconomic status and father’s characteristics were generally not associated with 
deviance and arrest.  These results suggest that a father’s history of incarceration is not a 
proxy for transmission of socioeconomic status or adolescent relationships of the 
biological father to son.  Instead, father’s history of incarceration is a strong and unique 
predictor among family-level variables in predicting adult male delinquency and arrest.   
In regression models, community-levels were found to be fairly insignificant in 
predicting delinquent behavior in both the sibling sample and in adult arrest and 
delinquency.  Though not presented, use of factor scores based on Haynie et al’s (2006) 
measures of relative deprivation also were found to be non-significant.  These results may 
stem from the fact that community variables are relatively weak predictors of arrest 
(Guang and Zhou 2000); existing analysis linking crime and arrest in spatial studies 
normally examines violent crimes such as homicide and sexual assault (e.g., Sampson et 
al 2005; Land et al 1990).  While Haynie et al.’s (2006) models do link Wave I 
community variables with Wave I and Wave II delinquency, their measures use pooled 
male and female data and negative binomial regression models to measure categorized 
count data for delinquent acts.  These differences in Haynie’s research design may hence 
explain differences with my findings.  
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 In final models for adult delinquency and arrest, I estimated models with 
individual, community, and family variables.  Having a father with a history of 
incarceration was associated with a 59% increase in Wave III delinquency (p<0.001) and 
an 89% increase in likelihood of arrest (p<0.001).  Individual-level predictors were found 
to be most significant, with strongest results found for alcohol and/or substance abuse in 
predicting both delinquency and arrest, age and marriage in predicting delinquency, and 
dropping out of high school in predicting arrest.  Among family-level variables, a history 
of repeated child abuse and being removed from a home by social services were 
significant predictors in delinquency, but were found to be non-significant in predicting 
arrest.  As in the other models estimated, community variables were found to be non-
significant in predicting delinquency and arrest. 
When considering variables in the national twins sample and nationally-
representative adult sample, analysis indicates that individual-level predictors are most 
strongly associated with reducing significance of father’s incarceration in predicting adult 
arrest.  Molecular genetics markers remained significant predictors when tested alongside 
father’s history incarceration and empirically suggest that some biological factors operate 
independently from father’s incarceration in predicting delinquent behavior.  Family 
variables are also found to be significant, with a history of child abuse and family 
disruption through removal of child by social services as predictors.  Community 
variables were found to exert no influence on delinquency in the models estimated.  The 
significance of 1) genetic influences with individual and family influences and 2) 
individual and family variables also suggest that processes of cumulative advantage play 
a role in creating individual propensities for arrest.  The significance of having an 
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 incarcerated father remained across all models tested, indicating father’s history of 
incarceration is a robust predictor of delinquency and arrest that holds in a nationally 
representative sample of the U.S. population.       
As with all studies, this analysis has limitations.  With the twins sample, only a 
small number of genes were tested on a relatively small population.  Currently, a Wave 
IV survey is being funded, which will increase the number of genes available for analysis 
with the entire Add Health sample, thus allowing the possibility of testing genotypes with 
a nationally-representative population.  This will also allow for testing significance of 
genotypes as predictors of delinquency with more basic statistical methods.  The Wave 
IV questionnaire also asks for greater detail on father’s history of incarceration to better 
test for timing, while placing greater emphasis on interviewing individuals serving time 
in jail or prison.  This analysis will provide a means of testing if father’s history of 
incarceration may hold across latent classes of offenders (Moffitt 1993a; Nagin and Land 
1993).  Data on timing of father’s incarceration may also be used in fixed effect models 
to determine if changes in delinquency occur within individuals.  This form of analysis 
would suggest that father’s incarceration might change behavior and not simply capture 
time-invariant correlations in father’s socioeconomic status, societal discrimination, and 
societal inequality.  
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Table 4.1:   Add Health twins sample, descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Serious Delinquency Score     
Violent Delinquency Score   0 21 
     
Father’s Incarceration 0.141 0.348 0 1 
Missing Father’s Incarceration 0.050 0.219 0 1 
     
Individual-Level Respondent 
Variables 
    
     
White 0.571 0.159 0 1 
Black 0.173 0.378 0 1 
Hispanic 0.147 0.345 0 1 
Asian 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Age at time of Wave III Interview 17.61 2.88 0 1 
Age-squared 318.5 104.7 144 529 
Substance Abuse, Wave 1 0.279 0.481 0 1 
Respondent High School Dropout 0.132 0.339 0 1 
Job Tenure, Wave III 14.2 19.8 0 190 
Military Service  0.070 0.256   
School attachment Index 3.78 0.832 1 5 
Missing School attachment Index 0.015 0.121 0 1 
Marriage 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Cohabitation 0.271 0.444 0 1 
     
Family-Level Variables     
Two Parent Biological 0.635 0.481 0 1 
Single Mom 0.181 0.385 0 1 
Single Dad 0.026 0.161 0 1 
Non-Biological Two Parent 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Parental Strictness Scale, Wave 1 1.55 1.21 0 5 
Missing Parental Strictness Scale, 
Wave 1 
0.010 0.099 0 1 
Child’s Wave 1 Household Receipt 
of Food Stamps 
  0 1 
Biological Father Provided 
Alimony Payments to Respondent 
Household 
0.116 0.320 0 1 
Missing Information on Whether 
Biological Father Gave Alimony 
0.014 0.119 0 1 
Wave I Father Involvement Scale 5.10 2.51 1 10 
 
Missing Wave I Father Involvement 
Scale Score 
0.118 0.323 0 1 
Respondent Self-Report of 
Repeated Physical Abuse by Parent 
or Caregiver  
0.081 0.273 0 1 
Respondent removed from home by 
social services 
0.013 0.114 0 1 
   0 1 
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 Community Level Variables     
Log Transformation of Population 
Density 
0.247 0.302 0.001 2.610 
Proportion of Census Tract 
classified as African American 
0.124 0.137 0 1 
Proportion of Census Tract with 
college degree 
0.251 0.079 0 1 
     
Genotype Variable     
DAT1     
9R/other,10R/other 0.049 0.209 0 1 
9R/9R, 0.051 0.220 0 1 
9R/10R 0.334 0.472 0 1 
10R/10R 0.576 0.494 0 1 
MAOA     
2R 0.010 0.098 0 1 
3R,5R 0.427 0.494 0 1 
3.5R, 4R 0.563 0.468 0 1 
1DRD2     
A1/A1 0.547 0.498 0 1 
A1/A2 0.371 0.483 0 1 
A2/A2 0.081 0.273 0 1 
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Table 4.2: Add Health nationally-representative sample, sample means and 
individual-weighted standard deviations 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Delinquency, Wave I 0.781 1.110 0 4 
Adult arrest 0.150 0.358 0 1 
Father’s Incarceration 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Missing Father’s Incarceration 0.0577 0.233 0 1 
     
Individual-Level Respondent 
Variables 
    
White 0.659 0.474 0 1 
Native American 0.021 0.144 0 1 
Black 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Hispanic 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Asian 0.040 0.197 0 1 
Other Racial Category 0.012 0.109 0 1 
Binge Drinking, Wave 1 0.117 0.332 0 1 
Substance Abuse, Wave 1 0.254 0.456 0 1 
Respondent’s Job Tenure (in 
months) 
14.22 20.46 0 190 
Respondent With History of 
Marriage 
0.118 0.322 0 1 
Respondent With History of 
Cohabitation Only 
0.294 0.456 0 1 
Respondent’s Military Service 0.060 0.237 0 1 
Age at time of Wave III Interview 21.65 1.65 19 24 
Respondent High School Dropout 0.165 0.372 0 1 
School Attachment Index, Wave I 2.204 0.864 1 5 
Missing School Attachment Index, 
Wave I 
0.014 0.117 0 1 
     
Family-Level Variables     
Two Biological parents 0.587 0.492 0 1 
Single Mom 0.172 0.378 0 1 
Single Dad 0.036 0.187 0 1 
Non-Biological Two Parent 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Other Family Arrangement 0.046 0.210 0 1 
Parental Strictness 1.498 1.223 0 5 
Child’s Wave 1 Household Receipt 
of Food Stamps 
0.103 0.303 0 1 
Biological Father Provided 
Alimony Payments to Respondent 
Household 
0.132 0.339 0 1 
Missing Information on Whether 
Biological Father Gave Alimony 
0.119 0.324 0 1 
Wave I Father Involvement Scale 5.262 2.368 1 10 
Missing Wave I Father Involvement 
Scale Score 
0.117 0.321 0 1 
Respondent Self-Report of 
Repeated Physical Abuse by Parent 
or Caregiver  
0.079 0.269 0 1 
Respondent removed from home by 0.017 0.128 0 1 
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 social services 
     
Community Level Variables     
Log Transformation of Population 
Density 
0.255 0.372 0.001 2.610 
Proportion of Census Tract 
classified as African American 
0.134 0.135 0 1 
Proportion of Census Tract with 
college degree 
0.251 0.081 0 1 
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Table 4.4: Nationally-representative sample, ordered logistic regression odds ratios and 
standard errors for individual, family, and community-level predictors of Wave III delinquency
Variable  Individual Family Community Combined 
Father’s Incarceration 1.838***     
(0.187) 
1.617***     
(0.158) 
1.756*** 
(0.183) 
1.856*** 
(0.187) 
1.588***       
(0.162) 
Missing Father’s Incarceration 0.995     
(0.143) 
0.921     
(0.143) 
0.956 
(0.163) 
0.982 
(0.144) 
0.974     
(0.176) 
      
Individual-Level Respondent 
Variables 
     
Native American  0.790        
(0.190) 
  0.833       
(0.209) 
Black  1.168        
(0.142) 
  1.154       
(0.156) 
Hispanic  0.999        
(0.101) 
 
  0.986       
(0.102) 
Asian  0.955 
(0.161) 
 
  0.902       
(0.166) 
Other Racial Category  1.231        
(0.3293) 
  1.192       
(0.310) 
Binge Drinking, Wave 1  1.526** 
(0.175) 
  1.486**       
(0.177) 
Substance Abuse, Wave 1  1.648*** 
(0.151) 
  1.627***        
(0.148) 
Respondent’s Job Tenure (in 
months) 
 0.997      
(0.002) 
  0.997       
(0.002) 
Respondent With History of 
Marriage 
 0.512***       
(0.066) 
  0.503***       
(0.067) 
Respondent With History of 
Cohabitation Only 
 1.119       
(0.094) 
  1.134       
(0.096) 
Respondent’s Military Service  1.462*       
(0.237) 
  1.495*        
(0.246) 
Age at time of Wave III Interview  0.823***        
(0.020) 
  0.813***        
(0.021) 
Respondent High School Dropout  1.206+      
(0.108) 
  1.235+       
(0.135) 
School Attachment Index, Wave I  1.084+        
(0.049) 
  1.089+      
(0.048) 
      
Family-Level Variables      
Single Mom   1.267* 
(0.142) 
 1.067        
(0.119) 
Single Dad   1.237 
(0.246) 
 0.964       
(0.194) 
Non-Biological Two Parent   1.139 
(0.133) 
 1.027       
(0.125) 
Other Family Arrangement   0.757      
(0.215) 
 0.707       
(0.209) 
Parental Strictness     0.936+      
(0.033) 
Child’s Wave 1 Household Receipt 
of Food Stamps 
  1.041 
(0.180) 
 0.971        
(0.164) 
Biological Father Provided 
Alimony Payments to Respondent 
Household 
  0.993 
(0.116) 
 0.995        
(0.117) 
Missing Information on Whether   0.895   (0.091)  0.922        
187
 Biological Father Gave Alimony (0.104) 
Wave I Father Involvement Scale   1.016        
(0.022) 
 0.971        
(0.164) 
Missing Wave I Father Involvement 
Scale Score 
  0.945 
(0.157) 
 0.960 
(0.163) 
Respondent Self-Report of 
Repeated Physical Abuse by Parent 
or Caregiver  
  1.404*    
(0.197) 
 1.535**        
(0.219) 
Respondent removed from home by 
social services 
  2.999**        
(1.225) 
 2.765*      
(1.205) 
      
Community Level Variables      
Log Transformation of Population 
Density 
   1.121    
(0.118) 
1.182+       
(0.102) 
Proportion of Census Tract 
classified as African American 
   1.273    
(0.411) 
1.167        
(0.389) 
Proportion of Census Tract with 
college degree 
   2.000 
(1.108) 
1.476        
(0.817) 
      
      
N 5947 5947 5947 5947 5947 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -11487288 -11182800 -11433396 -11478561 -11125360 
+p<.10 *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 [two-tailed test] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188
  
Table 4.5: Nationally-representative sample,  logistic regression odds ratios and standard errors 
for individual, family, and community-level predictors of respondent incurring adult arrest 
Variable  Individual Family Community Combined 
Father’s Incarceration 2.12***    
(0.241) 
1.866***   
.223 
1.894**     
(0.217) 
2.155***   
(0.247) 
1.846***     
(0.223) 
Missing Father’s Incarceration 1.455+  (0.292) 1.290   (0.255) 1.285    
(0.276) 
1.439+   
(0.292) 
1.283     
(0.275) 
      
Individual-Level Respondent 
Variables 
     
Native American  0.531+      
(0.185) 
  0.541+     
(0.191) 
Black  1.191       
(0.168) 
  1.277     
(0.232) 
Hispanic  0.779 
        (0.130 
  0.749+        
(0.130) 
Asian  0.733       
(0.201) 
  0.683        
(0.193) 
Other Racial Category  0.790        
(0.609) 
  0.767      
(0.602) 
Binge Drinking, Wave 1  1.601**        
(0.228) 
  1.587**      
(0.222) 
Substance Abuse, Wave 1  2.536***        
(0.301) 
  2.503***     
(0.307) 
Age at time of Wave III Interview  0.958        
(0.033) 
  0.946        
(0.034) 
Respondent High School Dropout  1.577**       
(0.195) 
  1.669***       
(0.219) 
School Attachment Index, Wave I  0.971     
(0.066) 
  0.970     
(0.065) 
      
Family-Level Variables      
Single Mom   1.205     
(0.199) 
 0.928     
(0.167) 
Single Dad   1.576+     
(0.394) 
 1.104     
(0.284) 
Non-Biological Two Parent   1.139     
(0.187) 
 0.981     
(0.170) 
Other Family Arrangement   1.331     
(0.392) 
 1.063     
(0.323) 
Parental Strictness   0.907*     
(0.040) 
 0.929     
(0.045) 
Child’s Wave 1 Household Receipt 
of Food Stamps 
  0.924        
(0.204) 
 0.829     
(0.184) 
Biological Father Provided 
Alimony Payments to Respondent 
Household 
  0.973 
(0.155) 
 0.949     
(0.150) 
Missing Information on Whether 
Biological Father Gave Alimony 
  0.970     
(0.149) 
 0.923     
(0.152) 
Wave I Father Involvement Scale   0.973     
(0.030) 
 1.000     
(0.030) 
Missing Wave I Father Involvement 
Scale Score 
  0.989     
(0.204) 
 1.111     
(0.234) 
Respondent Self-Report of 
Repeated Physical Abuse by Parent 
or Caregiver  
  1.379*     
(0.222) 
 1.301     
(0.209) 
Respondent removed from home by 
social services 
  1.929+     
(0.657) 
 1.476     
(0.552) 
      
189
 Community Level Variables      
Log Transformation of Population 
Density 
   1.001   
(0.192) 
0.838     
(0.356) 
Proportion of Census Tract 
classified as African American 
   1.305   
(0.449) 
1.053     
(0.205) 
Proportion of Census Tract with 
college degree 
   2.550  
  (1.59) 
2.987     
(1.974) 
      
      
N 5936 5936 5936 5936 5936 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -4080649.3 -3870699.7 -4045654.2 -4076910.1 -3847579.7 
+p<.10 *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001 [two-tailed test] 
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 Appendix 1: 
   
List of Data Sources Used for Analysis in Chapter Two 
 
Segregation Data: 
 
Iceland, John, Daniel H. Weinberg, and Erica Steinmetz. 2004. "Racial and ethnic residential 
segregation in the united states, 1980-2000.  Available online at:   
Http://www.Census.Gov/hhes/www/resseg.Html." vol. Special Report Series, CENSR 
# 3.: U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
 
Population Data: 
 
Ruggles, Steven , Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, 
Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander. 2005. "Integrated public use 
microdata series: Version 3.0 [machine-readable database]   available online at:  
Www.Usa-ipums.Org." Minneapplois, MN: Minnesota Population Center, University 
of Minnesota. 
 
F.B.I. Arrest Data: 
 
Chilton, Roland and Dee Weber. 2000. "Uniform crime reporting program [united states]: 
Arrests by age, sex, and race for police agencies in metropolitan statistical areas, 
1960-1997 [computer file]." Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts [producer], 
2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributor], 2000. 
 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2006. "Uniform crime reporting 
program data [united states]: County-level detailed arrest and offense data, 2000 
[computer file]." ICPSR03451-v4: Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 2006-01-16. 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 2:  
 
Listing of MSA and Years Included in Chapter Two Dataset 
 
MSA Census Years included in dataset 
Abilene, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Akron, OH PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA MSA 1990, 2000 
Altoona, PA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Anchorage, AK MSA 1990, 2000 
Anniston, AL MSA 1980, 2000 
Bakersfield, CA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Baltimore, MD PMSA 1990, 2000 
Bellingham, WA MSA 1990, 2000 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 1990, 2000 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 1990, 2000 
Billings, MT MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Bloomington, IN MSA 1990, 2000 
Brazoria, TX PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Bryan-College Station, TX MSA 1990, 2000 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 1980, 1990 
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 1980, 1990 
Chicago, IL PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 1990, 2000 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA 1980, 1990 
Colorado Springs, CO MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Columbia, MO MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Columbia, SC MSA 1980, 1990 
Columbus, OH MSA 1990, 2000 
Daytona Beach, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Decatur, IL MSA 1980, 1990 
Detroit, MI PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
El Paso, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Fayetteville, NC MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Flint, MI PMSA 1980, 1990 
Florence, SC MSA 1980, 1990 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA 1990, 2000 
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 1980, 1990 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Gainesville, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Galveston-Texas City, TX PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
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 Gary, IN PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Greeley, CO PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, NC MSA 1990, 2000 
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 1990, 2000 
Hamilton-Middletown, OH PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Honolulu, HI MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Houston, TX PMSA 1990, 2000 
Jacksonville, NC MSA 1990, 2000 
Jamestown, NY MSA 1990, 2000 
Jersey City, NJ PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Kenosha, WI PMSA 1980, 1990 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Lancaster, PA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Lincoln, NE MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Lubbock, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Madison, WI MSA 1980, 1990 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX MSA 1990, 2000 
Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Merced, CA MSA 1990, 2000 
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 1990, 2000 
Mobile, AL MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Modesto, CA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Monroe, LA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Montgomery, AL MSA 1980, 2000 
Muncie, IN MSA 1980, 2000 
New York, NY PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Newark, NJ PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Oakland, CA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Olympia, WA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Orange County, CA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 1980, 2000 
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Pueblo, CO MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Racine, WI PMSA 1980, 1990 
Reading, PA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Redding, CA MSA 1990, 2000 
Reno, NV MSA 1980, 2000 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Rochester, MN MSA 1990, 2000 
Sacramento, CA PMSA 1980, 1990 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 1980, 2000 
San Diego, CA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
San Francisco, CA PMSA 1990, 2000 
San Jose, CA PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Sharon, PA MSA 1990, 2000 
South Bend, IN MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Spokane, WA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Springfield, IL MSA 1980, 1990 
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 State College, PA MSA 1990, 2000 
Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Tacoma, WA PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Tucson, AZ MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Tyler, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Ventura, CA PMSA 1990, 2000 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ PMSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA MSA 1990, 2000 
Waco, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA 1980, 1990 
Wichita Falls, TX MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
Yakima, WA MSA 1980, 1990, 2000 
York, PA MSA 1990, 2000 
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 Appendix 3:  
 
Delinquency Scales Utilized in Chapter Four for Twins and 
Nationally-Representative Sub-samples 
 
List of self-reported delinquency items used for twin’s sample 
(based on Haynie 2003; Hannon 2003; Hagan and Foster 2003; Guo et. al 2008) 
 
  
1. In the past 12 months, how often did you use someone else’s credit card , bankcard , 
or automatic teller card without their permission or knowledge? B 
2. In the past 12 months, how often did you hurt someone badly enough in a physical 
fight that he or she needed care from a doctor o r nurse?A 
3. In the past twelve months, how often did take part in a fight in which you were so 
badly injured that you were treated by a doctor or nurse?A 
4. In the past twelve months, how often did you use or threaten to use a weapon to get 
something from someone?A 
5. In the past twelve months, how often did you take part in a physical fight where a 
group of your friends was against another group?A 
6. In the past twelve months, how often did you steal something worth more than $50?B 
7. In the past twelve months, how often did you steal something worth less than $50?B 
8. In the last twelve months, how often did you deliberately damage property that didn’t 
belong to you?B 
9. In the past twelve months how often did you carry a handgun to school or work?A 
10. In the past twelve months, how often did you go into a house or building to steal 
something?B 
11. In the past twelve months, how often did you sell marijuana or other drugs?B 
12. In the past twelve months, how often did you buy, sell, or hold stolen property?B 
13. In the past twelve  months, how often did you deliberately write a bad check?B 
14. In the past twelve months, have you shot or stabbed someone?A 
15.   In the past twelve months, have you pulled a knife or gun on someone?A 
 
AFor this question, positive score values are coded as violent behaviors 
BFor this question, positive scores values are coded as non-violent behaviors 
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List of self-reported delinquency items used for nationally-representative sample 
(based on Haynie 2003; Hannon 2003; Hagan and Foster 2003) 
 
1. In the past 12 months, how often did you use someone else’s credit card, 
bankcard, or automatic teller card without their permission or knowledge? B 
2. In the past 12 months, how often did you hurt someone badly enough in a 
physical fight that he or she needed care from a doctor o r nurse? A 
3. In the past twelve months, how often did take part in a fight in which you were so 
badly injured that you were treated by a doctor or nurse? A 
4. In the past twelve months, how often did you use or threaten to use a weapon to 
get something from someone? A 
5. In the past twelve months, how often did you take part in a physical fight where a 
group of your friends was against another group? A 
6. In the past twelve months, how often did you steal something worth more than 
$50? B 
7. In the past twelve months, how often did you steal something worth less than 
$50? B 
8. In the last twelve months, how often did you deliberately damage property that 
didn’t belong to you? B 
9. In the past twelve months how often did you carry a handgun to school or work? A 
10. In the past twelve months, how often did you go into a house or building to steal 
something? B 
11. In the past twelve months, how often did you sell marijuana or other drugs? B 
12. In the past twelve months, how often did you buy, sell, or hold stolen property? B 
13. In the past twelve months, how often did you deliberately write a bad check? B 
14. In the past twelve months, have you shot or stabbed someone? A 
15. In the past twelve months, have you pulled a knife or gun on someone? A 
 
 
A  PFor this question, positive score values are coded as violent behaviors 
B  For this question, positive scores values are coded as non-violent behaviors.
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